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ABSTRACT
TELECOMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY AND SOVEREIGNTY:
EFFECTS ON STATES AS INFORMATION TRANSFER INCREASED FROM THE
SPEED OF OXCART TO THE SPEED OF LIGHT
James H. Radford
Old Dominion University, 2005
Director: Dr. Steve A.Yetiv

Sovereignty — the absolute and unlimited power o f the state — provides
independence o f action. Information about actions or intentions o f competitors, enemies,
or even friends, arriving after extended periods o f time, resulted in responses to fa it
accompli. When information travels nearly instantaneously, states must consider
potentially rapid international reactions before the fact. This suggests that since a state’s
freedom o f action has been abridged, the nature of their sovereignty has altered.
This study pursues the research question: In what ways does telecommunications
technology affect state sovereignty? The evolution o f sovereignty is compared to
development o f telecommunications technology over four distinct eras, each
characterized by a dominant means o f telecommunications.
The first era (1648 to 1844), serving a control function, covers the period from
Westphalia to introduction of the electromagnetic telegraph. Information moved at the
speed humans could carry it and the concept o f sovereignty manifested in the guise of an
international system o f sovereign European states.
The second era (1845 to 1917) began with introduction o f the telegraph and
concluded when the Zimmerman Telegram was plucked from the electromagnetic ether
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and became an element in the entry o f the US into World War I. At the same time,
sovereignty extended far beyond its original “closed club” o f European states.
Radio, telephone, telegraph, and television dominated information transfer during the
third era (1917 to 1964). Sovereignty extended throughout the world while information
transfer became widespread and nearly instantaneous.
The final era (1965 to present) began with the launch o f the first telephone relay
satellite and telecommunications approached ubiquitous. The international system of
states grew to nearly 200 sovereign entities and took on the status o f the “norm”
throughout the world and “nations” of all types demanded their share o f sovereignty.
Each era compares the development o f information transfer on sovereignty by
examining the dominant mass media, telecommunications systems, state territorial
control, cultural cross-pollenation, and international finance. The sovereignty and the
international system o f sovereign states of Westphalia in 1648 differs from the
sovereignty o f the early twenty-first century but the sovereign state remains an organizing
factor in the international system.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Relationships between widely diverse causes and apparently unrelated effects often
appear incomprehensible to initial observation. This study pursues a similar enigma and
describes a search for, and analysis of, a covariant relationship between
telecommunications technology and national sovereignty. Superficially, connections
between telecommunications and sovereignty might seem as remote as an association
between a small patch o f warm water in the Pacific Ocean and the number and intensity
o f hurricanes in the Atlantic. Superficial observation, however, does not always indicate
an obvious association, or causality, among variables. As revealed by intense study of
weather patterns, periodic appearance of el Nino — a relatively small Pacific region
where water temperature increases by only a few degrees — results in changed weather
patterns in North America and the Atlantic.1 Detecting causality between Pacific water
temperatures and Atlantic weather patterns requires navigating through an extensive
labyrinth o f intervening variables. Similarly, an appropriately focused examination of
telecommunications development reveals the likely existence o f an interesting
relationship to state sovereignty through the addition o f an intervening variable —
information.

This paper follow s the format requirements o f The Chicago M anual o f Style 15th Edition.
'Stanley A. Changnon, “Impacts o f El N ifio’s Weather, ” in E l Nino, 1997-1998: The Climate Event o f
the Century, ed. Stanley A. Changnon, 136-166 (Oxford: University Press, 2000), 145.
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Throughout humanity’s history, information traveled at the speed human beings could
carry it — nominally, and somewhat metaphorically — the speed o f oxcart. In primitive
times, data traveled only via “word o f mouth.” In later eras, the information might be
written on parchment, paper, or some other substrate, or perhaps, committed to memory
but the speed o f human travel still limited the rapidity o f transfer until the nineteenth
century advent o f the electronic telegraph. By the twenty-first century, information
traversed the world in a multitude of formats at velocities up to and including the speed of
light. The volume o f information transferred, the distances traversed, and the depths of
society reached all depended upon telecommunications technology, but more specifically,
it is the information element which holds the primary potential for influence on states
exercising their sovereignty; the underlying technology makes it possible.
Sovereignty is manifested in the international system o f sovereign states which
reached fruition during the seventeenth century when telecommunications did not exist.
Information transfer changed little during the ensuing two centuries. Often, depending on
distance, by the time potentially influential “news” reached a distant state, it had passed
through its natural metamorphosis to become “history.” By contrast, in contemporary
society, the entire world often learns of, and follows, breaking news in “real time”
because o f telecommunications technology which allows immediate transfer and
concurrent wide dissemination o f information. Telecommunications systems — ranging
from the telegraph at its simplest to twenty-first century interconnected computer
networks at a current zenith — have the ability to carry information o f all types over vast
distances and across sovereign territorial borders with little, if any, state supervision or
control. Therefore, information — the rapid exchange o f which is made possible by
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modem advances in telecommunications — emerges as an intervening variable
suggesting the possibility o f association or causality between sovereignty and
telecommunications deserving further study.
Some effect on state sovereignty appears intuitively obvious. How can a notional
state possess and pursue the same degree of sovereignty as previous centuries? Prior to
the telegraph, states learned o f the actions o f other states only as people traveled between
locales. In the “wired” world, with instantaneous and worldwide information transfer,
state actions become known throughout the world, as they occur.
The state’s sovereignty-based pursuit o f security and its place in the international
system o f states receives stimuli to change or evolve from many directions as a result of
telecommunications technology. Information, as an intervening variable, and the
increased speed o f its transfer receives much of the attention and analysis in following
chapters. However, the ability to transfer information in massive quantities, rapidly, with
little if any regard to distance also has secondary and tertiary effects. Developing
international economy, especially in the second half o f the twentieth century, moved
toward a new system based on service, all types o f technology, and information. The new
economic order relied on telecommunications technology to survive and prosper — an
essential element o f the new system was constant, immediate communications among
participants. As it developed, the importance o f territorial control exercised by states
decreased.
Various organizations took on elements of importance by which they claimed a place
as players, if not actors, along side states, in the international system. The intermingled
relationship o f multinational corporations (MNCs), all types o f international
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organizations, and a new financial order required reliable, and constant communications
provided by telecommunications. The impacts on sovereignty from telecommunications
technology-reliant players in the international system also figure in this study and its
analysis.

Research Question and Hypotheses
As a first step, the specific areas for study must be identified in the form o f a research
question on which to base core hypotheses and provide for more complex exploration.
Therefore, a parsimonious interrogative sentence establishing the basis o f all that is to
follow emerges as: In what ways does telecommunications technology affect state
sovereignty?
From the research question, then, basic hypotheses come forth to provide a focus for
investigation around which more complex explanations might be explored. At the core,
this study explores the following hypotheses:
The more telecommunications technology developed, the less states could:
a. Control the passage o f information across their borders.
b. Influence the inflow and outflow o f funds.
c. Limit cultural penetration through foreign influence from MNCs, international
financial institutions, and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) and non
governmental organizations (NGOs).
O f course, a null hypothesis must also be considered in order to establish
falsifiability: State sovereignty is unaffected by telecommunications technology.
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Definitions
Evaluating changes in sovereignty over time and how telecommunications technology
contributed to those changes necessitates the use of a variety o f terms which share
vernacular, technical, and discipline-specific meanings. The most used words on which
the investigation depends, therefore, require specific definitions to clarify their use
throughout this dissertation.
As the central theme, sovereignty requires special clarification. It is a term often used
in mass media vernacular as well as a dominant theme in international relations. It is a
social science term and takes on numerous theoretical nuances and practical
interpretations as well. As a theoretical concept describing and explaining state behavior,
it comprises the primary element in any debate concerning the international system and its
actors.2 It also has more substantial elements. Later discussion (Chapter II) will
establish a more inclusive theoretical basis and interpretation o f the concept, but for the
purpose o f introducing the study’s subject and scope, a simple, introductory political
science definition provides a starting point: “The absolute and unlimited power o f the
state.”3 The context implies “within the borders of the state.” It provides a convenient
framework within which to study the state as the primary actor in the international
system, and by which to analyze state behavior. However, many sovereign state actions
remain tacit and unacknowledged in such a simplistic definition. Further study requires a
definition which acknowledges the scope of sovereignty while maintaining succinct and

2Sohail H. Hashmi, “Introduction,” in State Sovereignty: Change an d P ersistence in International
Relations, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi, 1-14 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 4.
3Andrew Heywood, P olitical Theory: An Introduction (London: St. Martin’s, 1999), 90.
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parsimonious limits; it must acknowledge both the nature o f sovereignty and the
sovereign state to which it refers.
Sovereignty divides into two categories, both of which must be included in any
definition. Internal sovereignty is the absolute and unlimited power o f the state within its
territorial boundaries. External sovereignty is the state’s place in the international
system.4 The 1933 Montevideo Convention on Rights and Duties o f States defined a
sovereign state under the context of international law as containing four essential
elements: Defined geographical territory; a population identified with the state; a
functioning, sovereign government recognized by other sovereign governments within the
international system; and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.5
Therefore, a working definition must include both internal and external elements of
sovereignty. Internally, it is the state’s ability to control activities that are nominally or
juridically subject to authoritative decisions,6 with that realm o f control defined by
territory wherein a stable government exercises final authority.7 External sovereignty
requires recognition by other actors in the international system. A working definition of

“Ibid., 92-97.
5Hurst Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accom m odation o f Conflicting
Rights (Philadelphia: University o f Pennsylvania Press, 1990), 16.
6Janice E. Thomson and Stephen K. Krasner, “Global Transactions and the Consolidation o f
Sovereignty,” in G lobal Changes an d Theoretical Challenges: Approaches to World Politics f o r the 1990s,
ed. Emst-Otto Czempiel and James N. Rosenau, 195-219 (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1989), 195196.
’Ibid., 197.
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sovereignty then emerges as: “Recognition by internal and external actors that the state
has the exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within its territory.”8
In conjunction with sovereignty, several other terms appear throughout the ensuing
discussion. As a foundation for discussion, the following definitions apply, unless
otherwise expanded or elaborated upon.
Reference to the state, always implies sovereign state. Political science definitions of
the state generally require it to be composed o f three elements: a functioning sovereign
government, a population, and territorial limits.9 Often, a fourth element is added to a
state’s minimum requirements — the acceptance of sovereign status by other states which
includes the ability to enter into international agreements (treaties). This appears inherent
to the sovereign government rather than a separate element o f the definition. The state
and sovereignty are, therefore, inextricably linked but not necessarily synonymous. Since
the sovereign government forms an essential element o f the state, anything that affects the
government’s pursuit of its absolute and unlimited power may be said to have an impact
on sovereignty. Constitutions exist to limit the government’s use and abuse of power and
prevent any individual or institution from gaining total control; this effect on sovereignty
is internal to the state and exceeds the scope o f the study at hand. It is the external
influences on the government’s pursuit and exercise o f sovereignty that are o f concern
and interest.

8Janice E. Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations: Bridging the Gap Between Theory
and Empirical Research,” International Studies Quarterly 39, no. 2 (1995): 219.
9Joshua. S. Goldstein, International Relations (New York: Longman, 1999), 11.
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Specific differentiation between the government and the state requires some
additional refinement for the purpose o f discussion and analysis. Various elements of
power provide a framework by which to explain the state as it is used throughout the
following chapters. The political entity defined by territory, population, and government,
taken as a whole is often referred to in vernacular as the land, the nation, or the country.
It represents a synergistic amalgamation of natural resources, the population and its
collective individual assets, along with a combination o f “hard” and “soft” power. Hard
power consists o f economic and military might which holds the potential to coerce,
threaten, or induce cooperation by the resident population or other participants within the
international system. Soft power, on the other hand, uses culture, values, and ideas
convince others o f the validity of or need for cooperation.10
Policies and responses to threats, both foreign and domestic, are developed and
executed not by the geographically-defined political element as a whole, but by the
government. As an actor in the international system the specific state, and the state power
it exercises, represent that portion o f the total power which can be extracted by decision
makers and used to achieve their ends. State intentions are shaped by capabilities, but
state structure limits the amount o f power available to decision makers." The exercise of
domestic sovereignty, as a result, has internal limits determined by domestic structures,
constitutions, and institutions. This study focuses on the exercise o f sovereignty as
manifested in the employment of state power.

10 Joseph S. N ye Jr., The Paradox o f American Power: Why the W orld’s Only Superpower C a n ’t Go It
Alone (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), 9-10.
"Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins o f A m erica's W orld Role (Princeton,
NJ: University Press, 1998), 9.
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The term nation often appears in popular vernacular as synonymous with state or
country. However, when used herein, the term refers only to a grouping o f people with
shared characteristics such as language, culture, or historical heritage.12
A dictionary definition adequately describes telecommunications technology, a rather
straight forward technical term: The science and technology o f transmitting information,
as words, sounds, or images, over great distances, in the form o f electromagnetic signals,
as by telegraph, telephone, radio, or television.13 [Italic emphasis added.]
Telecommunications technology allows the electromagnetic “connection” of
geographically diverse points. That, in itself, results in little impact on any body politic.
However, establishing such connections allows nearly instantaneous exchange of
information, which also requires a working definition. In this case, information is
simply: a collection o f facts, data, numbers, and symbols that have meaning.14 When
considering the movement of information, two elements must be considered. First, the
transfer o f information from one place to another constitutes nothing more than people or
institutions “learning” or becoming aware of information which originated some distance
away. Distribution, on the other hand, represents the depth or breadth o f the population
becoming aware o f information, akin to publication or broadcast, by way o f examples.
For the purpose o f investigating the validity o f hypotheses, information may be
viewed in its modern sense as an abstract commodity, traveling at nearly instantaneous

12Hans J. Morgenthau, P olitics among Nations: The Struggle fo r P ow er an d P eace (New York: Alfred
A. Knopf, 1967), 97.
13Random House W ebster's Electronic D ictionary and Thesaurus, C ollege Edition, 1999, s.v.
“Telecommunications.”
14Information A ge D ictionary. (Overland Park, KS: Intertec Publishing, 1992), s.v. “Information.”
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speeds, and over which the state often may exercise little control or supervision. As a
result, state actions often become known throughout the international system instantly.
Purely domestic decisions must be made with consideration for international
ramifications, begging the question: Does increasing the speed, breadth, and depth of
information transfer cause states to alter their behavior? If so, it could be said that states’
pursuit o f sovereignty has been attenuated since they find themselves obligated to
consider the international system when dealing with domestic situations where sovereign
power would be, theoretically, absolute.

Purpose o f Research and Importance of the Question
The foregoing discussion o f sovereignty, information, and telecommunications
indicates the likelihood o f an interesting association between telecommunications
technology and state sovereignty. Pursuit o f answers to the research question, “In what
ways does telecommunications technology affect state sovereignty?” promises a positive
contribution to political science’s common body o f knowledge.
The sovereign state continues to play a significant role in the international system, but
manifestation o f the theory — the sovereign state — appears to be in transition. States
still exist, but the sovereignty under which they operate in the international system is not
identical to the concept as it emerged in 1648. Virtually all theories o f international
relations start with the foundation o f the sovereign state as the primary element of the
international system. Realism, the basis o f comparison from which other theories
establish their explanations o f the international system, focuses on states’ pursuit of
power and regards states as the dominant, if not the only actors in the international
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system.15 Neo-realism concentrates on the structures and distribution o f power but
maintains the primary importance of sovereign states in the international system.16
Various other theoretical approaches regard the state with less dominance or primacy, but
still acknowledge its importance as an organizing element in the international system.
Liberalism, in general, extends the focus of the international system beyond the state,
through organizations and institutions, on to the level o f individuals.17
Therefore, the future o f sovereignty is o f primary importance to the common body of
knowledge — both theoretical and practical. Telecommunications technology, enabling
the massive and instantaneous exchange of information, has evolved so rapidly that it is
often referred to as a “revolution.” 18 The potential interaction o f these two subject areas,
which might seem diverse and unconnected, deserves serious inquiry to examine in what
ways telecommunications technology affects state sovereignty.

Methodology
Concerted and scholarly analysis o f sovereignty presents significant challenges to the
researcher. Ideally, and wherever possible, the research effort would rely on statistical or
experimental methods.19 Sovereignty, as an abstract concept, does not lend itself to

l5Morgenthau, P olitics among Nations, 25.
l6Kenneth N. Waltz, Theory o f International Politics (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 95.
l7Michael W. D oyle and G. John Ikenberry, “Introduction: The End o f the Cold War, the Classical
Tradition, and International Change,” in N ew Thinking in International Relations Theory, ed. Michael W.
Doyle and G. John Ikenberry, 1-19 (Boulder, CO: W estview, 1997), 12.
l8Joseph S. N ye Jr., Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature o f American P ow er (New York: Basic,
1991), 8.
l9Arend Lijphart, “Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method,” Am erican P olitical Science
Review 65, no. 3 (1971): 685.
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empirical operationalization; there are no “units of sovereignty.” As a result, comparative
and case study methods offer more promising potential for analysis.
Statistical methods apply when the subject of investigation involves many cases.
Case studies apply analysis to a single case with multiple embedded variables, where the
comparative method involves relatively few, but at least two, cases.20 This study’s
research question — In what ways does telecommunications technology affect state
sovereignty? — suggests sovereignty and telecommunications as variables and
incorporates many inferences to the passage of time. Further investigation, therefore,
indicates a comparative method
An objective look at the history of sovereignty and the sovereign state provide several
significant points o f reference by which to separate different eras under study starting
with sovereignty’s “origins.” Sovereignty did not materialize by means o f spontaneous
incarnation. It was the manifestation o f a long process o f social evolution by which
feudal society gave way to sovereign states as the international system’s primary
organizing factor. Tied to the 1648 treaties o f Osnabruck and Munster, the Peace of
Westphalia marked the cessation of hostilities in the Thirty Years War and an
acknowledgment among Europe’s states that they were free to operate independently and
without interference from each other, or more specifically, from the Roman Catholic
Church.21 The year 1648, therefore, marks a convenient point at which to specify the
commencement of sovereignty and its associated system of sovereign states.

20Ibid., 691.
21Daniel Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction and Brief History,” Journal o f International Affairs
48, no. 2 (1995): 358.
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Sovereignty has provided the primary organizing element to the international system
for more than 350 years. Throughout much o f that time, information moved at the speed
humans could carry it. The telegraph emerged in 1845 and since then, a worldwide
network developed to a level inconceivable even to the most fertile imaginations of
previous centuries. Beginning with the telegraph, various technological advancements
frequently and rapidly emerged and then receded into obsolescence when replaced by
another, faster, more efficient means of information transfer. A concerted examination
into the effects o f telecommunications technology on sovereignty would appear
particularly apropos for case study. However, the effects of various technological
innovations on sovereignty over more than three centuries exceeds the appropriate time
parameters o f a single case study.
Systematic examination o f historical data has long established foundations for
theories o f political science, but lessons o f history often lack consistency.22 Comparison
of changes in states’ practice o f sovereignty necessitates an investigation with particular
attention to differences over time. John Stewart Mill provides a starting point by which
to frame the study with his presentation of comparative method o f difference.23 History
can not be altered in order to study international society with and without the influence of

“ Alexander L. George, “Case Studies and Theory Development: The Method o f Structured, Focused
Comparison,” in Diplom acy: N ew Approaches in History, Theory, and P olicy, ed. Paul Gordon Lauren, 4368 (New York: Free Press, 1979), 44.
“ John Stuart Mill, Philosophy o f Scientific M ethod (1881; repr., N ew York: Hafner Publishing, 1950),
214.
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telecommunications. Therefore, some improvisation becomes necessary to maintain valid
methodology through diachronic application.24
Application o f history to political theory — especially a broad theory such as
telecommunications technology’s effect on state sovereignty — requires multiple
historical cases in order to account for inconsistencies and anomalies. Introduction of
multifarious cases necessitates a single, structured, analytical framework by which to
identify conditions and variables affecting historical outcomes.
Providing structure to the research agenda requires organizing the study into distinct
cases which can then be compared across time. Conscientious adherence to good research
techniques further requires that each case, as a unit o f observation, must be identically
defined and logically connected with the research question.25
By separating the period under investigation into multiple eras, the dominant means
o f telecommunications technology provides logical definition to the structure. The
comparative method allows for an analysis of the impacts on state sovereignty during
each era, in direct concert with the research question.
“Structured, focused comparison,” proposed by Alexander George, furnishes a
framework by which to explore the research question. The procedure resembles
statistical methods except for the number o f cases; the population (number o f case

“ Steve A. Yetiv, A m erica and the Persian Gulf: The Third P arty Dimension in World Politics
(Westport, CN: Praeger, 1995), 160.
“ Paul Pennings, Hans Keman, and Jan Kliennijenhuis, D oing Research in P olitical Science: An
Introduction to Com parative M ethods an d Statistics (London: Sage, 1999), 10.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

15

studies), n, is too small to allow correlations, but permits control for anomalies incurred
when analyzing both historical and contemporary examples o f state behavior.26
The use o f structured, focused, comparison requires development o f “classes of
events” — periods in history identifiable by coherent characteristics — in which to study
the independent variables (available telecommunications technology). Then, effects on
the dependent variable (sovereignty) may be evaluated under a degree o f control.27 In this
study, four periods o f history emerge, each logically defined by a significant, dominant
telecommunications technology.
As a starting point, a “control” era allows evaluation of sovereignty at a time when
telecommunications technology was nonexistent. Transfer o f information was
accomplished via the physical transport of the written word, on parchment, vellum, paper
or other similar substrate at the speed o f human travel. Subsequent eras each center on a
dominant means o f telecommunications.
In succinct terms, this study examines the impact of telecommunications
technology on sovereignty. It does so by comparing the dominant means of
telecommunications technology with state sovereignty across four different chronological
eras. A principal means o f telecommunications technology dominates and defines each
era, except the first which is a “control group” during which no technological advance in
telecommunications was at play. Within each era, dominant mass media, primary means
o f telecommunications technology, the states’ control o f territory, cultural cross
pollination, and international finance are examined in concert with the effects of

26George, “Case Studies and Theory Development,” 49-50.
27Ibid., 50.
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telecommunications technology thereon. This allows an exploration o f the impact o f such
technological advances within one era and over time. The following four
“Telecommunications Technology Eras” are used in this study:
T0, “The Age o f [News] Paper,” 1648 - 1844, establishes a baseline for the study of
sovereignty. The period defines an era predating electronic telecommunications
when information transfer required physical conveyance at the speed humans
could carry it. Information distribution, on the other hand, was exploiting the
benefits of movable type printing manifest in the growth o f newspapers. This
epoch, which commences with the emergence o f the concept o f Westphalian
states and associated sovereignty, is a “control group.”
T„ “The Age o f Telegraph,” 1845 - 1916 is defined by the nineteenth century
technological environment in which the telegraph and fledgling telephone systems
provided telecommunications service. During this era, the sovereign nation-state
concept reached its apogee reenforcing the Concert o f Europe. The era ended
with the entry of radio telegraph to the telecommunications environment.
T2, “The Age of Radio and Cable,” 1917 - 1964 including half o f the twentieth
century, saw the combined capabilities o f cable synergistically uniting with
“wireless” radio technology to supply increasingly flexible and nearly
instantaneous transfer o f information. The time frame encompasses post-World
War I telecommunications advances coincident with a new outlook toward
sovereignty by states. It continues through the post-World War II and Cold War
environments where the concepts underlying sovereignty reflected significant
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changes in response to expansion of the number o f states participating in the
international system.
T3, “The Age of Ubiquitous Communications” 1965 - the present, illustrates the
technological situation when satellite communications introduced a vertical
element to telecommunications and sovereignty. Connectivity among electronic
devices approached universality. This period brings new expectations to the
concept of sovereignty with growing influence o f international organizations.
The complete study centers not on any particular state, geographic region, or issue
area, although sovereignty emerged in Europe with an initial international structure which
eventually evolved into the worldwide system o f sovereign states. Rather, the goal is to
obtain a sense of the general impact of telecommunications on state sovereignty over
time. While single case studies might prove useful, this approach, with its broad time
horizon, will help in the examination and explanation o f broader trends. Further, the end
product will provide new insight to the impact of postmodern telecommunications on the
future of state sovereignty.

Literature Review
A survey o f literature related to the research question yields a vast assortment of
related writings across multiple disciplines, most notably political science, technology,
and history. A rich and mature body of literature surrounds the concept o f sovereignty,
the dependent variable. Telecommunications technology, the independent variable, was
well documented throughout its development as a scientific discipline. Effects on society
as a result o f telecommunications enabled information, the intervening variable, have
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received some scholarly attention as well, but specific attention to possible covariance
between sovereignty and telecommunications technology remains inconclusive. The
following sections show that much evaluation has been accomplished on both sovereignty
and telecommunications technology, but very little, if any, book length work has been
done on the causal link between the two.

Sovereignty
The theory, history, and implementation o f sovereignty, as the dependent variable, all
apply directly to the research question and testing o f hypotheses. Various theories of
international relations concentrating on the sovereign state were thoroughly addressed as
early as Thucydides.28 Hugo Grotius expanded the concept in the seventeenth century.29
Hans J. Morgenthau anchored sovereignty to the twentieth century in Politics among
Nations: The Struggle fo r Power and Peace.30 Kenneth Waltz and the 1979 publication
o f the Theory o f International Politics31 further expanded the importance o f sovereign
states to the international system. Ken Booth suggested the necessity o f a firm theoretical
foundation based on actual states rather than textbook notions.32 Steven Krasner’s 1999

28Thucydides, The H istory o f the Peloponnesian War, ed. and trans. Richard Crawley (New York:
Dutton, 1950).
29Hedley Bull, “The Importance o f Grotius in the Study o f International Relations,” in Hugo Grotius
and International Relations, ed. Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, 1-65 (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1990), 42.
30Morgenthau, P olitics among Nations.
31Waltz, Theory o f International Politics.
32Ken Booth, “Dare N ot to Know: International Relations Theory Versus the Future,” in International
Relations Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith, 328-350 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1995), 335.
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Sovereignty: Organized Hypocrisy, continued the revision and discussion o f applicability
o f the sovereign state to contemporary society by exploring the divergence between the
theory and practice of sovereignty.33
The literature dedicated to sovereignty is extensive and represents a mature element of
the discipline. Various authors challenge the concept’s basis and continued utility, others
insist it is either dead or about to expire. O f particular interest, however, is the debate on
the future o f sovereignty and the erosion, changes, or perhaps metamorphosis o f the
concept from the classic Westphalian model to its present transitional state. Reasons
which might underpin reductions in sovereignty pertain to the research question even if
general in nature. Jens Bartelson argued in A Genealogy o f Sovereignty that the idea is
not a solid concept rooted in cohesive theoretical doctrine. Rather, sovereignty is
dependent on interpretations o f cultural, political, and historical data for the specific era
under consideration.34 Bartelson’s interpretation was particularly valuable as
telecommunications’ influence enters the discourse. Dramatic developments in
technology have far reaching impacts on society, and sovereignty receives its share of
repercussions.
C.

E. Merriam, Jr., in History o f the Theory o f Sovereignty Since Rousseau, looked at

ideas o f “concurrent sovereignty” peculiar to federal societies. He made specific use of

“ Stephen D. Krasner, Sovereignty: O rganized H ypocrisy (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1999), 237238.
34Jens Bartelson, A G enealogy o f Sovereignty (Cambridge: University Press, 1995), 38.
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the US model as an essential element and guiding principle for IGOs which develop
supranational identities such as the European Union (EU).35
John Hoffman, in Beyond the State, attempted to define the sovereign state with
regard to its development and look toward an evolutionary end point.36 Later, in
Sovereignty, he challenged the generally accepted inextricability o f the link between
sovereignty and the state. He suggested that severing the link would allow the concept of
sovereignty to be defined “properly” and reformulated.37
Hedley Bull, examined at the anarchical system o f sovereign states in The
Anarchical Society: A Study o f Order in World Politics, and concluded that the concept
system was fundamental to world order and in no danger o f decline.38 Hideaki Shinoda,
in a later, similar examination, Re-Examining Sovereignty: From Classical Theory to the
Global Age, deconstructed sovereignty’s structure and emphasized culture as the focus for
study rather than direct ties to the state.39 Gidion Gottlieb, also investigated culture,
specifically ethnicity, but as a possible cause for sovereignty’s decline in Nation Against
State: A New Approach to Ethnic Conflicts and the Decline o f Sovereignty.40

35Merriam, C. E. Jr., H istory o f the Theory o f Sovereignty Since Rousseau (N ew York: Columbia
University Press, 1900), 185.
36John Hoffinan, B eyond the State: An Introductory Critique (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 1995).
37John Hoffman, Sovereignty (Buckingham, UK: Open University Press, 1998).
38Hedley Bull, The Anarchical Society: A Study o f O rder in World P olitics (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1977), 17.
39Hideaki Shinoda, Re-Examining Sovereignty: From Classical Theory to the G lobal A ge (London:
Macmillan, 2000), 153.
40Gidon Gottlieb, N ation Against State: A N ew Approach to Ethnic Conflicts an d the Decline o f
Sovereignty (N ew York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1993).
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A cornerstone o f the international system o f sovereign states establishes the equality
o f actors in the system as opposed to great power primacy. Robert A. Klein, in Sovereign
Equality Among States: The History o f an Idea, examines the transition from great
power primacy to a point where he envisions states to be endowed with human-like
personality. Similar to legal personality in theories o f law, this (ideally) would result in a
true equality of states, whether great or small.41 The idea o f equality” can extend to the
availability o f telecommunications assets driving similar conclusions.
Sovereignty’s demise — imminent or eventual — occupied a significant position in
the scholarly literature during the second half of the twentieth century. Francis H.
Hinsley’s, Sovereignty, took on a reexamination o f the concept and predicted continued
value and utility o f the concept to the international system.42 His idea was further
developed by Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis o f International Society. He
supports the idea that sovereignty has been an organizing principle o f the international
system and continues to be desirable to much o f the world.43 James also edited States in a
Changing World: A Contemporary Analysis in concert with Robert H. Jackson, wherein
articles by numerous authors examined the sovereign state and pointed toward change but
not demise to the concept o f sovereign states,44 which has likely parallels to the impact o f
telecommunications technology.

‘"Robert A. Klein, Sovereign Equality among States: The H istory o f an Idea (Toronto: University
Press, 1974).
42Francis H. Hinsley, Sovereignty (London: C. A. Watts, 1966).
43Alan James, Sovereign Statehood: The Basis o f International Society (London: Allen and Unwin,
1986), 278.
44Robert H. Jackson and Alan James ed., States in a Changing World: A Contem porary Analysis
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 28.
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Maryann K. Cusimano, edited Beyond Sovereignty: Issues fo r a Global Agenda, in
which ten chapter authors examined effects of globalization on sovereignty.45 This
provided new criteria for examining the future relevance of sovereignty.
One often predicted death knell to sovereignty comes from the deepening of
intergovernmental organization ties which are often enhanced, or even made possible by
telecommunications technology. Geir Lundestad, “Empire ” By Integration: the United
States and European Integration, 1945-1997, followed the deepening ties o f the
European Common Market beginning in the 1950s. Americans, generally, encouraged
Europeans to surrender sovereignty to their integrated program, but the US found no
sympathy in any arrangement reducing its own sovereignty.46
Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: How Ideas Shaped Modern
International Relations, asserts that the concept of sovereignty and its associated system
o f states came about as a result o f the combined influence of the Protestant Reformation
and ideas o f nationalism and equality which brought an end to colonial empires.47 He
concluded that sovereignty, in some form, was a natural state. The idea that sovereignty
occupies a place in humanity’s catalog of natural rights was also explored in Hurst
Hannum’s, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination: The Accommodation o f
Conflicting Rights.48

45Maryann K. Cusimano, ed., B eyond Sovereignty: Issues f o r a G lobal Agenda (Bedford, MA: St.
Martin’s, 2000).
46Geir Lundestad, “Em pire" by Integration: The United States and European Integration, 1945-1997
(Oxford: University Press, 1998), 148-149.
47Daniel Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty: H ow Ideas Shaped M odern International Relations
(Princeton, NJ: University Press, 2001), 5.
48Hannum, Autonomy, Sovereignty, and Self-Determination, 15.
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Cynthia Weber, in Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State and Symbolic
Exchange also attempted to reach a new view o f sovereignty. She deconstructed the
concept from its basic tenets, followed its historical development through to the twentieth
century, and concluded that it is an abstract concept without a concrete antecedent; more
of a code of state behavior than a theory explaining actions.49
The relevant and dominant literature surrounding sovereignty yields little consensus
but provides valuable parallel examples. Neither the historical, current, nor the future
sovereign state commands any agreement among international relations scholars as to its
origin or evolutionary endpoint.

Technological Revolution
This study concentrates on telecommunications technology and its association with
sovereignty. However, telecommunications is not the only technology with likely
impacts on state sovereignty and the work done to consider other technological impact
deserves attention in pursuit o f influence, association, and causality. A century after
Westphalia, the Industrial Revolution and its associated technological developments
began to influence the system o f sovereign states. The Industrial Revolution’s
development was constrained, or perhaps even stagnated, by the limited speed o f human
(and therefore, information) movement. A business driven desire for increased speed of
information exchange among businesses in divergent sovereign states, especially financial
data, was the “mother” necessity driving its “child” invention. As early as 1776, Adam

49Cynthia Weber, Simulating Sovereignty: Intervention, the State, an d Sym bolic Exchange (Cambridge:
University Press, 1995).
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Smith in The Wealth o f Nations attempted to evaluate and explain the economic order
emerging from the fledgling years of the Industrial Revolution. He discussed the duties
o f “the sovereign” in protecting the society from injustice, oppression, violence and
invasion by other independent societies.50 Smith’s concern focused on sovereign duties
rather than on the concept of sovereignty. However, his pursuit o f the free market in
opposition to entrenched mercantilism developed tacit requirements for the economic
community to expand beyond geographic (and therefore, sovereign) borders. Further
expansion, placing more distance between centers o f commerce, further drove the desire
for more speed in communications. By advocating an end to national preoccupation with
amassing precious metals and encouraging reliance on international trade, Smith’s
philosophy focused on a path toward industrial nations with interdependence surrounding
export and import o f raw materials as well as finished products. States lost control of
some elements of their economic community. Therefore, domestic political and
economic decisions required consideration o f elements beyond geographic boundaries.
States’ absolute and unlimited authority within their borders had become, to some degree,
limited. Domestic economic and political situations and repercussions crossed
international borders.
Intrusion on national sovereignty by Industrial Revolution technology paled in
comparison to the results o f twentieth century scientific developments. Alvin Toffler
examined the effects o f rapid industrial and technological changes on society in general,
including both the individual and the family. In particular, he emphasized the

50Adam Smith, An Inquiry into the Nature and Causes o f the Wealth o f Nations (1776; repr., Chicago:
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952), 301.
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overwhelming nature o f technology. While the Future Shock discussion included
elements o f electronic communication, it was primarily addressed in its mass media
guise.51 Toffler concentrated on generic technology and society’s reaction; he did not,
specifically, address sovereignty. However, Toffler’s work established an interesting
foundation from which to launch an investigation o f changes to sovereignty as
specifically induced by telecommunications technology.
In a later volume, The Third Wave, Toffler expanded his investigation o f technologysociety affiliation. He forecasted society’s future based on “waves” o f development. The
“First Wave” commenced when hunter-gatherer tribes gave way to organized agricultural
production around

B.C.

8000. It was the dominant foundation o f society until the last half

o f the seventeenth century. The onset o f the Industrial Revolution began the “Second
Wave” which saw life in Europe and America revolutionized through industrialization. It
lasted until the mid-twentieth century when white collar and service workers in the US
outnumbered blue collar workers for the first time. The Second Wave subsequently
arrived at other industrialized nations at differing times. The contemporary “Third
Wave” represented the collision o f obsolete, encrusted economies and institutions of the
Second Wave with new technology.52
The term “Information Revolution” emerged in mass media during the 1990s to
describe the expansive impacts o f information on sovereignty, culture, and society in
general.53 The term describes changes brought on by a synergistic union o f

5lAlvin Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam, 1970), 5.
52Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave: The Classic Study o f Tomorrow (New York: Bantam, 1980), 13-14.
53N ye, Bound to Lead.
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communications and computing technologies which transmit and process information; the
two seemingly separate disciplines have actually merged to the point where a dividing
line between the two becomes indistinguishable.54 Numerous authors, especially in the
mass market press, have addressed the impact of the Information Revolution on states and
their sovereignty, but not under the restraints of a structured, focused comparison.55
Succinct, direct examination o f telecommunications technology and sovereignty
throughout the existence of both, while on the periphery of many discourses, remains
elusive.
Information theory, as a scientific discipline, actually began with C. E. Shannon’s
1948 publication o f “A Mathematical Theory o f Communication.”56 About the same
time, the transistor and prototypes of the modem computer also came to fruition.
However, information without the enabling factor o f telecommunications had existed and
influenced history far longer, as discussed by Daniel Headrick in When Information Came
o f Age: Technologies o f Knowledge in the Age o f Reason and Revolution, 1700-1850,57

54Walter. B. Wriston, The Twilight o f Sovereignty: How the Information Revolution is Transforming
Our World (Bridgewater, NJ: Replica Books, 1992), 2-3.
55Anthony Smith, G oodbye Gutenberg: The N ew spaper Revolution o f the 1980's (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1980); John B. Thompson, “The Trade in N ew s,” in Communication in History:
Technology, Culture, Society, ed. David Crowley and Paul Heyer, 118-122 (N ew York: Longman, 1999);
Raymond Vernon, Sovereignty at Bay: The M ultinational Spread o f U.S. Enterprises (N ew York: Basic,
1971); Per Magnus Wijkman, “Managing the Global Commons,” International Organization 36, no. 3,
(1982): 511-536; Wriston, The Twilight o f Sovereignty.
56C. E. Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory o f Communication,” The B ell System Technical Journal 27,
no. 3 (1948): 379-656.
57Daniel R. Headrick, When Information Came o f Age: Technologies o f Knowledge in the A ge o f
Reason an d Revolution, 1700-1850 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
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Gerald Sussman directly addressed technological impacts on society with
Communications, Technology, and Politics in the Information Age.58 Although not
directly evaluating sovereignty, Anthony G. Wilhelm studied the problems of
“cyberspace” on democratic processes in Democracy in the Digital Age: Challenges to
Political Life in Cyberspace.59
Walter B. Wriston looked more closely at telecommunications technology,
information, and the international system in The Twilight o f Sovereignty: How the
Information Revolution is Transforming Our World.69 Although targeted to a mass
market audience, he made a contribution to the subject’s literature by addressing the
influence o f information and knowledge on society’s development. W. Russell Neuman,
Lee McKnight, and Richard J. Solomon carried a similar approach with The Gordian
Knot: Political Gridlock on the Information Highway f

They studied the ever expanding

access to information created by the Internet and associated technologies and evaluated
impacts on political society.
In Masters o f the Wired World: Cyberspace Speaks Out, Anne Leer compiled brief
articles by notable celebrities on the world stage — Prime Minister Tony Blair, Vice
President A1 Gore, Arthur C. Clarke, and many more — mostly praising the new world

58Gerald Sussman, Communication, Technology, and Politics in the Information A ge (Thousand Oaks,
CA: Sage, 1997).
59Anthony G. Wilhelm, D em ocracy in the D igital Age: Challenges to P olitical Life in Cyberspace
(New York: Routledge, 2000).
60Wriston, The Twilight o f Sovereignty.
61W. Russell Neuman, Lee McKnight, and Richard J. Solomon, The G ordian Knot: P olitical Gridlock
on the Information H ighway (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
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order where telecommunications technology permits, and the dependent society often
demands, nearly universal interconnection among all elements o f world society.62
Technology affecting projection of national power develops military interest, of
course. Under sponsorship o f the National Defense University, David C. Gompert
published Right Makes Might: Freedom and Power in the Information Age.63 He
developed information and its effective use as an essential element o f power.
Carl J. Couch combined the disciplines to evaluate the social context o f information
and associated technologies in Information Technologies and Social Orders.64 Michael
Dertouzos evaluated similar subjects and made predictions about future effects in What
Will Be: How the New World o f Information Will Change Our L ives66 Ithiel de Sola Pool
went on to challenge the territorial nature of sovereignty and technology which can not be
geographically confined in Technologies without Boundaries: On Telecommunications in
a Global Age.66 These investigations provide an initial glimpse at alternatives to the
sovereign state.

62Anne Leer, ed., M asters o f the Wired World: Cyberspace Speaks Out (London: Financial Times
Management, 1999).
63David C. Gompert, Right M akes Might: Freedom and P ow er in the Information A ge (Washington,
DC: National Defense University, 1998).
64Carl J. Couch, Information Technologies and Social O rders (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1996).
“ Michael Dertouzos, What Will Be: How the N ew World o f Information Will Change Our Lives (San
Francisco: Harper Collins, 1998).
“ Ithiel de Sola Pool, Technologies without Boundaries: On Telecommunications in a G lobal Age
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990).
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Alternative Basis fo r the Sovereign State
If technology, or any other source of influence, “threatens” the existence of the
sovereign state, possible alternatives must be addressed. Without some means of
organizing international society — currently met by sovereignty — the alternative is
chaos. Theorists predicting an end to the state and its associated sovereignty, generate a
question: if not the sovereign state, what? Technological impact, although not
specifically telecommunications technology, on the sense o f community, addressed by
Toffler in Future Shock, entered the Third Wave discussion as well. Acknowledging the
synergistic nature o f information combined with telecommunications, Toffler developed a
case for communities which are not based on geographic collocation or cultural affinity
(the classic “nation” o f the “nation-state”). Rather, computer networks, organized on
functional lines, could give rise to “telecommunities.” His proposition would not
necessarily depersonalize society, as is often predicted in techno-phobic arguments.
Rather, he predicted such future possibilities as telecommuting which might diminish
face-to-face contact among workers, but increase direct family time available due to
drastic reduction in commuting requirements.67 The 1980 publication o f Third Wave, as
computers were still relatively new, and nearly non-existent in the home market, made
predictions o f such ideas as telecommuting and telecommunities somewhat revolutionary.
The nation-state could find its national identity in danger if citizens should develop an
affinity more aligned with the telecommunity than traditional ideas o f the cultural nation.
The concept o f telecommunities, and the effect on national sovereignty developed
further after the computer and supporting telecommunications became readily available.

67Toffler, The Third Wave, 372.
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At a 1995 Conference on Communications Technology and National Sovereignty in the
Global Economy, George Bugliarello presented a paper addressing technological impacts
on sovereignty. Under classical evaluation, political power and economic power share
the same boundaries which are normally defined by geographic borders o f nation-states.
Telecommunications give rise to telecommunities, similar to those proposed 15 years
earlier by Toffler. Bugliarello further suggested that telecommunities are prone to foster
elements o f sovereignty68 which develop at the expense o f nation-states.
Telecommunities are not the only possible institutions addressed in the literature
which augment, complement, or even potentially replace the nation-state. Richard
Rosecrance, in The Rise o f the Trading State proposed the impact o f international trade
on nation-states. Rather than geographically defined nation-states, future, state-like
international organizations might be expected to emerge based on trade based blocks.69
While not directly related to telecommunications, Rosecrance acknowledged the
contribution o f generic communications, especially transportation, to the interdependence
generated by trade. He suggested that the combined capabilities o f manufacturing,
transport, and telecommunications to facilitate complex financial actions allows states to
project influence which might establish a situation where sovereignty could actually
expand. As states amplify their influence in the absence o f conquest, interdependence is
a natural outgrowth and indicates a situation germane to the reduction o f sovereignty.
Such a situation invites further investigation into the actual, net effects on sovereignty.

68George Bugliarello, “Telecommunications, Politics, Economics, and National Sovereignty: A N ew
Game,” Technology in Society 18, no. 4 (1996): 404.
69Richard Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading State: Com merce and Conquest in the M odern World
(New York: Basic, 1986), 217.
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An extended analogy to analyze the similar effects o f telecommunications requires little
inventiveness. Modem trade relationships rely on the near instantaneous nature of
electronic fiscal transactions. Telecommunications’ ability to penetrate the most isolated
geographic regions o f territorially based sovereignty extend the influence o f technology
beyond conventional definitions of both communications and transportation. Rosecrance
further developed economics and trade as a focus for the state versus sovereignty in The
Rise o f the Virtual State: Wealth and Power in the Coming Century™
Hendrik Spruyt argued in The Sovereign State and Its Competitors that the sovereign
state was not necessarily an inevitable development following the demise o f feudalism
and contemporary developments may lead to different factors providing organization to
the international system.71 A particular element likely to influence future development o f
the international system results from requirements for states to cooperate to accomplish
the tasks required in a technologically complex world. This gives rise to theories of
functionalism.

Functionalism
Among the international influences of technology are the requirements to cooperate in
application and use o f equipment, programs and systems. If states desire their
international mail to be delivered, they must agree to mutual mail delivery procedures. If
they desire interconnection o f telegraph, telephone, or computer networks,

70Richard Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Virtual State: Wealth an d P ow er in the Coming Century (New
York: Basic, 1999).
7lHendrik Spruyt, The Sovereign State and Its Com petitors (Princeton, NJ: University Press, 1996).
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interoperability standards must be agreed and implemented. Such functional
requirements can be construed as agreements by states to surrender o f some degree of
their sovereignty and therefore offer a possible link in the telecommunications and
sovereignty causality chain under consideration in this study. International requirements
for states to coordinate and cooperate among numerous functional regimes forms the
basis o f functionalism. Functionalism, and the institutions it fosters, are often seen as a
means by which states “surrender” sovereign control o f some element under their control
in the interest o f international efficiency. The efficiency often relies on the underlying
foundation o f telecommunications infrastructure and the resultant immediate availability
o f information. The related literature is rich and replete with varied approaches. Ernst B.
Hass evaluated the future of the nation-state from the functional perspective and projected
the impact of various types o f international organizations on sovereignty.72 Written
before the “revolution” in computers, data, information, and telecommunications, Hass’
book developed the case for the synergy resulting from functional cooperation. Similarly,
Donald A. Schon approached functionalism as the basis for evolution beyond the nation
state.73 He credited cooperation through international organizations with the logical
progression from the stability o f the Westphalian nation-state to further stability o f
interdependence.

72Emst B. Haas, B eyond the Nation-State: Functionalism and International O rganization (Stanford,
CA: University Press, 1964), 513.
73Donald A. SchOn, B eyond the Stable State (New York: Random House, 1971), 223.
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Addressing the two longest enduring functional organizations, George Arthur
Codding, Jr. wrote The Universal Postal Union,14 and with Anthony M. Rutkowski, The
International Telecommunication Union in a Changing World.15 These two venerable
functional organizations, to which virtually all states subscribe, require cooperation and
perhaps, some forfeit o f sovereign control, and form the basis for the idea behind
functionalism — cooperation in essential areas drives cooperation in other international
endeavors.
Less well developed, the literature on neo-functionalism accepts the premise of
international cooperation in functional areas but challenges the “roll-over” benefits to be
gained in other areas. Here an element o f neorealism also enters the argument.
Cooperation beyond functional organizations results in a voluntary surrender of
sovereignty. Nation-states are unlikely to surrender sovereignty unless such a sacrifice
can be shown to be in their own best interest. The institutional nature o f neo
functionalism leads much o f the literature toward study o f the EU. As the European
Parliament emerged as an institution worthy of serious consideration, the neo
functionalist nature of the EU presented a “laboratory” opportunity for political theorists.
Jane P. Sweeney evaluated the initial impacts of extended functional cooperation and the
benefits thereof.76 However, the applicability of neo-functionalism to high level
organizations such as the EU is not universally accepted.

74George A. Codding Jr., The Universal P ostal Union: Coordinator o f the International M ails (New
York: University Press, 1964).
75George A. Codding Jr. and Anthony M. Rutkowski, The International Telecommunication Union in a
Changing W orld (Dedham, MA: Artech House, 1982).
76Jane P. Sweeney, The First European Elections: Neo-Functionalism an d the European Parliament
(Boulder, CO: W estview, 1984), 144.
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Alexander Warleigh77 and Simon Hix78 both challenged neo-functionalism’s power to
explain the voluntary surrender o f nation-state sovereignty. Further, neorealism’s
influence also fails to add explanatory power; while appropriate for study o f integration, it
do not provide adequate theoretical tools. Cooperative federalism and other emerging
theoretical concepts provide better instruments for the EU’s special case in international
institutions.

Institutions
Tied closely to functional requirements for international cooperation,
intergovernmental institutions and their functional processes and procedures for operation
depend on telecommunications to interconnect their bureaucracies. States’ participation
in IGOs potentially provides opportunities for erosion o f sovereignty as they agree to act
according to internationally agreed norms rather than strict self-interest. Some
institutions exist to augment the use o f telecommunications and minimize the chaos of
electronic interference, but all institutions depend on the technology for smooth operation
in a complex world. As this can introduce another influence on sovereignty with subtle
involvement o f telecommunications, the associated literature is o f interest to this study.
The international relations literature extensively addresses the specific role of institutions
in the international environment, but with little consensus. In a 1995 literature debate,
John Mearsheimer fired the first shot with “The False Promise o f International

77Alexander Warleigh, “Better the D evil You Know? Synthetic and Confederal Understandings o f
European Unification,” West European Politics 21, no. 3 (1998): 1.
78Simon Hix, “The Study o f the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics,” West
European P olitics 17, no. 1 (1994): 1.
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Institutions” in which he emphasized the inability o f international organizations to cause
peace. He stressed the lack o f data and testable hypotheses by which to show any value
of institutions when they are actually needed. Member nation-states participate only
when it is in their best interest to do so.79 Mearsheimer’s challenge prompted responses
from Robert Keohane and Lisa Martin,80 Charles and Clifford Kupchan,81 John Gerard
Ruggie,82 and Alexander Wendt83 in a diverse and complex theoretical debate. The replies
centered on the value of institutions and their contribution to peace and prosperity, even if
they could not meet Mearsheimer’s requirement to cause peace. The surrender, erosion,
or pooling o f sovereignty caused by institutional membership was in exchange for
benefits which exceeded the cost.
Editing Maastricht and Beyond: Building the European Union, Andrew Duff, John
Pinder, and Roy Pryce coordinated several articles contributing to the loss, surrender, or
“pooling” o f sovereignty as a result of EU membership — the newest, largest “prototype”

79John J. Mearsheimer, “The False Promise o f International Institutions,” in Theories o f War and
Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cot6, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 329-383
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998), 331.
80Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, “The Promise o f Institutionalist Theory,” in Theories o f War
an d Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cot£, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 384-396
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
8lCharles A. Kupchan and Clifford A. Kupchan, “The Promise o f Collective Security,” in Theories o f
War an d Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Owen R. Cot6, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 397-406
(Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1998).
82John Gerard Ruggie, “The False Premise o f Realism,” in Theories o f War an d Peace, ed. Michael E.
Brown, Owen R. Cot6, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 407-415 (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1998).
83Alexander Wendt, “Constructing International Politics,” in Theories o f War an d Peace, ed. Michael
E. Brown, Owen R. Cot6, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, 416-426 (Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press, 1998).
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intergovernmental organization.84 Complex organizations, such as the EU, have
expanded into nearly every area o f state responsibilities, but they began with, and
continue to rely on economic foundations.
Telecommunications technology combined with advances in computer systems allows
entirely new methods o f accomplishing economic transactions. Don Tapscott, in Digital
Economy: Promise and Peril in the Age o f Networked Intelligence evaluated the
potential changes and impacts generated by new technology.85 The Borderless World:
Power and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy86 and The End o f the Nation State: The
Rise o f Regional Economies ,87 by Kenichi Ohmae, looked toward an international system
defined more by technological connections than by geographic borders. This projected
easing o f the power and influence o f states and control over telecommunications
infrastructure seemed to suggest the possibility o f chaos.

Potential Chaos o f Telecommunications
In the industrialized world, telecommunications technology, in all o f its variants, is
used in ever increasing volume. As a result, the potential for users to interfere
electronically with one another requires cooperation among states to minimize chaos.

84Andrew Duff, John Pinder, and Roy Pryce, ed., M aastricht an d Beyond: Building the European
Union (London: Routledge, 1994).
85Don Tapscott, The D igital Economy: Promise and P eril in the Age o f N etw orked Intelligence (New
York: McGraw-Hill, 1996).
86Kenichi Ohmae, The Borderless World: Pow er and Strategy in the Interlinked Economy (New York:
Harper Collins, 1999).
87Kenichi Ohmae, The E nd o f the Nation State: The Rise o f Regional Econom ies (New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1995).
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The necessity to work together may result in further reductions to sovereignty. Therefore
the literature surrounding the potential for chaotic telecommunications and states
avoidance thereof must be evaluated. Mark D. Alleyne investigated the concept of
international power and the influence o f international [tele]communications. He
concentrated on the functionalist basis for the rise in importance o f telecommunications
and used long enduring international organizations to establish the foundation. He
proposed a division o f international communications into eight areas:
Telecommunications, News, Mail, Motion Pictures and Television Programs, Intellectual
Property, Books and Periodicals, Advertising, and Recorded Music. O f these areas, only
three have multinational institutions or coherent regimes. The International
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the Universal Postal Union (UPU) were
established in 1865 and 1874 respectively. The World Intellectual Property Organization
(WIPO) was founded in 1967. These institutions provide examples for the success and
failure o f multilateral cooperation as opposed to laborious bilateral agreements. Further,
they offer specific examples by which to evaluate the associated structure o f power.88
The functional nature o f many international organizations and regimes directs any inquiry
toward associated theory.
The nature of telecommunications and use o f the electromagnetic spectrum would
hold incredible potential for chaos if unregulated. Consequently, much o f the literature
centers on the many regimes, both tacit and formal, addressing the necessity o f regulation,
and the attempts to stave off chaos. Centering on the ITU, James G. Savage evaluated the

88Mark D. Alleyne, International P ow er and International Communications (New York: St. Martin’s,
1995), 21-22.
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politics surrounding the functional and technical requirements involved with
international, cooperative communications management.89 As the longest enduring of
functional organizations, the ITU evolved from international coordination in the cable
telegraph era to contemporary satellite segment management. Communications satellites
result in national extension o f sovereignty into space; nation-states now claim their
sovereign “share” o f available segments of the geo-synchronous orbit, over the equator.
By extending their sovereignty into orbit, states agree to central ITU management, again,
to avoid potential chaos. But membership entails acceding to the organization’s rules and
a resultant loss o f sovereignty.
Dan Schiller examined the impacts on international markets with Digital Capitalism:
Networking the Global Market System.90 Seyom Brown, New Forces, Old Forces, and
the Future o f World Politics evaluated technology’s impact on the international system of
states.91 In an anthropological approach, Noam Chomsky presented World Orders, New
and Old taking a new look at a world dominated by technology.92
A rich and well developed body of literature exists surrounding the multiple areas of
interest which point toward answers to the research question. Despite the profusion o f
publications, a direct and forthright answer remains elusive. Existing literature tends to
focus on the “institution” or regime of sovereignty, its manifestation or its future. When

89James G. Savage, The Politics o f International Telecommunications Regulation (Boulder, CO:
Westview, 1989), 9.
90Dan Schiller, D igital Capitalism : Networking the G lobal M arket (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press,
1999).
91Seyom Brown, New Forces, O ld Forces, and the Future o f World P olitics (N ew York: Harper
Collins, 1995).
92Noam Chomsky, W orld Orders, New and O ld (London: Pluto Press, 1996).
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technology is an element of investigation, investigation focuses on the impact on society
and culture. Consequently, this research seeks to fill the gap by exploring the ways
telecommunications technology affects state sovereignty, thereby offering an original
contribution to the body o f literature on international relations.
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CHAPTER II
BACKGROUND

Two variables dominate the research question: sovereignty, the dependent variable
and telecommunications technology, the independent variable. Both were introduced and
discussed in Chapter I but each requires additional discussion before commencing an
analysis and comparison. As presentation of information and analysis proceeds, a wide
variety o f related subjects, associated topics, and discipline peculiar uses o f terms enter
the discussion. This chapter presents foundational background information on which to
build the remaining discussion by familiarizing the reader with basic aspects of
sovereignty and telecommunications technology. First, sovereignty is examined — its
origins, theoretical foundations, and practical manifestations. A brief introduction to the
basic history and technical elements of telecommunications follows. An exhaustive body
of literature surrounds both subjects and this chapter summarizes the information
necessary for further discussion. Therefore, this chapter establishes a basic foundation on
which to construct the detailed examination, analysis, and comparison of
telecommunications and sovereignty.

Sovereignty
The term, sovereignty, appears frequently in political rhetoric, mass media, and
scholarly publications. External to scholarly venues, the term often invokes an imprecise,
ill defined, and emotional context. Scholars, conversely, tend to over specify the word’s
meaning and narrowly define its use to fit the argument under discussion. However, even
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in the most ambiguous of contexts, sovereignty provides the bedrock for the anarchical
international system o f states. Regardless o f the specific context, the world consists of
sovereign states. The state’s role in both internal and external affairs dominates the
international arena.
The anarchical international system of sovereign states reached maturity, or perhaps,
achieved adolescence, in the seventeenth century following the Thirty Years War as
Europe entered its “modem” era in the “Age o f Discovery” following the Renaissance.
Sovereignty, in the guise of a system o f sovereign states, did not instantly materialize
spontaneously. Rather, 1648 marks a point — a significant point, but just a point — on a
social evolutionary continuum where society’s organizing determinant evolved away
from feudalism toward some, as yet, undefined end state. Initially, only states populated
by Christians with geographical borders within Europe could qualify for admission to the
“fellowship” of sovereignty. During subsequent centuries, trade, colonization,
communications, and international exchange caused the concept’s expansion throughout
the world. By the late twentieth century, virtually all states, and many stateless nations,
claimed or demanded an inalienable right to sovereignty.
Occupying a place o f significance on the social evolutionary continuum for over three
centuries, sovereignty has received due attention from scholars, but developing a means
by which to structure study proves elusive. It is both a theoretical concept and a practical
application thereof. As a theory, various hypotheses associated with sovereignty help to
explain the actions o f states. As a concept, sovereignty provides a framework by which
to think about and define power. Humanity wields and submits to power, not
sovereignty. Often discussed as something concrete, sovereignty remains a concept —
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abstract in nature — applied to political power.1 The concept expresses the idea that
there is a final and absolute authority in the political community. Yet the sovereign state
is a concrete manifestation o f that power, wielding significant strength over its citizens
internally, and playing a role as an actor in the international arena.

State versus Nation-State
In any political science discussion, the term nation-state enters the discipline specific
lexicon. Some clarification, therefore, is required at the onset. The concept o f nation, a
group o f people with shared characteristics such as language, culture, or historical
heritage,2 figures in any discussion o f states as the focus o f sovereignty. Some political
theories maintain the nation as the most logical unit o f focus for establishment o f a state.
Sovereign states emerged in concert with the development o f national identities.3 It is,
therefore, logical to connect the two in both theory and practice. During the post-colonial
era, however, numerous states — especially in Africa — emerged based on territorial
borders drawn by colonial powers for their convenience with little regard to the “nations”
contained therein and resulted in violent civil wars.
Many nations incorporated into larger states with diverse cultures have later
demanded sovereignty on the idea o f nation-state. The breakup o f the former Republic of
Yugoslavia provides the most telling example. Several nations which shared centuries of

'Hinsley, Sovereignty, 1.
2Morgenthau, P olitics among Nations, 97.
3Alexander Passerin D'Entreves, The Notion o f the State: An Introduction to P olitical Theory (Oxford:
Clarendon, 1967), 174.
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open hostility among themselves were forced into a single state’s population.
Domineering rule by Josip Broz Tito suppressed their cultural hostility, but when
removed, the individual nations exerted themselves, demanding sovereignty in the guise
of new states.4 However, “single nation states” — those with only a single, identifiable
racial and cultural entity — are rare in political history; Japan is among the few
examples. This study pursues the issue o f the sovereign state, regardless o f the ethnic or
cultural makeup o f the associated population.

History
Sovereignty’s origins frequently figure in ensuing chapters. Therefore, it will be of
value to discuss, very briefly, how sovereignty emerged as an organizing principle in
international society. Political science and history alike generally acknowledge the end of
the Thirty Years War, marked by the Peace o f Westphalia in 1648, as the inauguration of
the modem international system o f sovereign states existing in anarchy. However,
delegates from the warring entities negotiating the Treaties o f Munster and Osnabruk,
which, synergistically became known as the Peace o f Westphalia,5 did not develop a plan
for a worldwide system of sovereign states. Rather, they reached agreements by which
each participating state determined its own fate free o f direct influence from the others,
and perhaps most importantly, the Roman Catholic Church.

4M. W esley Shoemaker, Russia, Eurasian States, and Eastern Europe: The World Today Series
(Harpers Ferry, WV: Stryker-Post, 1994), 321.
5Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction,” 359.
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Sovereign states actually existed prior to 1648. Greek city-states and the Roman
Empire certainly qualified as sovereign states by the standards o f both internal and
external sovereignty.6 However, there existed no international system o f sovereign states.
In medieval Europe, the Roman Catholic Church provided the only unifying political and
social concepts, known at the time by the doctrine of Corpus Christi (Body o f Christ).
The spectrum o f humanity stretched from peasants at one extreme with the Pope at the
other. The individuals between peasant and pope had church defined roles which
provided social cohesiveness and a Christian identity o f shared views o f laws and
morals.7 The concept o f nation strained the unity provided by Corpus Christi. Distances
between Rome and many o f the components o f Christendom, and especially the resultant
times required for communications caused divergence in allegiance, and led many proto
nation-states to pursue their own goals without the benefit of the Pope’s guiding hand.
In England, King Henry VIII dismissed the Pope’s claim more than a century prior to
Westphalia, establishing his state as sovereign by definition. Various German and Swiss
political entities adopted the religious doctrines o f Martin Luther, Huldrych Zwingli,
Girolamo Savonarola, and John Calvin which renounced papal allegiance. A movement
toward implementation o f a concept of sovereignty was in progress, but these proto
sovereign entities still did not function within a system o f mutual recognition.
The Peace o f Westphalia, more accurately, marked the emergence o f an international
system o f sovereign states with mutual recognition. Dominance o f a central church
diminished and states subsequently operated under the principle o f cujus regio, ejus

6Hinsley, Sovereignty, 45.
7Philpott, "Sovereignty: An Introduction," 357.
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religio — whoever rules determines the religion of the subjects.8 The system no longer
recognized the monarch’s mandatory allegiance to the Pope’s temporal authority.
Monarchs, and to some extent individuals, determined the level o f ecclesiastic supremacy
to be exerted by the Roman Catholic Church within territorial borders.
The Pope provided nearly immediate evidence of Westphalia’s success and o f the
concept of sovereignty by condemning and nullifying the agreements;9 participating states
ignored his edict. As sovereign states, they were no longer bound by his claim of
ecclesiastic supremacy. The state wielded its power through a government (monarch) and
recognized the rights o f others to do so as well. In seventeenth century Europe, the states
participating in this very exclusive “club” of sovereignty were monarchies. Wresting the
power o f the state away from the monarch and vesting it in the citizenry took somewhat
longer. The location, or focus, o f sovereignty within the state varied according to the
peoples’ “social contract” with their rulers and would be the subject o f numerous
revolutions — both peaceful and violent — throughout the world as ideas o f democracy
grew.
The English commenced the process on a very slow course beginning the creation of a
parliament to advise the monarch. Possibly, the most significant event marking the
refocus of British sovereign power was the 1688 “Glorious Revolution” deposing King
James II and installing Queen Mary II and King William III by act o f Parliament. While
the Parliament was not a democratically elected body, it represented the state’s population

'Daniel Philpott, “ Ideas and the Evolution o f Sovereignty,” in State Sovereignty: Change and
Persistence in International Relations, ed. Shohail H. Hashmi, 14-48 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania
State University Press, 1997), 29.
9Felix Gilbert, ed., The Norton H istory o f M odern Europe (N ew York: W. W. Norton, 1970), 258.
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(or some element thereof) rather than a ruler under divine right. The slow process of
democratization continued through the nineteenth century, until Queen Victoria “ruled”
over a democratically based republic, and into the twentieth century and universal
suffrage.
In 1776, American colonists took more immediate action by nullifying the social
contract with the English king and seizing the sovereignty in the name o f humanity’s
inalienable rights. However, inquiry into the specific location or focus o f sovereignty
varies within any given state and quickly becomes a study in social constructs o f the
particular society. This study concentrates on sovereignty’s existence at the state level
and its theoretical and conceptual basis along with its actual manifestation. Theories and
concepts o f sovereignty center on the existence o f a sovereign state. As with any
theoretical situation which finds its way into practical application, reality often differs
from theory.

Theory
This study deals, in part, with the theory of sovereignty. Therefore, it will be useful to
see how theoretical debates evolved. This puts the present work into perspective because
sovereignty, as a social concept, is subject to social evolution. The origins o f its
development through various incarnations and how scholars regarded it may prove useful
to evaluate its future. Intellectual debate on theories associated with sovereignty actually
predated Westphalia by nearly a century. In the sixteenth century, the King o f France
consolidated power over rebellious feudal lords bolstered by the writings o f Jean Bodin.
The social evolutionary process from feudalism to national identity and sovereignty took
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a significant step as a result.10 Machiavelli’s contemplation o f his monarch’s power and
the realities o f late fifteenth and early sixteenth century politics considered interests and
issues which were embraced by the concept of sovereignty when it matured a century
later.11 Contemporary with Westphalia, Hugo Grotius proposed concepts o f equality
among sovereign states which formed an essential element o f the anarchical international
system of states.12
Theoretical discussion explores the “ideal” form o f sovereignty. As a social
construct, however, it is open to subjective interpretation and analysis. The theory of
sovereignty in 1648 described and explained (as theories are wont to do) the international
circumstance o f the era. It involved a small and very exclusive fellowship o f states in
Europe. Other states existed in some degree o f sovereignty but did not actively
participate in the international [European] “system.” Would the same descriptions and
explanations apply to the twenty-first century international environment? Sovereignty did
not emerge in any sort o f end state. With roots firmly planted in the history o f political
science, it evolved from the Greek city-state era and Thucydides, through the Roman
Empire, feudalism, Westphalia, Machiavelli, and Grotius, to the modem system of states
and Morgenthau, Booth, and Krasner.
Contemporary theories o f international relations treat the issue o f sovereignty with
varying degrees o f significance, but virtually all rely on the sovereign state as an essential

10Encyclopedia Britannica, Multimedia Edition, 1998, s.v. “Sovereignty.”
"R. B. J. Walker, "International Relations and the Concept o f the Political," in International Relations
Theory Today, ed. Ken Booth and Steve Smith, 306-327 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State
University Press, 1995), 317-319.
l2Hedley Bull, Benedict Kingsbury, and Adam Roberts, ed., Hugo G rotius an d International Relations
(Oxford: Clarendon, 1992), 222.
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actor and unit o f analysis for study o f the international system. “Classic” realists treat the
sovereign state as the only actor o f significance, while liberal theorists include other
actors as well — primarily the various international institutions permeating the
contemporary international environment. Still, the state, and its defining concept of
sovereignty, dominate.
As with any social theory, the study of sovereignty involves some degree of
subjectivity. It is a human, social concept. It was thought into existence; it can be
thought into a different incarnation, or even out of existence.13 The theory o f sovereignty,
as with all theories, represents an abstract representation o f reality. It is neither true nor
false; rather its value lies in the ability to explain why events occurred as they did.14 If
observed phenomena indicate that the actions o f sovereign states differ from theoretical
norms, consideration must be given to changes in the social construct on which the theory
was based. The basis o f any theory requires that it helps explain observed phenomena. If
the two do not match, either the theory fails to explain or the observations are inaccurate.
If the theory was accurately based on archaic observations but no longer explains
contemporary behavior, the theory is not necessarily defunct or discredited. It could also
mean that the theory, once accurate, requires modification to maintain validity as societal
constructs evolve. Differences might indicate erosion, increase, or simply changes to the
level o f sovereignty. Since it does not lend itself to absolute quantification, evaluation
requires more subtle means o f analysis. The most promising means o f weighing “levels”

13Klein, Sovereign Equality among States, 14.
l4Tobj 0m L. Knutsen, A H istory o f International Relations Theory (Manchester, UK: University Press,
1997), 2.
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or “degrees” o f sovereignty necessitates a comparison o f what “was” (in multiple
iterations) against what “is.”

Practice Versus Theory
Sovereignty was never absolute. The anarchical, international system existed and
states functioned therein, free o f allegiance to any other entity. The reality o f sovereignty,
however, often failed to achieve the objective. The Holy Roman Empire remained on the
European landscape but without many elements o f sovereignty. Some princes continued
to acknowledge allegiance, but also exercised other sovereign rights such as the freedom
to form alliances strictly in their own self-interest. Outside Europe, other states with
functioning governments, populations, and territory were actually considered terra
incognita and available for colonization and domination but not mutual recognition.15
Even in the non-interdependent world (by contemporary, twenty-first century
standards) o f the seventeenth century, state isolation was not an option. Mercantilism and
its preoccupation with import o f gold dominated economies; but bringing precious metal
into the state treasury required trade. Trade nearly always leads to some degree of
interdependence.

Erosion, Reductions, and Changes to Sovereignty
Differences appear intuitive between the behavior o f states within a small, European
centered “international system” and the twenty-first century structure with nearly 200

l5Yale H. Ferguson and Richard W. Mansbach, “The Past as Prelude to the Future: Identities and
Loyalties in Global Politics,” in The Return o f Culture and Identity in IR Theory, ed. Y o sef Lapid and
Friedrich Kratochwil, 21-44 (London: Lynne Rienner, 1996), 38.
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sovereign actors. O f interest to any scholarly inquiry concerning sovereignty are both
changes over time as well as underlying causes. Did some external variables provide an
“abrasive” by which to “erode” the sovereignty? Did “erosion” result in reduced levels of
states’ ability to exercise their exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities
within their territory? If not by erosion, what changes took place and why? This study,
o f course, delves into the role o f telecommunications technology as an external element
causing changes in sovereignty, but other “abrasives” — sources or causes o f change —
also exist.
State-centric international relations theories, such as realism in any o f its variants,
assume sovereignty of states as an essential element. Various, liberal, non-state-centric
theories tend to accept sovereignty as a significant and valid principle in the international
system, but not necessarily the exclusive or dominant element. Differences between the
two approaches rest in accepting an evolutionary reduction, erosion, or even the possible
eventual demise o f sovereignty.16
Territory always provided a critical, defining element to sovereignty. States
occasionally, perhaps often, disagreed about ownership of specific areas under situations
o f irredenta, but tacit if not specific acknowledgment o f borders accompanied mutual
recognition. Little opposition existed to any state’s control o f cross-border movement of
any commodity and border security became a primary element o f state behavior as
international law developed to codify such norms. Economic evolution, combined with
technological advances o f all types, created situations making state border control ever

16Charles Burton Marshall, The Exercise o f Sovereignty: P apers on Foreign P olicy (Baltimore: Johns
Hopkins University Press, 1965), 3.
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increasingly difficult. Pursuit o f favorable international trade situations often required
states to relax their never complete attempts to control imports and exports to
accommodate expeditious industrial movement o f goods. Where trade took place,
financial data accompanied it. Telecommunications technology, in particular, provided a
dilemma; it was the means by which information crossed state borders. The information
might well contain data of benefit to the state’s international trade transactions, but it
might just as well carry alien cultural concepts or other ideas considered subversive.17
States had the “right” to attempt to “seal” their borders and inspect all people and
shipments crossing frontiers. Smuggling always took place, but suppression o f illegal
importation was a domestic police matter and fully within states’ sovereign authority.
Illicit transport o f goods could be accomplished in small quantities carried on the backs of
people or their pack animals. Larger shipments required carts and roads. Historically,
states tended to organize their border defenses against invasion rather than smuggling.
Defense against the illegal movement o f goods was a matter for tax laws and enforcement
tended to be based more on fear o f revenue lost to smuggling than security threats.
Concerted efforts toward crossing borders with illicit goods was, in all probability,
economically beneficial despite the risks. However, the movement o f information was
very likely never difficult. Books hidden within personal baggage, letters on the person
o f a traveler, or most dangerous o f all, ideas within the brain o f an immigrant were
indefensible. In later eras, information in quantities comparable to entire libraries could
be transferred in an instant via the combined capabilities of computer and
telecommunications networks. International frontiers were, in all likelihood, always

’’Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations,” 215.
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incredibility permeable to small groups moving limited quantities o f any commodity,
even if those borders were well defended against military invasion. Still, many states
relied upon revenue from imports for their operating funds.
However, as levels of trade increased, draconian inspections would introduce
unacceptable delays with cumulative effects on business and domestic economy. Letters
o f credit, documents, or other “subversive” information might be smuggled in the form of
books or letters on the persons of travelers, and some would (and will) always get through
despite the state’s attempt to exert control. The introduction o f electronic transfer of
information makes detection and interception more difficult by orders o f magnitude.
While border control, and its potential limits, might seem to dominate a loss of
sovereignty, other more subtle forces influence state pursuit and practice o f sovereignty.
International organization membership also contributes to erosion o f “traditional”
sovereignty. States always maintained a nearly unlimited right to go to war when in the
national interest to do so. The formation of the United Nations (UN) made a significant
alteration in the application, if not the concept, o f sovereignty. Member states accept
restrictions on the right and endorse punitive sanctions on violators o f the organizational
norm.18 Although free to join or not to join various IGOs such as the UN, states —
especially smaller states — often find membership critical to prosperity, if not survival.
Joining IGOs might be seen as a threat to absolute sovereignty, but sovereignty was never
absolute. The norms o f state actions under anarchy still acknowledge some form of
universally accepted behavior — the fundamental basis o f international law. Functioning

l8Mihali Simai, The Future o f G lobal Governance: M anaging Risk an d Change in the International
System (Washington, DC: United States Institute o f Peace Press, 1994), 255.
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in the international environment while adhering to norms reduces the practice from the
absolute, ideal concept to something less.
States might “forfeit” some degree o f their sovereignty through other ways as well:
Conventions: agreements (human rights accords, for example) do not require the
states to behave contingent on the actions o f others. Rather, actions should follow some
internationally accepted norm. Instead o f national interest or benefit, actions are expected
because they represent “the right thing to do.”
Contracting: states voluntarily forfeit some degree o f sovereignty in quid pro quo for
benefits, such as a international loans or benefits o f institutional membership. In many
cases, such as international postal exchanges or radio spectrum utilization, international
membership and cooperation benefits both domestic and foreign efficiency — the basis of
functionalism.
Coercion: rulers o f stronger states compel actions through threats.
Imposition: weak states have no option but to agree to the wishes o f a stronger state.19
The idea o f sovereignty is so ingrained in the current international environment’s
collective thinking that it does not allow for open acknowledgment o f any surrender o f
independence and therefore, sovereignty. Still, states make concerted decisions to enter
into contracts and conventions because it is in their best national interest, and the idea of
“pooling” versus surrender of sovereignty emerges. Early manifestations o f the European
Union (EU, nee European Economic Community — EEC) were little more than an
experimental IGO, but it has since evolved into an entity in possession o f some elements
o f sovereignty. It has defined territory, a European population, and a functioning

19 Stephen D. Krasner, “Compromising Westphalia,” International Security 20, no. 3 (1995): 117.
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government with some, but by no means all, elements o f sovereignty to which members
pledge fidelity. It would appear to be a combination o f contract and convention
augmented by some degree o f subtle tacit coercion in the background. The limited
sovereignty exercised by the EU over its member states originated at the members’
expense. Rather than admit to a loss or surrender o f sovereignty, members view the
arrangement as “pooling” o f sovereignty,20 with hopes that the pool will develop some
degree o f synergy where the cumulative sovereignty will exceed the sum contributed.
While the concept o f pooling sovereignty might provide a face saving means to placate
residual nationalism, it still constitutes member states ceding some finite degree o f their
inherent sovereignty to a “higher authority.”
International organizations cause further alterations in state behavior which, in turn,
might alter theoretical description of observed phenomena. Accepted behavior of states
— norms — forms one element in the foundations o f international law.21 Such behavior
usually forms the basis o f natural law, or simplistically: “the right thing to do.” By
joining an IGO, a state accepts — and at least gives “lip service” to — the norms
proscribed by the founding treaty or charter. If the norms under which states act have
changed since Westphalia, sovereignty in the twenty-first century, logically differs as
well. It begs the question: Is sovereignty eroding away from some original concept? Is
the sovereign state still a valid organizing feature to the international system, but
operating under different norms? Are changes necessarily bad?

20Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction,” 364.
2lPeter Malanczuk, Akehurst's M odern Introduction to International Law (London: Routledge, 1997),
57.
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This simplistic approach ignores the social nature o f the theory and concept. They
describe and explain why states act as they do. A better approach might be: If the nature
of the international system has changed, the theory describing and explaining it requires
revision. Some theorists postulate that revising the theories explaining state behavior
indicates the end o f sovereignty and the associated sovereign state in the near future.22
One particular way to emphasize potential sources of change revolves around the
organization o f the state itself. Traditionally a territorial entity, new primary organizing
foci have been proposed in the form of telecommunications for “telecommunities”23 and
economic interdependence driving “trading states.”24
As the post-Cold War “world order” continues to evolve, or organize itself around
new norms, the entire international system has taken on an altered nature. Intervention,
under the legitimacy o f the UN or other IGOs, has been used to suppress horrors such as
“ethnic cleansing.” A next, possibly logical step might result in stronger states and
organization intervening before the fact — which might be used as an explanation or
justification for US intervention in Iraq. Such actions shift foreign policy from actions
among states to politics within states. Regardless of the humanitarian basis generating
sovereignty-violating intervention, smaller states are likely to develop suspicions o f more
drastic motives and reiterate their claims to sovereignty and freedom from international
interference. If world politics evolve toward the same status as international economics,
continuous interactions will blur the differences between foreign and domestic affairs.

22Philpott, Revolutions in Sovereignty, 8.
23George Bugliarello, “Telecommunities: The Next Civilization,” The Futurist 31, no. 5 (1997): 24.
24Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading State, 190.
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States — governments — cannot be expected to surrender their sovereignty — their very
existence — lightly. If for no other reason, the process o f maintaining domestic order
will extend the life o f sovereignty.25
While these prospects open numerous arguments regarding the future o f anarchy, it
also importunes a discussion of: If not the sovereign state, what? How could the
international system organize itself without the bedrock sovereign state?

Alternatives to “Traditional" Sovereignty
The sovereign state has always been based on the territorial limits within which the
state exerted its control. As IGOs begin to exercise some elements o f sovereignty, they
may not reach a realist’s threshold for relevance, but must be take seriously as actors in
the international system. Territory alone does not limit the extent o f a state’s sovereign
influence.
“Metaterritorial” activities enter the study of sovereignty and necessitate redefining
the actors participating in the international system. The classic territorial state, firmly
bounded by its borders, includes many common activities — agriculture, physical
infrastructure, military, and police organizations. Metaterritorial elements, are far more
abstract without the confining limits o f geographical borders. Scientific knowledge,
information, electronic transactions, or satellites in orbit can not be contained within
national boundaries.26 Any consideration of the future of, or alternatives to, sovereignty
must include metaterritorial considerations.

25John Stremlan, "Antidote to Anarchy," The Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (1995): 43.
26Bugliarello, “Telecommunications, Politics, Economics,” 407.
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The examples provided by the United States, where sovereign entities coalesced into a
single federal state, and the EU, possibly on a similar course, lead many theorists to
predict some sort o f global governance. A mythological idea belonging to the genre of
science fiction, it may lie in the far distant evolutionary future o f humanity, but it rests far
beyond the reality of even the most liberal of visions. More likely, redefinition o f actors
in the international system, their roles, and their behavior define more probable
alternatives.
As developed by Richard Rosecrance, the concept o f “trading states” projects
industrial production and trade replacing territorial expansion in virtually all states’
pursuit o f national interest. Associated blocks o f states based on trade could provide a
central unit o f study to replace absolute focus on the territorial state.27
Similarly, George Bugliarello explored the metaterritorial aspects of
telecommunications and posited the emergence of “telecommunities” as international
actors with some elements o f sovereignty. The influence of geographically dispersed
organizations linked primarily by telecommunications technology, particularly fax,
Internet, and e-mail as dominant media during the 1980s and 1990s, has been
demonstrated by several precise examples: The Ayatollah Khomeini’s rise to power in
Iran while in exile in France; the international influence on public opinion developed by
insurgents in the Mexican state o f Chiapas; and more recently, al Qaeda’s coordinated
terrorism. Such entities hold potential to evolve into state-like telecommunities.
Although they do not possess inherent military power, they have the ability to empower
militia or rebel groups through the sharing of information and electronic transfer o f funds.

27Rosecrance, The Rise o f the Trading State, 190.
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Providing fertile ground for new varieties o f crime, telecommunities might be induced to
develop means by which to regulate access to their valuable data bases and thereby
creating a type o f “police;” further enhancing their own illusion o f “sovereignty.”28
As the EU approaches supra-national status, the “member-state” materializes as a
possible alternative to the sovereign state. Surrendering some elements o f their
sovereignty to an IGO, states could be defined less by their territory and populace than by
the organization o f which they are members.

Summary - Sovereignty
In 1648, all o f the actors in the international system were sovereign states, with the
possible exception of the Roman Catholic Church’s attempts to maintain some vestigial
degree o f sovereignty despite exclusion from the “club.” The modem world must include
some consideration of others. While trading blocks or IGOs might cultivate some
elements o f sovereignty, they would not meet the basic requisites o f territory, population,
and government. Even if the definition o f sovereignty were revised to exclude the
requirements for territorial control, another basic question emerges: Would such non
territorial entities accept the “housekeeping” duties required o f territorially-based states?
With sovereignty comes a necessity to respond to demands o f the citizenry.
A telecommunity or trading block might wield military or police powers, but would
they build roads beyond those required for trade or military access? How would they
respond to citizens’ needs for schools, social justice programs, and other prerogatives of
citizenship which have come to approach the status o f “natural rights?” As

28Bugliarello, “Telecommunities: The Next Civilization,” 24.
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telecommunications enable the easy receipt of information on a worldwide basis and the
“have-nots” discover how much they do not possess by comparison with the “haves,”
citizens’ demands may be expected to increase. The sovereign state has a place in the
future, but telecommunications technology has a role in determining the exact nature of
that position.

T elecommunications
The foregoing discussion addressed the origins, theoretical basis, and practical
applications o f sovereignty, the dependent variable. Telecommunications technology, the
independent variable, also requires a foundation on which the reader may rely in pursuit
o f the analysis in the following chapters. It is a specialized discipline tied closely to
engineering and mathematics. The following discussion presents a minimal level of
background information on telecommunications technology which is necessary for
effective analysis and comparison.

Introduction
The root of telecommunications, is of course, communication. In current usage, the
addition o f tele to the root carries with it the addition o f electromagnetic technology.
However, any investigation into the history and effects must acknowledge a “control era”
prior to the developments o f modem science.
Regardless o f a message’s means of transmission, it follows a basic process. The
“sender” possesses information and wishes to pass it to another. It must be put into forms
(media) suitable for transfer to another location. It might be spoken directly, but if the
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recipient is not within earshot, the information might be consigned to written words on
paper in the form o f a letter, picture, diagram, chart, or in the case o f fiction, philosophy,
or scientific advance, result in production of a book. For secrecy, a messenger could be
required to memorize information — a process often used in societies without written
language. In pursuit o f privacy, cryptography was often used to conceal the information
contained within the written material. Then, the information must be delivered by the
most appropriate means. Historically, it would be carried by a human being. Today, the
Internet, facsimile, e-mail and other high-technology means provides nearly instantaneous
delivery with little regard to the distance between sender and recipient. When received,
the receiver reads or processes the information appropriately. O f special note, the
“message” might be a hand-written letter, a book, or a massive computer database. All
contain information, and much — especially financial information — can have severe,
time sensitive implications.
The earliest form o f transmission o f information over long distances required wordof-mouth. Many epic poems, such as the works later codified by Homer, began as ballads
committed to memory to preserve and extend the range o f “historical” and cultural
legacies. For the purpose o f this study, however, the starting point assumes the
development o f written documents and a desire to transfer the contents over long
distances.

Length o f Time Historically Required fo r Information Transit
The primary benefit to transmission o f information via telecommunications
technology results from the drastic reduction in elapsed time between the sender’s
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dispatch and receiver’s receipt. Therefore, a brief look at the time necessary for delivery
o f information before technology entered the environment would be appropriate.
Throughout history, senders could consign information to letters and send them via
courier to recipients elsewhere. Messengers could also commit information to memory,
but that reduced the flexibility of delivery; only the original courier could deliver the
information without a laborious effort to have another memorize the same message.
Where privacy was desired or required, various means were often employed to hide the
existence or contents o f the communications. Letters hidden on the person or among
innocuous possessions of the courier disappear to the casual observer. Messengers with
memorized information could easily conceal their true intentions with viable cover
stories. Cryptography could conceal the contents o f a documents. However, the speed of
transport still relied on existent means of ground or sea transport.

Methods o f Transmission Prior to Telecommunications
Several examples exist where various civilizations developed means to transmit
information to critical decision-makers via more “rapid” means. Greek signal fires
relayed brief messages from hilltop to hilltop. Native Americans, similarly, are credited
with the use o f “smoke signals.”29 Some historical evidence, dating to the twelfth
century and Genghis Kahn, points to use of carrier pigeons to transport written messages
tied to the bird’s leg. The “throughput” (to use modem vernacular) — the amount of
information transferred — was unreliable, extremely limited, and time consuming.

29Laszlo Solymar, G etting the M essage: A History o f Communications (Oxford: University Press,
1999), 19.
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In eighteenth century Europe, semaphore stations relayed information around the
continent using “mechanical telegraphy.” Hilltop towers were equipped with “arms”
which could “wave” to a visible, distant hilltop. A code of arm positions permitted
transmission o f text messages. While these “communications systems” represented a
drastic improvement to the speed o f information distribution, they were still very slow;
transmission speeds could be measured in single-digit words per minute, at best. Further,
reliability was often dubious All relied on visual observation which limited the length of
any individual “leg” o f the relay chain. Weather conditions or operator inattention might
restrict accurate observation and every relay point in the long chain o f the network
increased the likelihood o f introducing errors. Alexandre Dumas exploited this
possibility in The Count o f Monte Cristo by arranging for a “misinterpretation” in
semaphore signals to report a “revolution in Spain” to Paris, resulting in banking chaos
for the Count’s adversaries. A fictional example, o f course, but it demonstrated the
potential impact o f information — albeit misinformation due to technology — on
international financial transactions.30

Distribution o f Received Information
Distribution o f information, once received, must also be considered. In the case o f
semaphore, at the hilltop nearest the person receiving the transmitted information, the
message had to be either written down or committed to memory and physically delivered.
In the case o f general information such as news, philosophical discourse, or scientific
breakthrough, wide-spread dissemination after physical delivery to the recipient, required

30Alexandre Dumas, The Count o f Monte Cristo, Vol. II (1845; repr., N ew York: Collier, 1910), 108.
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publication. For uncounted centuries, “publication” necessitated laborious hand-copying
o f texts. Introduction of moveable-type printing made drastic increases in levels of
distribution, but still did nothing for the speed o f transfer.

The Telegraph
Except for the few attempts at visual signaling, which by their nature could not cross
extended expanses o f water, the first quantum leap in transmission o f information
emerged in the nineteenth century with electric telegraphy. The telegraph, well known
for its inventor, Samuel Morse, and his associated Morse Code, introduced rapid
transmission o f information. “Processing” o f the information required the originator to
write it down (and if necessary for protection o f the contents, introducing cryptographic
privacy) and delivering it to “Point A” o f the telegraphy system. The telegraph operator
then transmitted the data to “Point B” at a maximum speed o f 20 to 30 words per minute.
An operator at Point B wrote the message and initiated the process o f delivering it to its
intended recipient(s).
Telegraphic transmission over longer distances developed rapidly through the
introduction o f relays. Relays involved operators at the extremis o f telegraph line who
copied the message and turned to the origin of another line and resent the message. The
effective distance increased, but so did the concomitant likelihood o f errors. That
problem, as a technological issue, was reduced by improved cables and potential
distances expanded through the extensive technological developments taking place
throughout the nineteenth century. The telegraph was introduced for practical use in
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1845; by 1866, North America and Great Britain were linked by an undersea telegraph
cable.
Technology did not remove all requirements for relays, and state sovereignty entered
the domain o f “modem” telecommunications. When information transport involved
crossing international frontiers, states often exercised a right to restrict or supervise its
entry into or departure from sovereign territory much as they might for “physical” goods
and merchandise. The reasons might be based on national security, economic viability, or
some less defined purpose such as cultural purity or even blatant censorship. During non
electronic eras o f information transfer, states’ control o f borders included attempts to
intercept information o f interest and prevent passage o f data which might represent
potential danger or undesired influence. States always pursued such information.
Decision makers require knowledge o f actions and intentions — actual or expected — by
an enemy, adversary, competitor, or even “friend,” in normal pursuit o f diplomacy,
statecraft, and economic transactions. In 1324, King Edward II o f England ordered the
interception and review o f all letters coming from or going to “parts beyond the seas.” By
the sixteenth century, the British were famous for their interception o f all diplomatic
dispatches.31 Spies, informants, and agents, throughout history, provided their leaders
with information, but transport of the data unearthed by them still depended on available
means o f surface transportation. Many and variable methods o f conveyance existed, but
their speed depended primarily on surface transportation. Basically, information moved
only as fast as human beings could carry it.

3lMichael Smith, Station X: D ecoding N azi Secrets (London: Channel 4 Books, 1999), 8.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

65

Searching shipments or possessions of travelers crossing borders poses many
problems, but when the target is information in electronic form, the task becomes more
difficult. In the mid-nineteenth century, technology allowed direct telegraphic
transmission of messages from Paris to Berlin. However, when initially installed, both
France and Prussia refused to allow messages to cross their borders without national
supervision. Telegraph operators at the border transcribed messages and passed them to
national agents for review. The paper copies o f the examined and approved messages
were then passed “across the border” — which was actually accomplished by passing
them across a desk within the same room — to the other state’s operators.32
The content o f messages frequently involved time-sensitive economic data. As
business and industry began to realize and exploit the benefits o f rapidly transmitted (and
received) data, the delay and backlog introduced by state supervision became untenable.
States were faced with a choice between sovereign rights of border supervision and
benefits to their economy gained by efficient communications. In the above example,
state control over all traffic between Paris and Berlin was removed in the interest of
international and economic efficiency. As a result o f telecommunications technology,
states had exchanged some degree o f sovereignty in response to demands by international
business concerns and economic benefits.
Availability o f “instant” communications expanded, but loss o f privacy was often
included in the cost. Few, if any, of the people desiring the telegraphic transmission o f
information possessed the skill necessary to use Morse Code. The nature o f the telegraph
involved numerous people with access to the information contained within messages. The

32Solymar, G etting the Message, 5.
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“sender” committed information to paper and passed to a series o f clerks and operators
for processing, billing, and transmission. At the “distant end,” the process was reversed.
Numerous “pairs o f eyes” — normally, but not always, disinterested — had the
opportunity to view and make note o f information o f interest. Agents o f states, business
rivals, or other interested parties could develop numerous opportunities to intercept and
read any and all messages passing through the telegraph system — especially in states
where the communications systems were government-owned.
Telegraph operators sending “plain text” (words in coherent sentences) were far more
efficient and accurate than when sending a series o f nonsensical letters and numbers.
They had to transmit at a slower speeds to ensure accuracy which tied-up the circuit
longer. In the nineteenth century, US Secretary o f State William Seward fully
acknowledged the need for cryptographic protection o f diplomatic messages. However,
the increased cost — which could approach ten times the charge for “plain text”
transmission — proved to be prohibitive. As a result, decisions to risk possible
“compromise” of diplomatic information by sending messages “in the clear” tended to be
made based on cost rather than the security threat. The increased cost o f transmitting
encrypted messages proved to be prohibitive and Seward’s budget could not withstand
the strain.33 Little privacy existed in nineteenth century US Department o f State
communications.
Well into the twentieth century, diplomatic messages were carried by public telegraph
networks. Telegraph systems in the United States were commercial enterprises except for

“ Ralph E. Weber, “Seward’s Other Folly: The Fight Over America’s First Encrypted Cable,”
Cryptologia 19, no. 4 (1995): 326.
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a few private or dedicated military systems. Throughout much o f the world, however,
national postal systems owned and operated every aspect of the telegraph network.
Senders (whether they were state agencies, commercial enterprises, or individuals) who
desired “privacy” for their information exchanges over public telegraph could “cover” the
message with cryptography — cipher systems. This resulted in transmission of a
message which, rather than a sensible combination o f words and phrases, contained
[apparently] nonsensical, pattern-less letters and numbers. The lack o f “plain text” made
transmission and reception far more difficult for operators, and therefore, slower.
Telegraph companies charged a high premium for transmission o f encrypted messages.
Originators and receiving operators still consigned the messages to paper. States —
especially those whose telegraph networks were government-owned — could easily
intercept the content o f transmission. During World War I, United States government
code breaking operations had agreements with telegraph stations for daily receipt of
copies o f all international diplomatic message traffic. Although protected by
cryptography, copies were obtained and subjected to intensive code-breaking efforts to
investigate the information leaving and entering sovereign territory.34
Although the US required special agreements, and often court orders, to obtain copies
of messages from the commercial telegraph operators, many other states had few such
restrictions. Since the communication system was government owned, government
interception was assumed by all involved. Some state sovereignty had been surrendered
in exchange for international efficiency — largely in the business arena. However,
sovereign actions still attempted to investigate the information crossing borders.

34Herbert O. Yardley, The American Black Chamber (Laguna Hills, CA, Aegean Park Press, 1931).
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Enter the Telephone

Telephone communications entered the communications arena in the final quarter of
the nineteenth century. Once again, states could — technically — supervise
conversations crossing their borders. However, where telegraphic messages required
consignment to paper, telephone conversations were transient and left no residual trail.
Supervision o f cross-border telephone conversations would require an operator to listen
to every international call — one government agent per call. As with early attempts to
control telegraphic messages, the sheer enormity o f the task required that states forego
universal supervision in the interest o f communications efficiency. States could still
selectively or randomly eavesdrop on telephone calls but control — short o f severely
restricting or not allowing international telephone connections — was lost.

Wire Versus Wireless
Both telegraph and early telephone networks required physical connection between
points by wire. Early in the twentieth century, nearly worldwide “wireless” connections
via radio became feasible. Telegraph and telephone systems required physical
construction o f cable systems between points. Radio, on the other hand, operated with
transmitters at one location and receivers at another. Laws o f physics with further
dependency on atmospheric phenomena determined maximum distances. Initially, radio
could only support the transmission o f telegraphic messages, but later advances allowed
for voice, and later, much more rapid transfer of data. Where Morse Code (whether by
wire or radio) allowed transmission at rates of approximately 30 words per minute, early
radio teletypewriters more than doubled that speed.
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The possible distances traversed by radio waves made it attractive to many long
distance applications. Terrestrial telegraph wires presented a physical presence over
which states had some control. Installation o f the wires could always be forbidden or
severed at the border if they became undesirable. Radio waves, however, fall where they
are directed. A state has no ability to prevent a radio wave from crossing its borders and
must invest in appropriate technology in order to learn that waves have crossed its
frontiers.
Laws o f physics determine how radio waves travel. Depending on electromagnetic
characteristics o f the transmitter and its associated antenna, waves might “hug” the earth
for maximum “line-of-sight” distances o f around 30 miles, bounce off o f the ionosphere
for possible, but sporadic, communications worldwide, or travel in straight lines from
point-to-point in terrestrial applications or into outer space. In the latter case, orbiting
satellites receive the signals and relay them back to earth. But states are powerless to stop
the radio waves (and the information carried thereon) from entering their sovereign
territory. The signals are present and require only the appropriate equipment to detect
their presence and extract the information component. The state’s only option to prevent
the reception o f these unwanted signals requires the generation and transmission of
technically similar, but more powerful signals — normally referred to as “jamming.”

Copper, Glass, and Gutta-Percha
Both “wireless” radio and cable have evolved technologically. The telegraph cable of
the nineteenth century consisted o f a copper wire protected from the elements by rubber
or gutta-percha — a rubber-like substance, more durable and less flexible, particularly
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well-suited for underwater electric insulation. One wire allowed the transmission o f one
message at maximum speeds of approximately 30 five-letter words per minute (five-letter
words were used as a quantified measure of transmission speed; shorter and longer words
were, o f course, routinely used in actual message texts). Early telephone connections
suffered from the same limitations — one wire (or pair o f wires) for each conversation.
Contemporary cables contain various configurations o f metal or minuscule strands of
glass — fiber optics — which can simultaneously accommodate the equivalent of
thousands o f single-wire circuits. Similarly, modem radio systems, often reliant on
satellites to relay signals back to earth, carry thousands o f telephone calls simultaneously
in concert with the transfer o f television signals and huge quantities o f computer data.
Rather than telegraphic or electronic communications, these technologies are best
described by the term telecommunications: The science and technology o f transmitting
information, as words, sounds, or images, over great distances, in the form of
electromagnetic signals, as by telegraph, telephone, radio, or television.

Satellites and Sovereignty
Telecommunications technology also introduced a “vertical” element to sovereignty
far beyond the altitude o f aircraft entering or traversing a state’s territory.
Communications relay satellites generated the question: How far “up” into the
atmosphere, stratosphere, ionosphere, and beyond, does a state’s sovereignty extend?
While this might appear, at first, to rank in importance with the number o f dancing angels
accommodated on the head o f a pin, the question actually has significant import to the
joint and interrelated issues o f telecommunications and sovereignty.
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Development of aircraft first introduced the vertical element to sovereignty. States
claimed and continue to maintain sovereign rights to control air traffic above their
territory. But at what altitude does sovereignty attenuate?
In the late 1950s and until 1960, the US flew recurring U-2 aircraft reconnaissance
missions over the Soviet Union. Operating altitudes in excess o f 80,000 feet, they were
considered “safe” since Soviet air defense capability could not extend higher than 60,000
feet. No international law precedent existed or developed as a result, but a de facto
interpretation limited vertical sovereignty to the operational limits o f air defense
technology. As that technology developed, the operational “reach” extended,
theoretically, into the range of satellite orbits. Contemporary satellites o f all types, space
stations, and shuttles continuously pass over the “sovereign” territory o f many of the
world’s states, some of which could conceivably develop an anti-satellite capability
(although such development has been limited by treaty). No outcry ensues claiming
sovereignty violations. However, satellites dedicated to telecommunications (as opposed
to those intended for espionage, weather, or scientific exploration) provided a forum for
the world’s states to determine the status o f sovereignty and orbiting platforms.
In practical application, long distance, high-capacity telecommunications technology
requires satellites to act as a relay for electromagnetic communications beyond “line-ofsite.”35 Satellites in “low earth orbit” rotate around the planet at a rate dependent on their

35High frequency communications in the 3 to 30 hertz range also provide over-the-horizon
electromagnetic communications. However, the information carrying capacity is severely limited to the
vicinity o f 1.2 kilobytes per second where “high capacity” requirements are measured in the m egabyte (and
higher) range. Cables, especially those based on fiber-optic technology also provide high capacity
information transfer, but the cable has a clearly identifiable physical presence, unlike electromagnetic waves
which require equipment to detect their presence.
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altitude above the surface. Typically, a satellite in a low-earth orbit o f approximately 100
miles completes circle of the earth in about 90 minutes.
Antennas for use in satellite communications are highly directional and must be
“aimed” at the satellite within a tolerance of a few degrees. Consequently, a low-orbit
satellite is “visible” for only a short time, and further, must be “tracked” as it passes
across the sky from horizon to horizon.
The orbiting satellite’s orbital “period” increases in direct proportion to its distance
from the earth. Again, dependent upon o f laws o f physics, a platform placed in orbit,
directly over the equator, at 22,300 miles above the earth’s surface has a period o f 24
hours. As the earth beneath it rotates at the same rate, the satellite appears to remain
permanently in the same spot in the sky. Antennas may, therefore, be aimed at a satellite
and remain virtually fixed, except for minor “fine tuning.”
Relay satellites’ positions over the equator are critical to the telecommunicationsdependent government, business, and industrial operations o f the world. In 1978, several
equatorial states presented the World Radio Conference (WRC), under the auspices o f the
ITU, with demands for sovereignty over the satellite “slots” 22,300 miles above their
territory. The situation was resolved not by acknowledging equatorial states’ sovereignty
over spots in space 22,300 miles above their territory. Rather, the various “slots” were
allocated to all o f the world’s states participating in the WRC.
The specific vertical limit o f sovereignty remains unresolved under international law.
However, platforms in orbit have been limited by treaty (the Outer Space Treaty, 1972)
and other agreements within the WRC.
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The Internet — Synergistic Amalgamation o f All Transmission Media
The Internet uses pieces o f virtually every type o f telecommunications. The “user” at
a home or office computer connects to an Internet server via telephone, television cable,
or special dedicated circuit over a pair of wires or strand of fiber optics. Connections
between the servers and Internet nodes might be accomplished by terrestrial based cable
and radio, or by satellite radio systems, or any combination thereof. The volume of
information transferred, when compared to early telegraph capabilities, becomes
staggering. No longer measured in “words per minute,” “bits per second” (bps) now
quantity information transfer. Manual, 30 words-per-minute telegraph might be expected
to transfer information at a few bps. The typical home computer with a dial-up Internet
connection operates at 56,000 bps. Fiber optic cables and high capacity radio systems
measure information transfer in the millions (mega) and billions (giga) bps range, with
much higher rates on the technological horizon.

Radio Waves Without Respect fo r Territorial Borders
The contemporary result o f a century and a half o f technological evolution in
telecommunications since the introduction of the telegraph is that information-carrying
telecommunications media cross international borders with near-impunity. States can,
through parallel technical development, attempt to monitor communications and decipher
the contents, but any ability to influence or control the content o f information reaching
their citizens is negligible, at best, without draconian measures. China, for example,
attempts to control all Internet traffic entering and leaving the country by requiring all
exchanges to transit government-controlled servers. However, satellite telephones, which
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connect directly to worldwide telephone systems, allow Internet connections which
circumvent state-sponsored supervision. The only sure means o f preventing Internet data
from reaching Chinese users would require a ban on all computers and non-state
controlled telephones. Such measures might virtually eliminate the state’s much sought
after foreign investment.
North Korea pursues even more extreme measures to isolate itself from the adverse
effects o f information. The state strictly controls television and radio transmissions, the
Internet is virtually non-existent and where it does exist, its use is closely monitored, and
international telephone calls are priced by state-owned utilities beyond the means o f most
citizens. However, refugees frequently brave the borders to cross into China where they
purchase and often return with cellular telephones. Near borders, the smuggled
equipment can make use o f Chinese cellular service which allows information exchange
far beyond that desired by the state.36

Summary: Telecommunications, Information, and Sovereignty
In the modem telecommunications environment, states find that their sovereign
control over cross-border data flows are severely limited. That data may contain cultural
material (radio, television, motion pictures, music or any imaginable type of
entertainment media), include large or small financial transactions, or disguise
multifarious exchanges among dispersed people. The alternative, withdrawal from
participation in the international economic environment, causes states to accept a
surrender, reduction, or change in the nature o f sovereignty.

36Young Howard, “The Real Threat to Kim,” International H erald Tribune, February 25, 2005.
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The discussion thus far, leads back to the original research question: In what ways
does telecommunications technology affect state sovereignty? In pursuit o f answers, a
series o f hypotheses were proposed in Chapter I:
The more telecommunications technology developed, the less states could:
a. Control the passage o f information across their borders.
b. Influence the inflow and outflow of funds.
c. Limit cultural penetration through foreign influence.
After more detailed discussion o f both sovereignty and telecommunications, it
appears that further analysis will result in rejection o f the null hypothesis. However, an
arbitrary decision about acceptance or rejection o f hypotheses requires structured
consideration as proposed in the methodology section. The subsequent four chapters each
address sovereignty during historical eras dominated by particular telecommunications
technology.
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CHAPTER III
AGE OF [NEWS] PAPER — 1648-1844

The previous two chapters developed the process and provided background on
sovereignty (the dependent variable) and telecommunications (the independent variable).
This chapter begins analysis o f the two variables at a time when the value o f the
independent variable was, effectively, zero. Sovereignty, and the associated system of
sovereign states existed; telecommunications did not. This chapter, therefore, serves as a
“control era” to investigate sovereignty when information transfer existed in its peculiar
“state-of-nature” and moved only at the speed humans could carry it. Establishing and
evaluating a baseline situation also lays the groundwork for a foundation and format for
follow-on eras when new elements of telecommunications technology dominated
information transfer.
This era commences with the emergence of an international system o f sovereign states
in the seventeenth century when no telecommunications technology could accelerate the
speed o f information transfer. Three and a half centuries later, as a result of
telecommunications technology, information routinely shifted throughout the world at the
speed o f light. To restate the research question: In what ways does telecommunications
technology affect state sovereignty? This and subsequent chapters explore how sovereign
states differ across the time included in the four eras and what role telecommunications
technology played in creating those differences.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

77

Introduction
The methodology presented in Chapter I stipulates a structure consisting o f four
chronological eras, each of which was dominated by a characteristic technology for
transfer and distribution o f information. The eras provide a framework for analysis of
effects on sovereignty as telecommunications technology developed and the speed of
information transfer escalated. This chapter begins at a time when the international
system o f sovereign states was a new phenomenon and information transfer was in its
“state-of-nature” and not accelerated or augmented by any electronic means. Historically,
information moved by cumbersome processes. Data, facts, ideas, or any other form of
knowledge or intelligence was consigned to the written word on papyrus, paper,
parchment, or some similar substrate. (Paper was a relatively late development in the
history o f humanity, but it is used here as a generic term for any o f the lightweight
substrates to which the written word was consigned. Heavier material such as pottery or
stone was also used but more for preservation and presentation o f information than
transfer.1) O f course, information could also be memorized and transported “in the brain”
of a messenger, but quantity, and perhaps quality, o f the delivered information might be
in question. Transport o f the paper was the most viable means o f information transfer for
multiple millennia subsequent to the development o f writing and until the development of
the telegraph. In research methods terms, the Age of [News] Paper, therefore, serves as a
“control” era for subsequent comparison. Ensuing chapters explore sovereignty under the

'Dard Hunter, Papermaking: The H istory and Technique o f an Ancient Craft (New York: Dover
Publications, 1947), 8.
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influence o f technology which accelerated information transfer and permitted wider
distribution and availability.
The mid-seventeenth century provides a particularly appropriate time to begin a study
o f sovereignty. Political scientists and historians generally agree that the first
international system o f sovereign states reached fruition in 1648 following the Peace of
Westphalia at the conclusion o f the Thirty Years War.2 The manifestation of sovereign
states alone marks a pertinent point at which to begin discussion and analysis. However,
other events during the same era also emphasize the appropriateness o f beginning
evaluation at that point. In particular, banking and monetary transactions made
evolutionary surges and newspapers entered the public domain as the first incarnation of
“mass media.”
During the seventeenth century, the fledgling international monetary system
approached a level o f sophistication permitting various forms o f paper notes to be
exchanged in lieu of long enduring processes requiring the physical transfer o f precious
metal coin. This development depended upon sophisticated merchants who saw the
advantage of storing their money in locations other than their homes. Growth and success
in monetary systems required trust in the stability o f both governments and the banking.3
Additionally, moveable type printing matured to a point where increased literacy and
concomitant public hunger for news resulted in the emergence o f periodic broadsheets,
pamphlets, and written propaganda o f all types. Spurred on by public demand for

2Bull, The Anarchical Society, 9.
3Steven Horwitz, M onetary Evolution, Free Banking, and Econom ic O rder (Boulder, CO: Westview,
1992), 115.
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information about the Thirty Years War, the newspaper entered European society where it
became the first “mass media.”4 Post-Renaissance European society and culture were
poised for transformation and very susceptible to change. Society was in a state o f flux
and even the newly acknowledged sovereignty of states, despite the immaturity of their
“system” as primary international organizing factor, were among the targets for change.
Trade among sovereign states necessitated international financial transactions and the
ease o f funds transfer made possible by the emergence o f international banking
cooperation. States were moving toward mercantilism with its inherent emphasis on
maximizing exports while minimizing imports. Easing border restraints encouraged trade
and related activities but came at the cost of some sovereign control.5 Cultural interaction
and exchange, as it had taken place throughout history, continued. Where borders are
opened for one purpose, they become permeable; the easing o f migration or trade
restrictions allowed the passage o f ideas as well.
This process continued with little change until the nineteenth century when the steam
engine increased the speed o f human movement over water and land, and in 1845,
Samuel Morse opened his first telegraph line. For the first time, the information transfer
exceeded the speed at which humans could carry it. Therefore, 18454marks the
appropriate point at which to end the Age o f [News] Paper.

4R. A. Houston, Literacy in Early M odem Europe: Culture an d Education, 1500-1800 (London:
Longman, 1988), 167.
sHenri Pirenne, Econom ic and Social H istory o f M edieval Europe (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1937),
217.
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Role o f Information
As introduced and discussed in Chapter I, any relationship between state sovereignty
and telecommunications appears superficially esoteric, at best. With the introduction of
an intervening variable — information — the association begins to solidify and become
somewhat more intuitive. Still, information’s role, its speed o f transfer and distribution,
and any resultant effect on sovereignty remains elusive. The very basis o f the sovereign
state establishes the foundations for analysis. Theories o f international relations,
developed in pursuit o f explanations for the international system, differ as to the exact
role o f states. However, regardless of the theoretical platform on which behavioral
explanations are based, states, in the exercise and pursuit of their sovereignty, are most
likely to act in their own best interest. In doing so, timely knowledge about the actions of
competitors, adversaries, enemies, or even friends across the international system
influence a state’s decision making processes and development o f responses to other
states’ actions. In straight forward terms, the rapidity o f information transfer often
determines its impact on states and their actions. “Rapidity,” in this context falls into a
particularly pertinent trap o f relativity. Routine news historically traveled across the
breadth o f Europe in terms o f months as travelers, traders, or migrants moved. However,
a dedicated dispatch rider might complete the journey in a matter o f weeks, but at great
expense. In the sixteenth century, for example, letters containing “news” traveled faster
than any other commodity. Mail at its most efficient employed private postal firms which
promised, but rarely accomplished, mail delivery from Rome to Madrid in 24 days — 26
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days during winter.6 More typically, during the same era, the Venetian ambassador in
Madrid was known to complain of two months passing without news and instructions
from his home government.7 Timely letters were the purview only o f the very rich who
could purchase rapid transport; maximum speed and minimum time eluded most
correspondents. In this case, the best possible time lapse between event and receipt of
news resulted in aging of “new” information. Often, the latest “news” received was not
far separated from “history.”
The role o f information deserves additional discussion with particular attention to its
working definition. As noted in Chapter I, information is a collection o f facts, data,
numbers, and symbols that have meaning. Information can also assume complex
meanings. The field o f information theory delves into mathematical optimization of
transfer o f data over electronic channels.8 In a social science environment, the
mathematics o f data transfer plays virtually no role as information simply represents the
application o f knowledge to work in pursuit of “wealth.” For example, facts about the
existence of game running free in a forest provide little value. Adding information to the
facts about game increases its worth. The hunter has information about where to find
game, how to stalk it, how to kill it, and how to dress and cook the meat.9 Beginning with
the simplistic nature o f basic information, the path toward an information based society

6Femand Braudel, The M editerranean and the M editerranean World in the A ge o f Philip II, Vol. I
(New York: William Collins, 1972), 368.
’Ibid., 357.
8Shannon, “A Mathematical Theory o f Communication,” 380.
9Wriston, The Twilight o f Sovereignty, 3.
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seems long and somewhat esoteric. In simple steps, the importance o f information rose
steadily, if somewhat slowly, throughout history.
As society evolved from hunter-gatherers to become more complex, the information
of value to society also increased in volume and complexity. Facts and the application of
information continued to include practical applications necessary for day to day life and
continued survival, but expanded into philosophical and esoteric areas. The Romans
introduced the manufacturing “high technology” o f the era, the potters’ wheel, throughout
its European domain along with their Latin language, distinctive ways o f dress, housing,
and governance. The synergistic influence o f technology, culture, and knowledge — all
based on information — influenced future development o f European society long after
Roman withdrawal. However, without continued “real time” influence, potters’ wheels
disappeared throughout the middle ages and reappeared only as the continent awakened
and embarked into the renaissance.10 Types and categories o f information could be
dissected and subjected to infinite levels of scrutiny, but for purposes o f this study,
information is best approached using a more subtle, even simplistic definition:
Knowledge communicated or received concerning a particular fact or circum stance;11 in
modem vernacular, it is little different from news.
In this context, information represents a “commodity.” It exists as a result of the
occurrence o f an event, creation of an idea, or virtually anything happening.
Information’s value particularly materializes after transfer to another location and

10J. D. Van der Waals, “Early Ceramics in the Netherlands: Two Problems,” in Ceram ics and Man, ed.
Frederick R. Matson, 124-139 (Chicago: Aldine Publishing, 1965), 124.
11Random House W ebster’s Electronic D ictionary an d Thesaurus, C ollege Edition, s.v. “Information.”
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distribution to “consumers.” Throughout history, information traveled in concert with
human movement. Eventual introduction o f telecommunications technology would
propel information at previously unimagined speeds, allowing it to be received [nearly]
instantaneously at great distances and rendering distance irrelevant; as a result, it is
telecommunications technology that provides a basis for the trite adage about “the world
growing smaller.”
Remaining, for the moment, with that trite idea, if the world grew “smaller,” how big
had it been? In other words, what was the nature o f information transfer before
telecommunications? Ergo, the reason for a “control era;” the Age o f [News] Paper
establishes the “state-of-nature” for information transfer.

State-of-Nature
Social scientists and political philosophers postulated on the basic makeup of
humanity throughout history (and continue to do so). The concept o f “state-of-nature,”
provides an analytical tool for imaginative projection o f humanity and interpersonal
relations before the creation o f organized political society.12 A liberal interpretation of
the political science term, with only slight expansion to its classic definition, offers a
similar analytical tool for the study o f telecommunications development and concomitant
influence o f information. Prior to the development and introduction of
telecommunications, information existed and traveled in its peculiar state-of-nature. In
its “natural” state, information travels at the speed o f human movement.

l2David Robertson, ed., D ictionary o f P olitics (London: Penguin Books, 1993), s.v. “State o f Nature.”
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Similarly, intercultural influence and other natural processes o f social evolution — to
include evolution o f sovereignty — occurred at their peculiar state-of-nature, dependent
on migration, trade, or conquest and general human interaction where they cross
pollinated through exchange o f food, music, language, religion, and ideas. “Dominant”
cultures sometimes engulfed and subsumed others throughout history, but at a velocity
appropriate to the speed at which cultural influence spread. The faster information moves
across state or cultural boundaries, the faster social evolutionary changes might be
expected. In the end, over extended periods, anything approaching “cultural purity” has,
probably, always been something of a myth. In the early twentieth century, Ralph Linton,
in The Study o f Man: An Introduction, suggested: “There is probably no culture extant
to-day (sic) which owes more than 10 percent of its total elements to inventions made by
members o f its own society.”13
Information, in any o f its forms, at some point loses its vitality as news and precedes
through an esoteric metamorphosis to become history. In the seventeenth century, by the
time news o f a financial crisis, invasion of one state by another, or even natural disasters,
traversed Europe, states’ reactions would likely be to a fa it accompli rather than a
situation in progress. By comparison (and to set the stage for an eventual end point in
later chapters) in the modem world, events unfold under the watchful eyes o f the world.
The worldwide telephone network with its inherent facsimile machines, computers, video
phones, and a plethora o f other devices; massive electronic data bases; and nearly
ubiquitous broadcast news teams linked by satellite provided instant access to the world’s
financial specialists and government decision makers. The participants in this cornucopia

nRalph Linton, The Study o f Man: An Introduction (New York: D. Appleton-Century, 1936), 325.
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o f interpersonal communications spent money and voted. Potentially, ideas leading to
democracy, free markets, and free expression transfer among cultures as well as
traditional exchanges o f music, food, language, and sports competition. A remark,
attributed to Indira Gandhi, once speculated that a revolution could result from a peasant
seeing a modem refrigerator while watching a foreign television sitcom.14 Faced with a
constant barrage o f information which reaches the populace as readily as it reaches state
decision makers, states had to deal with their exclusive authority within their territory as
well as their participation in the international system. Not only do they have access to
global actions o f MNCs, individuals, and other states, the rest o f the world has access to
their domestic actions. Secrets, state or other, prove difficult to keep. In the information
transfer state-of-nature, sovereign states need have little concern for drastic and
immediate influence o f “alien” concepts. Information moved slower. It was subject to
some (but never absolute) control or even censorship. Ideas might be exchanged, but at a
slower pace.
Some interaction between state sovereignty and telecommunications technology
appears to exists. O f course, scholarly analysis requires a structured comparison allowing
valid conclusions rather than intuitive or anecdotal inference. The nature o f the situation
suggests comparison across time beginning with a “control” or state-of-nature period
when transfer o f information, in the form of words, sounds, or images, over great
distances did not exist, and concluding with the early twenty-first century, where
ubiquitous communications have made distance nearly irrelevant to the immediate
transfer o f information. Electromagnetic means o f information transfer (telegraph,

l4Wriston, The Twilight o f Sovereignty, 46-47.
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telephone, radio, television, computer networks, and all the associated means of
communications) first entered the equation in the nineteenth century and expanded
steadily thereafter. The existence, availability, and use telecommunications and
concomitant changes to sovereignty indicate a covariant relationship. However, an
indication does not constitute empirical evidence.
This study particularly lends itself to analysis based on a structured, focused
comparison. The nature o f telecommunications development suggests a study thereof in
four “eras,” each defined by a dominant means o f information transfer. The first era —
the focus o f this chapter — establishes a period for “control” when information transfer in
its state-of-nature lacked any enabling factor of telecommunications technology and
transfer and distribution was at the “state-of-nature.” The telegraph dominated the next
era, followed by another where continued use o f cable connected telegraph was
augmented by “wireless” radio. The final era examines a time when communications
approach truly ubiquitous.
Sovereignty, as the dependent variable, provides an essential element o f this
investigation. However, sovereignty did not materialize in 1648 out o f proverbial thin
air. It was the product of extended social evolution which did not then abruptly halt at its
inception. Gradually, states, their leaders (princes), and political systems flexed their
cognitive wings, freed themselves o f feudalism’s fetters, and set their sights on the
freedom o f state actions which manifested in sovereignty.
This and each of the succeeding chapters focuses on one o f the eras under study.
Each analysis begins with an examination of how sovereignty manifested itself during
that time frame and how it met the needs of the era’s society. The dominant means of
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telecommunications technology and how it affects the sovereignty o f the era provide a
framework under which to identify the mass media present as the most prevalent means
o f information distribution; telecommunications infrastructure, territorial control, cultural
cross-pollination, and international finance.

Sovereignty and Society in the Age of [News] Paper
Seventeenth century European society was poised for an Hegelian synthesis like
sovereignty. The Renaissance neared its terminus, the Age o f Discovery approached its
zenith, and the Industrial Revolution balanced in waiting on the event horizon o f the
space-time continuum. Society had evolved to a point where proto-industrialization and
the business infrastructure provided organization to society. Residual elements of
feudalism no longer offered any structural stability to communities.15 The Middle Ages
had been socially and technically stagnant; spanning nearly a millennium beginning with
the fifth century fall o f the Roman Empire, neither sovereignty nor communications saw
any development. Feudalism dominated society and information distribution continued
as it had since conception o f the written word.16 Scribes laboriously hand copied text
which then moved, if at all, only as fast as humans carried it. Distribution o f information,
at best, happened when a town crier or other official read “news” or other announcements
to an assembled, and largely illiterate, populace.
The Eurocentric nature o f the origins o f sovereignty bear repeating at this point.
Although sovereign states dominated the entire world’s international system in the

l5Philpott, “Ideas and the Evolution o f Sovereignty,” 29.
l6Bartleson, A G enealogy o f Sovereignty, 244-245.
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twentieth and into twenty-first centuries, sovereignty was originally a phenomenon
peculiar to Europe. It was a “closed club” o f Christian, Caucasian, European states which
extended “membership” very begrudgingly. Not until the aftermath o f the twentieth
century and its two world wars did the “system” expand to encompass the entire planet.17
As Europe crept out o f the Middle ages, the release o f restraints on thinking combined
with the maturity o f movable type printing to spark an increase in the texts available for
distribution. As logic and reason crawled into cognitive processes previously
overpowered by religious dogma, the social and economic environment was set to exploit
non-religious use o f the printing press. Gutenberg’s initial success was based on
production o f sacred books, but entrepreneurial developments soon saturated the market
for religious texts and the new printing industry expanded into the secular domain.
The church dominated feudal world allowed no conception o f secular based states.
Governments owing no allegiance to the Pope were unthinkable. Free thinking
encouraged by the Renaissance and the Protestant Reformation combined with
widespread distribution o f printed material and allowed the “Princes” o f Europe (and
their sycophantic court philosophers) enough freedom o f thought to conceive of an
international system without church restraint. The causes of the Thirty Years War, 1618
- 1648, included a prince’s right to determine his state’s religion free o f external (as in
“papal”) influence. The war’s conclusion, marked by the Peace o f Westphalia (see
Chapter II) and emergence o f the sovereign state, acknowledged the princes’ rights to
determine how their citizenry would worship.18 Freedom from the pope’s influence left

l7Bull, The Anarchical Society, 13.
18Philpott, “Ideas and the Evolution o f Sovereignty,” 29.
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state governments as the ultimate authority within their territory. The international
system o f sovereign states was in existence despite the pope’s “nullification” o f the
Westphalia agreements. The states involved exploited the validity, strength, and vitality
of their sovereignty.19
This was the [European] “world”of the seventeenth century. States had been to war
over how their realms would worship. Philosophers thought and wrote without church
imposed, dogmatic restraints on their range o f ideas — or at least, far fewer restraints
than suffered by previous generations o f thinkers. States might attempt to exert influence
on appropriate subjects for intellectual investigation, but foreign church influence had
been removed. Books emerged from presses and the literate public’s thirst for
information gave rise to the first newspapers as the prototype mass media.20
The very ground so fertile to the germination o f the sovereign state, at the same time,
also contained the sown seeds o f threats to the states’ unlimited domestic power.
Sovereignty rested with the princes. The sovereign state was a product o f free thinking
and the wide distribution of information about “other” ways to live, govern, and be
governed. Free thinking would eventually lead to demands in many states for a shift in
the focus o f sovereignty from the prince to a governing legislature and eventually to the
populace. Absolute and unlimited power were always theoretical; state sovereignty was
neither absolute nor static. It always had limits and as a social concept, it was subject to
changes brought about by social evolution.

19Gilbert, The Norton H istory o f M odern Europe, 258.
20Harold Herd, The M arch o f Journalism: The Story o f the British P ress fro m 1622 to the Present D ay
(London: Allen and Unwin, 1952), 12.
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Telecommunications and Sovereignty During the Age o f [News] Paper
The “Age o f [News] Paper” sets the stage for diachronic comparison of the ensuing
three “ages.” It establishes the “norm,” as it were, when mass media, state control of
territory, cultural development, international finance, and sovereignty as a whole
functioned in their “state-of-nature” without the external influence o f telecommunications
technology. Although some mechanical means existed for “long distance”
communications such as Europe’s mechanical telegraph or semaphore system,21 their
information throughput was so low that they played little role in technologically
stimulated social evolution. Not until the introduction o f the electro mechanical telegraph
in 1845 did an effective means o f information transfer evolve.

Dominant Mass Media
As the chapter title implies, the newspaper monopolized mass media during this era.
For uncounted generations, news had passed among the worlds’ populations via word of
mouth, or in formal procedures, by public criers or assemblies. With increased literacy
— even if largely confined to middle and upper classes — the public demanded more
information. Periodic (daily and weekly) broadsides arose during the Thirty Years War
— the same war that gave rise to sovereignty.
Newspapers were printed in massive quantity and distributed in the same manner as
all other information of the era, at the speed humans could carry it. Items for inclusion
within the printed material (information) had to travel to press at the same speed at which
the end product printed material was distributed.

21Solymar, G etting the M essage, 23.
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[Tele] -Communications
Throughout the Control Era, no means existed for the transmission o f words, sounds,
or images over great distances except physical transport. Movable type printing
technology evolved to a point where the first “mass media” emerged in the form of
newspapers early in the seventeenth century. The readily available printed news provided
extensive distribution to large numbers of people. The movement o f information, its
transfer, however many copies might have been quickly and easily printed, still relied on
the speed o f the era’s contemporary ground transport. No telecommunications existed to
provide augmentation to information transfer.

Territorial Control
The sovereign state was bom a territorial entity.22 Classic political science definitions
of the state require a functioning government capable o f external recognition and
negotiation, a population identified with the state, and defined territory. In its early days,
the sovereign state met that definition better than it ever would again. The borders o f the
first European states also encompassed ill defined “nations” (people with a shared
cultural heritage) giving rise to the idea of “nation-state.”
The nature o f transportation required the use o f paths or roads as most people or
goods crossed state frontiers. Smugglers, o f course, could avail themselves o f less
traveled (and less guarded) border crossings. Piracy, smuggling, and other criminal
activities sought to circumvent border controls. Still, states were able to exert positive
supervision over much of what crossed their borders. In an age o f mercantilism, states

22Krasner, Sovereignty: O rganized H ypocrisy, 20.
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tried to minimize the export of precious metals and supervise any funds entering or
leaving their territory. Information, however, was another matter. The state might try to
intercept books, letters, or other media, but ideas can be committed to memory and
regurgitated once through border control points; books are relatively small and easily
concealed; letters, more so. Borders might be guarded but where information was
concerned, they were always somewhat permeable. In later eras, as money became less
possession o f specie and more inseparable from information, its control became more
difficult.

Cultural Cross-Pollination
As long as human beings clustered together and formed something approaching a
“culture,” they interacted with other, similar groupings. It was a slow process. Contact
with other cultures resulted from trade, migration, and warfare often leading to conquest.
Travel between cultures was on foot (either human or animal) and cross-pollination
between and among cultures was an active but belated response. Intercultural contact left
its mark on affected societies, but it took time.
The existence o f books, newspapers, pamphlets, and other printed material emerging
from the new technology o f moveable type printing, perhaps, exerted some degree of
acceleration to the state-of-nature level of cultural exchange. Literate elements o f the
populace had more information than ever before about other cultures, but censorship was
nearly universal. “Illegal” books and other material could be obtained, however, state
restrictions put severe limits on many classes of literature.23

23Houston, L iteracy in E arly M odern Europe, 167.
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The territory defining early states tended to surround a “nation.” Difficult to define
precisely, a nation simply describes a group of people with a shared or common cultural
heritage including identity and language.24 Therefore, the territorial states tended toward
the concept o f nation-states. The nation element o f the nation-state, was constantly under
“attack” as the recipients o f cultural cross-pollination. No culture remains static unless it
is totally isolated from any outside contact. It is difficult to imagine any culture
prevailing in total isolation; even remote Pacific Island tribes have been shown to have
experienced some cross-fertilization via ocean migration.
Throughout history, people moved among population centers for purposes of
migration, trade, or conquest and as they did, their cultural heritage traveled with them
and some o f it shed influence on other societies.25 This represents the “state-of-nature”
under which cultural development takes place; intermingling, cross-fertilization, and
transcultural assimilation takes place as an entirely “natural” element o f social evolution.
This state-of-nature, without the influence of telecommunications technology,
becomes another essential starting point for evaluation. As speed o f travel and
information transfer developed, it was not a direct influence on social and cultural
evolution, but rather, a catalyst which accelerated the natural processes. Cross
pollination of cultures, intermingling o f heritage, or any other descriptive term, was a
natural process in the development of humanity.

24Iain McLean, ed., O xford Concise D ictionary o f P olitics (Oxford: University Press, 1996), s.v.
“Nation-state.”
“ “Cultures: Millennium in Maps,” N ational Geographic, August, 1999, Map Supplement.
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International Finance
Yet another “revolution” in social evolution was taking place and coming into its
own during this era. A banking system supporting the use o f paper money in lieu of
classic cash, approached maturity.26 The history o f money includes the use of many
substances o f value including foodstuffs, salt, gems, and most well known, precious
metals - predominantly gold and sliver. The use o f precious metal coins emerged in Asia
Minor, specifically Lydia, during the sixth century

B.C.

at which time it replaced

exchange o f commodities as a means of trade.27 By the seventeenth century and the era
under study, gold and silver dominated national coin. Trade, even at the prevailing speed
of ground transport, was a fact o f life and required payment for goods received and
services rendered. Valuations o f trade using various precious metal coin remained the
dominant means o f exchange until banking systems emerged with the adequate public
trust to permit the use o f paper abstractions o f the specie. The need to make payments
across borders gave birth to international banking and exchange o f paper instruments in
lieu of payment in gold or silver, but without the physical movement o f metal by the
trader.
States’ rights to determine their “coin of the realm” predated the manifestation of
sovereignty. As an essential element of state function, it remained unchanged. If far off
bankers in Amsterdam analyzed and assessed their coin and determined its value to be

26Niall Ferguson, The Cash Nexus: M oney and P ow er in the M odern World, 1700-2000 (New York:
Basic, 2001), 109.
27Jack Weatherford, The H istory o f Money: From Sandstone to C yberspace (N ew York: Three Rivers
Press, 1997), 31.
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less than the state’s declared worth, news o f the transaction was so slow in arriving that
challenges might well have been moot.
In a world economy dominated by mercantilism, states’ ability to exert positive
control over their borders, and the time delay in learning o f distant transactions all
merged to give the state essential control over its domestic finances relatively free of
external influence. Funds crossing borders either had to be in specie or letters o f credit.
Letters of credit were o f primary value when redeemed through banks which were,
further, under state scrutiny if not control. The international use o f generic “money”
reached a degree o f maturity in this era as the associated development o f banks and
“paper money” entered the world’s markets.28

Sovereignty as a Whole
Sovereign states, as the “Control Era” commenced, were as independent o f other
states as they would ever be. A century and a half later, but still within the control era, at
the 1815 Congress o f Vienna and the through the resultant Concert o f Europe, the
sovereign state reached genuine maturity.29 Still a European, Christian, Caucasian
phenomenon, the states approached (but never reached) absolute sovereignty.

However,

as soon as they were established, “threats” to sovereignty began as well. Within half a
century o f Westphalia, the Industrial Revolution eased its way into existence with

28Ibid„ 132.
29Beatrice Heuser, “Sovereignty, Self-Determination, and Security: N ew World Orders in the Twentieth
Century,” in State Sovereignty: Change and Persistence in International Relations, ed. Sohail H. Hashmi,
81-104 (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997), 83.
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explosive results. Bloodless — with the exception o f many “expendable” workers — the
Industrial Revolution began to chip away at the solidity o f state borders.
No state, however diverse, had the natural resources to support industrial
development and production without international trade. Little argument challenged a
state’s absolute right to guard its borders. Every shipment across international frontiers
could — legally — be inspected by the agents of the affected governments on both sides
o f any border, but shipping time had already been limited by the contemporary speed of
transport. Imposition o f additional delay in delivery due to government bureaucracy
would very likely result in increased costs leading to the true bottom line o f lower profits.
Lower profits would result in lower taxes paid to the state, so it could be said that
“surrender” o f some element of sovereignty was actually self-preservation. The same
situation would emerge in later eras under the influence o f technology when states had to
make decisions as to the “free” or unrestricted passage o f electronic messages, first
through telegraph wires and later via more sophisticated information transfer means.
For strictly economic reasons, governments relaxed border oversight. Information
might well fall into the category o f “goods” when in the form o f books, newspapers, or
other printed material. In the Industrial Revolution, the seeds o f the Information
Revolution were, perhaps, sown more than two centuries before the name was applied to
the process.
Markets in various cities which were centers o f economic commerce operated in
independent isolation. By the time news was received in reaction to occurrences in one
market, so many other transactions had taken place that any reaction would be attenuated.
Markets could only react long after the fact to news o f actions by other markets. Stimulus
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and response financial transactions were limited by the intervening variable of
information and the time it took to reach its consumer. State influence beyond its borders
was also subject to the speed o f ground transport. News of domestic decisions to tax
imports, which might have serious implications to other states’ economy, could take days
or weeks, by the fastest horse mounted courier, to reach other affected governments.

Summary
The sovereign state existed in the international system o f the Control Era it its
peculiar state-of-nature. Information o f all types concerned the state — as it had and
would continue to do throughout history. New ideas might cross borders in the form of
books, newspapers, or intellectual correspondence, but they did so at a pace
commensurate with the speed at which the rest of society moved. News took days,
weeks, or months to circulate among various world capitals, seats o f government, and
market centers.
The international system o f sovereign states reached a functional level o f fruition in
1648. States’ power approached absolute. Sovereign states existed in a mutually
nurturing environment where the strength o f one increased the strength o f all. Little
challenged the sovereignty o f a state and its absolute and unlimited power within
geographic borders.
Between 1648 and 1844 (the inclusive dates of this era), the [relative] efficiency of
international trade, maturity o f banking, and increasing literacy o f the middle class
presented an ideal environment for revolution. The population o f Britain’s American
colonies and the people o f France wrested sovereignty away from the monarch to bestow
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it on the people. At the same time, the Industrial Revolution emerged and capitalism
dislodged mercantilism; its continued expansion required new markets. New markets, in
turn, required new and faster means o f transport. If the old adage is true, and necessity is
the mother o f invention, then capitalism’s necessities gave birth to railroad technology to
transport goods, and telecommunications to transport the information necessary for
business operations.
As business and the associated financial transactions began to dominate the
international environment, states provided the financial and legal systems under which
commerce took place. Logic would dictate that the sovereignty o f states o f 1648, when
virtually everything in the world moved no faster than the speed o f human travel, must be
different when information moved at the speed o f light. Subsequent chapters examine the
differences.
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CHAPTER IV
AGE OF TELEGRAPH — 1845-1916

This chapter examines sovereignty in an era when the telegraph enhanced the speed of
information transfer. Chapter III established a “Control Era” by presenting the “state-ofnature” for sovereignty where telecommunications did not exist and information traveled
at the speed humans could carry it. Physical distance provided states with a degree of
separation and independence. It required time for news o f their actions to reach distant
states and as a result, markets operated as independent national entities. Introduction o f
the telegraph, however, provided rapid and reliable transfer o f information across
extended distances and allowed governments and businesses to react quickly to actions of
others as well as to coordinate activities among widely dispersed locations. At the same
time, advances in other technologies, especially ground and sea transport utilizing steam,
increased the speed at which humans travel — the original and long standing standard for
movement o f information.
The Industrial Revolution was in full force along with associated benefits,
disadvantages, and technological developments. At the same time, the sovereign state
was a strong organizing element throughout Europe and beginning to expand to other
continents as well. Business and governments alike incorporated the new developments
in telecommunications technology — beginning with the telegraph and expanding to
include telephone and radio in turn — into their normal operating procedures. Initial
effects on sovereignty resulted from the loss of practical means by which a state could
supervise the content o f information crossing its borders. As the era neared its close early
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in the twentieth century, the synergistic union of telegraph, telephone, and radio would
see telecommunications technology approach maturity and begin to require states to
function in an environment where the world begins to know o f events nearly as they
happen.

Introduction
Any means o f communications, to include postal systems, books, trade, and
international banking allow people to reach beyond state frontiers for political or
economic activities. That has an impact on state sovereignty by enabling citizens to
extend reach and influence beyond their own and into foreign territorial boundaries.
When telecommunications enter the equation, that impact becomes more dramatic due to
the speed o f information transfer.1 Introduction o f the telegraph allowed information to
travel across vast distances at previously unheard o f speeds. Although available to
individual members o f society, it was expensive and became a tool primarily used by
governments and large businesses. Later in this era, the telephone became the first
instrument o f telecommunications technology directly available to, and used by the
generic consumer. However, “long distance” transfer o f voices over wire, versus the
transmission o f Morse code’s dots and dashes, required amplification which did not reach
fruition until near the end o f the era. Similarly, “wireless” radio also made its debut
during this era, but as an effective means o f information transfer, its impact did not
approach inherent potential until later eras. In terms o f telecommunications, this was the
Age o f Telegraph; therefore, the 1845 introduction o f telegraph provides an apt point to

‘Bugliarello, "Telecommunications, Politics, Economics,” 407.
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end an Age of [News] Paper and begin analysis o f impacts on sovereignty as the
movement of information drastically increased.
Since the mid-eighteenth century, scientists and experimenters pursued a practical
application for electricity as the means o f rapid information transfer.2 A viable
manifestation did not appear until 1845 when Samuel Morse introduced the telegraph.
Prior to this time, some primitive “mechanical” or non-electrical (as opposed to
“electromagnetic” means as included in the definition o f telecommunications) systems
achieved some success in passing information across extended distances; signal fires date
to antiquity; pigeons may have been used as early as the twelfth century, and mechanical
semaphore stations relayed messages around eighteenth century Europe in a few hours
versus the multiple days actual travel might require. The amount o f information actually
passed, throughput in postmodern vernacular, was very low and subject to a high degree
of inaccuracy (see Chapter II).
Early nineteenth century civilization, in general, developed a desire to move faster as
the Industrial Revolution grew in intensity to dominate the “civilized” world. An
international system o f sovereign states, advances in science and technology, and the
introduction o f steam power synergistically conjoined to drive requirements for rapid
exchange o f information. Raw material had to reach production facilities. Growth o f a
middle class created consumers who desired and had cash to spend on manufactured
goods. International commerce needed to exchange funds. In response to the quest for
speed, steam powered ships and railroads materialized as the first major changes to
surface transport speed since the wheel. Information transfer also increased as a result of

2Solymar, G etting the M essage, 51.
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accelerated ground travel; information, especially in the form o f printed material, still
traveled at the speed at which humans could carry it but steam provided humans with a
means o f carrying the information faster and farther.
Samuel Morse’s telegraph, combined with his associated Morse Code for adapting
information to facilitate electronic transmission, set the stage for a new era. For the first
time, information could be transferred from one point to another far distant point in
minutes. The “vastness” of the distance increased rapidly. Samuel Morse’s first
telegraph line, opened in 1845,3 extended only from Baltimore to Washington, D.C. By
1866, just 22 years later, a single, unbroken telegraph line extended from North America
to Great Britain. (See Chapter II).
Steam power decreased Atlantic crossing time by ship to only a few days as
opposed to a few weeks under sail, but the telegraph passed information in minutes.
Various markets’ traditional independence and isolation virtually dissolved. Trades in
London, Paris, or Berlin could be known in New York only moments after they occurred.
Notwithstanding the advance in telecommunications, the nineteenth century still moved
much slower than later epochs. Despite railroads, steam powered ships, and the
telegraph, actions in New York or San Francisco might not be known or acted upon
immediately upon receipt o f information by European markets and associated decision
makers. Time zone differences could still delay influence until at least the next business
day. Further, information normally traveled in the form o f telegrams which were
committed to paper and entered the bureaucratic paperwork process. Information o f vital
importance might reside in a queue waiting to be read.

3Ibid., 54.
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To extend any distance approaching “vast,” telegraph lines required the crossing of
state frontiers, especially in Europe where territorially defined states were relatively
small. Technology allowed states to intercept all telegraph messages transiting their
borders, but at the cost of time and investment in personnel. A bureaucratic delay in
information might be acceptable to the states’ interest in security, but unacceptable to
both domestic and international business interests. Telecommunications now presented a
high technology version o f border inspection dilemma. In the control era (Chapter III),
states might have wished for a border control situation where every shipment o f goods
could be off loaded from the transporting wagon or cart and thoroughly inspected.
Concerned about the information crossing into foreign hands, states might like to inspect
the contents o f every telegram entering and leaving its sovereign territory.4 But at what
cost? The delay to an already slow delivery, the commitment o f personnel, and the
logistics of the operations would combine to make full inspections o f all shipments
prohibitive. Inspecting all contents o f horse-drawn wagons proved difficult. The
increased cargo capacity o f railroads made it more so. In the twenty-first century, states
face the same dilemma, inflated by orders o f magnitude, when trying to manage
containerized cargo.

Sovereignty and Society in the Age of Telegraph
The nineteenth century saw the system of sovereign states, still centered in Europe but
expanding, come o f age. The European states, with their system o f colonialism, attempted

4William J. Drake, "Territoriality and Intangibility: Trans Border Data Flows and National
Sovereignty," in B eyond National Sovereignty: International Communications in the 1990s, ed. Kaarle
Nordenstreng and Herbert I. Schiller, 259-313 (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1993), 266.
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to maintain the “closed club” attitude toward sovereignty while holding out the distant
goal o f independence for colonial peoples “when they are ready.”5 Further, the
intellectual exercises of the Renaissance’s cultural success gave rise to the scientific
developments which were transformed into practical applications for the Industrial
Revolution. American and French independence movements interjected new elements to
the sovereignty club by redefining the legitimacy upon which statehood existed; divine or
dynastic rights still existed but popular and voluntary consent was forced into the
equation as well.6 By mid-nineteenth century, the sovereign state, and the international
system in which it subsisted, was changing.
Raw materials and natural resources fed the insatiable appetite o f Industrial
Revolution production and every state had to import some portion o f the required
material. The colonial system, strongly rooted in the same arrogant Western Christianity
that tried to maintain the closed club of sovereignty, provided some satisfaction to the
revolution’s hunger. The colonial powers accepted as “given,” their “rights” to extract
wealth from foreign holdings without regard to the indigenous population. At an 1885
Conference in Berlin, European powers divided the world into “civilized” (meaning
European, at best, and industrialized, at the most liberal) states and “barbarians” (all
others). The so-called barbarian entities would be considered for self-determination when
they had proven their ability to govern themselves.7 Resource requirements which could

5Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction,” 362.
6Ferguson and Mansbach, “The Past as Prelude to the Future,” 38.
7Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction,” 362.
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not be met by colonies required international trade, which in turn, necessitated both tacit
and formal trade regimes.
The world was speeding up. Transoceanic movement of people and goods moved at
steam power’s steady, reliable speeds rather than at nature’s mercy as determined by
winds and tides. Well traveled ground routes moved goods via rail at speeds unimagined
in previous eras. The “electric telegraph,” as it was initially named to differentiate it from
mechanical signaling systems, provided particular value to the scheduling, management,
and control of railroads carrying supplies, raw materials, and finished goods.
Information moved across telegraph cable in virtual instantaneity. With the increased
speed came increased necessity to coordinate departures and arrivals, bills and payment,
and imports and exports. The “high technology” means o f communications such as the
telegraph, followed by telephone, required coordination o f technical and interconnection
standards. The “absoluteness” o f the sovereign state, which was always somewhat less
than absolute, had to give way in the name o f international efficiency. Pursuit of
international efficiency contributed to the compromise o f sovereignty as states abrogated
their “right” to inspect commodities crossing their frontiers. In this case, the commodity
was the information contained in electronic exchanges. The alternative required an
investment in personnel to do the inspections and inserted a time delay into the otherwise
rapid transfer of information provided by the telegraphs.
Customers o f the various domestic telegraph systems desired the speed of
international service and were willing to pay for it. Therefore, telegraph lines crossed
borders. Each side o f the border had to agree to mutually acceptable technical and
operational standards, and required bilateral agreement to facilitate the installation and
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continued operation o f the telegraph and to determine the level o f sovereign control over
information entering and leaving state territory. In an area such as Europe where multiple
states existed in close geographic proximity, each entity became involved in a
hodgepodge o f arrangements resulting in an inefficient and confusing international
telegraph service.8
During the 1850s, Austria and various German states formed a loosely knit group to
attempt standardization of international service with the Austro-German Telegraph
Union. Concurrently, other states formed the West European Telegraph Union. Although
some inter-organization contact was attempted, little uniformity resulted. In 1865,
Napoleon III sponsored a conference in Paris to attempt international standardization.
The resulting convention established Morse Code as the standard for transmitting
messages and codified the obligations for message delivery service. The conference also
established a functional organization, the International Telegraph Union to continue to
organize the anarchy o f the various domestic telegraph systems.9 States found it
necessary, once again, to alter their domestic systems to accommodate international
connections. Further, growing commercial dependence on the speed o f telegraph
messages would not tolerate any state intervention which might interpose delays. States
accepted rapid movement o f information in the form of messages as more beneficial than
exercise o f sovereign supervision. Effective transfer o f business data improved the
efficiency, and hopefully the profitability, of industry. Profitable industry resulted in

8Codding and Rutkowski, The International Telecommunication Union, 5.
9Ibid„ 6.
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benefits to economic activity which states, in turn, could regard as sources for the
taxation revenue necessary for governmental survival.

Telecommunications and Sovereignty During the Age o f Telegraph
Railroads and steamship technology increased the speed at which humans could travel
and carry information, but the telegraph allowed nearly immediate transfer o f information
over vast distances. States always had to deal with “things” crossing borders, but now
they were forced to consider invisible pulses o f electricity contained entirely within wires.
Later, totally invisible electromagnetic (radio) waves crossing borders with impunity
brought an end to the era. Telecommunications had become an essential element o f the
international environment.
As the speed o f human activity in the world increased, states had to develop means of
reacting to the new velocity. If news o f a domestic action, when it reached distant shores,
would have international ramifications, then states must consider the speed at which the
news would travel. Does that affect sovereignty? If the absolute and unlimited power of
the state must be used in a way that considers reactions by others, then limits have been
put on both the “absolute” and “unlimited” elem ents.10

Dominant Mass Media
Basic mass media changed little between the Age o f [News] Paper and the Age of
Telegraph. Passing information to the masses was still best accomplished via the

l0Cees J. Hamelink, "Globalism and National Sovereignty," in B eyond N ational Sovereignty:
International Communication in the 1990s, ed. Kaarle Nordenstreng and Herbert I. Schiller, 371-393
(Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1993), 385.
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newspaper. The telegraph allowed news to be transferred across long distances far faster
than humans could carry it, and modem presses permitted mass print runs o f newspapers
serving ever larger metropolitan areas. Once printed, they could travel at the steam
enhanced speeds o f ship and rail.
Both transfer and distribution were enhanced by technology o f the era, especially
advances in ground transport. Telecommunications technology, however, affected only
the transfer elements o f news production — getting information about newsworthy events
from the point o f occurrence to press locations. Still, the development o f a worldwide
telegraph and telephone networks was neither instantaneous nor even particularly rapid.
Lines were installed between locations where projected commercial earnings justified the
expense. Markets with potential received attention, but developing a “complete,”
worldwide network would await future and less expensive technical developments.

Telecommunications
Information traveled through telegraph cable at very near the speed o f light, but the
throughput combined with the processes necessary to prepare the data for transmission
was time consuming. The specific process of telegraph transmission was discussed in
Chapter II, but with apologies to the physics regime and Albert Einstein in particular, all
things are relative. The time involved in drafting a message, transporting it to the nearest
telegraph office, time in a queue awaiting operator action, a few minutes o f actual
transmission, and delivery following similar procedures at the distant end were minuscule
when compared to ground (or sea) transport.
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Diplomats who traditionally operated in relative independence based on infrequent
dispatches from home now could request and receive specific guidance in hours rather
than weeks or months. Telecommunications actually assisted governments in exerting
sovereignty where the early telegraph capability existed. Where telegraph lines crossed
frontiers, states faced a dilemma.
Especially during times of conflict or hostility, states would desire to supervise all
messages crossing borders. Early attempts at close supervision o f telegraph messages
entering and leaving European countries proved debilitating to the business environment
that grew and prospered in exploiting the benefits o f rapid communications. This is not
to say, however, that states gave up their sovereign rights to supervise cross-border
communications. The last few years of this era were dominated by World War I.
Government interception o f telegraph messages played a role in the war’s outcome.
In many cases, especially in Europe, telegraph and telephone systems were
government owned and operated, usually by their respective postal authorities. Where
governments controlled the telegraph offices, all users assumed that their messages were
subject to government review. For that reason, diplomats using the telegraph services of
their host government would encrypt their messages so that they appeared to be
indecipherable. In the US, the telegraph system was privately owned. Intelligence
operatives from both the State and War Departments appealed to the telegraph
companies’ patriotism and arranged to receive carbon copies" o f international message
traffic.12 Early uses of long distance radio transmissions to pass international messages

"“Carbon Copy:” the low-tech version o f Xerox. A technology now lost to antiquity.
12Yardley, The Am erican Black Chamber, 37.
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were also subject to interception. Obtaining messages for review, especially those
requiring “decryption,” was always done in secret.
Businesses as well as states assumed that their messages were subject to interception
by others, but the area o f intelligence gathering which became know as signals
intelligence (SIGINT) operated covertly. Part o f the value o f information obtained
through SIGINT was ignorance on the part o f the sender and receiver that their
communications were monitored by a third party.
Issues o f privacy versus sovereignty had entered the telecommunications
environment. How much state supervision was acceptable before rights were violated?
The question has yet to be adequately answered. The US only resolved the issue in 1976
with the passage o f the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. As a result, the National
Security Agency was restricted to interception of data in the international arena and only
in the interest o f national security.13

Territorial Control
The importance of territorial borders to sovereign states changed little during the Age
o f Telegraph. Initial attempts to control telegraph messages crossing frontiers proved
manpower, time, and resource intensive, and generally hampered both state and non-state
businesses conducted over the new means of communications.
Introduction o f the telegraph had no direct effect on states’ ability to control their
borders. A case could even be made that the telegraph, as a command and control adjunct

l3James Bamford, Body o f Secrets: Anatomy o f the U ltra-Secret National Security Agency from the
C old War through the D awn o f a N ew Century (New York: Doubleday, 2001), 440.
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to weapons, allowed more positive defense o f borders. Military commanders in the
capital or at other headquarters had unprecedented control of border security personnel.
The Industrial Revolution was at its height and market forces had replaced
mercantilism. A state with draconian border control measures would suffer in the
effectiveness o f its participation in the international trade regime. Sovereign enforcement
of borders could be relaxed in the interest of trade and development, or attempts could be
made to hold on to elusive sovereign rights to states’ economic peril.
Migration brought with it economic and territorial issues as well as a significant
influence on cultural development. Craftsmen crossed borders in search of work.
Economic refugees left Europe (especially Ireland) to escape from famine and pursue
opportunities in America. The size and speed of steam powered ships allowed
transatlantic migration, while railroads empowered migration between and among land
joined states.
The sovereign state could still control borders, open them — in either direction — to
migrants, defend them, and determine how commerce would transit them. Electrons in
telegraph cable and radio’s electromagnetic waves, however, offered the state little
opportunity to prevent cross-border passage o f information.

Cultural Cross-Pollination
In terms o f cultural cross-pollination, the telegraph and early uses o f the telephone did
not cause any quantum leaps beyond the “state-of-nature” for cultural development.
Cultural expansion was more likely the result o f extensive development in the speed of
ground transportation. Humanity still interacted via trade and migration; conquest played
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less of a role as the nineteenth century experienced a relatively peaceful era compared to
previous centuries, especially in Europe. Printed news generally appeals to local
populations and the increasing presence of mass media did not accelerate cultural
exchange. Rates o f migration and magnitude o f trade grew by phenomenal extent with
equally exceptional effects on cultural evolution. The enabling technology, however, was
more likely steam powered presses and transport than telecommunication.

International Finance
The world’s major markets, particularly those located in financial capitals such as
London, Berlin, and New York, had traditionally operated independently. With the
arrival o f news from another, transactions were completed and any reactions were after
the fact, at best. The fledgling telegraph network found its metaphorical wings in
providing more or less immediate information among world markets and a telegraphic
scion emerged in 1867 in the form o f the stock market ticker tape.14
The ticker tape used telegraph technology dedicated to satisfying a long standing
hunger in the business community for accurate and reliable, local and distant stock
market information. As a case in point, one o f the first stock-peculiar uses o f telegraph
resulted from a telegram delivery clerk who accepted payment from New York businesses
to keep them informed about the content o f messages which might affect their dealings.
The same clerk, John J. Kieman, formed a news agency (eventually to become the Wall

14Encyclopedia Britannica, Multimedia Edition, 1998, s.v. “Ticker.”
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Street Journal)15 dedicated to providing up to the minute news to subscribers. More than
thirty years prior to the completion of the first Transatlantic cable in 1869, he routinely
rowed a small boat out to meet incoming vessels to buy foreign newspapers from sailors
and ask passengers for the latest information they might have picked up before sailing.
The few hours he gained in collecting and distributing information from abroad gave him
a particular advantage over competitors. In 1867, Kieman began sending out his news via
the newly invented ticker tape machine introduced by E. A. Calahan.16 Ticker tape
technology automatically received and printed stock symbol, number o f shares, and
transaction price onto narrow rolls o f paper. The machines required a dedicated telegraph
line which could not be used for other purposes and was impractical for most
international transactions unless the specific stock trading industry was willing to accept
the cost o f installation and maintenance.
The quest for more and faster information on which to base business and investment
decisions led to local and short distance international use of ticker tape machines. Less
immediate, but still comparatively rapid, news via telegraph energized business’
collective hunger for faster access to information. Sovereignty over national markets was
eroding. Seeds for the world’s single, collective market had germinated and were
growing in the fertility o f telecommunications. Markets had, since their inception,
provided states with commercial means to encourage both domestic and international
financial exchange. With instantaneous information about market actions, responses

15Jerry M. Rosenberg, Inside the Wall Street Journal: The H istory an d the P ow er o f D ow Jones &
Company and A m erica's M ost Influential N ew spaper (New York: Macmillan, 1982), 9.
l6Ibid., 3.
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thereto, and international news of all kinds, markets took on a “life o f their own.” They
reflected the international financial system rather than the economy o f the states where
they were located.
As telecommunications began to make distance an irrelevant factor in international
markets and finance, the banking industry, as well as their customers, started to search for
ways to exploit the new technology as well. Use o f the telegraph allowed banks to speed
up many transactions, verify existing credit information, and validate availability of
funds, most specific transactions still had to be accomplished in person. Not until the
post-World War II systems o f routine check and credit card emerged would banks
manage to take the best advantage o f technology.17
With increased use the telegraph to exchange financial data, states faced a dilemma
which would continue to the present. Successful businesses resulted in positive
contributions to national economy. Thriving economies could be taxed for the benefit o f
the state. State intervention in the communications processes, even in the interest of
national security, could introduce business hampering delay or deterrents to the free flow
o f financial data. Sovereign rights to control commodities crossing frontiers which were
never absolute, were being attenuated by telecommunications technology.

Sovereignty as a Whole
The “absoluteness” o f sovereignty began to wane during the Age o f Telegraph. The
“dominant” European states found it increasingly difficult to maintain their “closed club”
o f sovereign states as the world approached World War I. The telegraph became an

l7Weatherford. The H istory o f Money, 233.
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essential element in both business and governments. Telecommunications technology
may be viewed as a threat to sovereignty, but it is not universally so. Throughout history,
diplomats and military commanders received orders prior to departure or via slow surface
mail. They were then “trusted” to perform duties in the best interest o f their country.
Consultation with national authorities required too much time to have a direct impact on
day to day diplomacy or pursuit o f military objectives.
With the availability o f international telegraph, consultation could be reduced to a
manageable length o f time. Rather than await ground transport o f a letter with details of
the current situation and a request for instructions followed by a similar time for return
travel o f an answer, the elapsed time might be reduced to a matter o f hours or days by
transmitting the information electronically. Although the actual international transport of
the information in a telegram might be accomplished in a matter o f minutes, the nature of
telegraphic systems imposed other time constraints. Receipt o f information might
necessitate a timely reply, but technology could not accelerate the bureaucratic decision
making process.
Diplomats posted at foreign locations had to rely on telegraph terminals operated by
the host nation, the majority o f which were government owned. International telegraph
wires solely for the use o f diplomatic messages might have been theoretically possible,
but fiscal practicality limited such dedicated systems. Further, use o f the international
telegraph required financial considerations. It was expensive. Therefore, composition of
a message had to state all necessary information, but in as few words as possible. The
nature o f the telegraphic system required many clerks and operators to view the message
during its transit from originator to addressee. If the information contained therein were
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deemed “sensitive,” cryptographic “protection” might be applied, but that increased cost.
Rather than rational words arranged in sentences, the encrypted message sent through the
telegraph system would often be significantly longer and consist o f a series o f letters and
numbers, usually in five letter groups separated by a space.
Telegraph operators sending “plain text” (words in coherent sentences) were far more
efficient and accurate than when sending a series of nonsensical letters and numbers.
They had to transmit at a slower speeds to ensure accuracy which tied up the circuit
longer. In the nineteenth century, US Secretary o f State William Seward fully
acknowledged the need for cryptographic protection o f diplomatic messages. However,
the increased cost — which could approach ten times the charge for “plain text”
transmission — proved to be prohibitive. As a result, decisions to risk possible
“compromise” o f diplomatic information by sending messages “in the clear” tended to be
made based on cost rather than the security threat18 and little privacy existed in nineteenth
century US Department o f State communications.
With a “writer to reader” time measured in hours rather than weeks, states developed
extensive control o f far flung assets. Consultation by foreign posted diplomats and
deployed military commanders became feasible if not in “real time,” at least in
“reasonable time.” In such situations, the state, in exercise and pursuit o f sovereignty,
found an augmentation in the new means of telecommunications rather than a threat.

l8Weber, “Seward’s Other Folly,” 326.
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Summary
Introduction o f the telegraph created little immediate effect on sovereign states. As
international telegraph connections expanded, largely in support o f commercial
requirements, states capitalized on the new technology to their advantage. Telegraph
links, where they existed, could be exploited by states to receive information and provide
guidance to diplomats or other national agents. As the world’s telegraph network
interconnected continents toward the end of the nineteenth century, altered means of
centrally controlled diplomacy became the norm.
Telegraph connections rapidly transferred information to the mass media o f the era
(newspapers); distribution o f the resulting printed material, however, continued to move
at the speed humans could carry it and depended upon contemporary surface
transportation technology. Effective harnessing o f steam created quantum leaps in the
speed and reliability of transport, and the mass distribution o f information as well.
The second half of the nineteenth century represented a period o f relative peace which
virtually eliminated cross-cultural influence by conquest but a variety o f social and
economic developments resulted in extensive migration, especially to the US Advances
in surface transportation increased trade and migration and their resulting cultural cross
pollination. While extensive cultural expansion, melding, and synthesis resulted from
trade and migration, little o f it could be attributed to the introduction, existence, and
growth of the telegraph.
Transfer o f funds by wire initiated a process which would eventually culminate in the
feasibility o f “electronic cash transactions” (e-cash, in later vernacular). Letters of credit
capitalized upon synergistic trust among corporations, governments, and banking
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institutions and had been used for centuries. The telegraph extended their use into the
limits o f available technology. International financial transactions were taking place
through the invisible movement o f electrons through telegraph cables. While government
observation might still be expected by the communications system’s users, government
supervision and control was slipping.
The Age o f Telegraph was the era during which many of the Industrial Revolution’s
benefits, disadvantages, and technological developments came to fruition. The sovereign
state thrived in the international environment and capitalized on the consequences of
increased trade, migration, and a multitude o f various technologies. Telecommunications
was in its infancy; it laid foundations for future effects on sovereignty, but its actual
impact was tertiary, at best. The technology began to come into its own with the
synergistic union o f telegraph, telephone, and especially, radio. Distant points could be
“connected” without wires stretching across borders.
The Zimmerman Telegram offers a particularly apt point at which to end the Age of
Telegraph and begin a new era. It also provides an interesting example o f governments
exerting their sovereignty while interfering with the sovereignty o f others, aided by the
latest incarnation of telecommunications technology. During World War I, Germany’s
foreign minister, Arthur Zimmerman, proposed an alliance with Mexico if the US entered
the war. The “Zimmerman Telegram” — in this case, actually a radio message — was
intercepted by the British and covertly decrypted. Information contained therein could
benefit the British by igniting US indignation against Germany, but if Germans
discovered that the British or US knew the contents o f a sensitive, encrypted diplomatic
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dispatch, it would also tell them that their cipher had been compromised.19 Knowing this,
they would change their cipher and the British effort to “break” the German codes would
begin anew.
Britain, Germany, Mexico, and the US, all sovereign states, were communicating and
exercising their sovereignty through diplomacy using “cutting edge” technology o f the
day — in this case, radio. Two, Germany and Britain, were at war. Mexico and the US
were officially neutral. Germany attempted to enlist Mexico in an alliance. Britain went
to extreme elements to prevent development of the alliance and use the information about
the German proposed alliance to encourage US entry into the war in Europe. It was all
done in secret and the latest ciphers were employed to keep it secret. The US did enter
the war in 1918 and the specific role played by the Zimmerman Telegram remains subject
to historical interpretation. Still, radio signals radiating through the atmosphere were
intercepted by unintended recipients to extract the information contained therein, and the
potential existed for international ramifications affecting multiple sovereign states.
Twentieth century states had, by 1917, already come to rely on telecommunications as
an essential new tool for states to use in diplomacy and exercise o f their sovereignty.
Complexity o f the new century’s world required industrialized states, and those aspiring
thereto, to participate in the new technology. However, it proved to be a vulnerability as
well.
In peace or in war, the technical requirements to monitor and control every telegram
and telephone call crossing international frontiers would prove prohibitively time
consuming and expensive. States would find it necessary to alter their modus operandi to

’’Barbara W. Tuchman, The Zimmermann Telegram (New York: Dell, 1963), 184.
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deal with information flowing across their borders with little control. The Zimmerman
Telegram set the stage for the next era and provides a logical end point to the Age of
Telegraph.
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CHAPTER V
AGE OF RADIO AND CABLE — 1917-1964

This chapter continues diachronic analysis by addressing the impact on sovereignty as
the world’s appetite for immediate information expanded faster than telegraph
technology could provide it. By 1917, telegraph cables interconnected much o f the
world, electronically linking points where economic requirements dictated profitable
return on the investment. “Wireless” radio telegraph met other connection requirements
where distance, technology, or profit potential prevented installation o f cable. The
telephone and radio combined with the telegraph system to make rapid communications
available to much o f the world. Concurrently, the idea o f sovereignty and its associated
state expanded to where it approached the status of “natural right” for all people. The
rebuilding efforts following World War II resulted in international modernization and
trade. The world’s collective community grew ever more interdependent while the
complexity o f international society interconnected by telecommunications pressured
sovereignty.
Diplomatic actions, business concerns, military operations, and individual activities
had altered their modus operandi based on newly available ground, sea, and air
transportation along with the immediate availability o f information. Despite “dangers”
from loss o f privacy or sovereign dominance over international borders, collective
appetites for faster access to information had been whetted to a fine edge and could not be
dulled. By the end o f this era, most (but not all) telephones could be connected to nearly
any telephone, anywhere, regardless of distance.
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Introduction
The Age o f Radio and Cable commences January 17th, 1917 with transmission o f the
Zimmerman Telegram. Clandestine radio intercept o f a secret, encrypted diplomatic
transmission and exploitation o f the information contained therein by states for whom it
was not intended, marks the logical commencement o f a new era. The era endured until
1964 when launch o f the first geo-synchronous relay satellite marks another critical
element in the historical time line.
At the beginning o f the new era, information o f varying, but often vital, import
flowed through cables and beamed through the atmosphere in gargantuan magnitude.
Cable systems, begun during the previous era, continued to expand with augmentation by
a fledgling radio network filling some of the gaps where telegraph service was either too
difficult technically or too expensive. A war of violence and lethality inconceivable to
previous generations had engulfed Europe with the deadliness o f weapons enhanced by
the tactical “combat multiplier” o f telecommunications in the form o f telephones,
telegraph, and early radio technology.
Except in support o f government or military operations, telegraph connections were
still economic investments, made with expectations o f fiscal gain. Few altruistic
concerns governed proposed cable routes. Where financial or national interests were
involved (often indistinguishable in the nineteenth century’s pursuit o f wealth by the
industrialized states), investments in telegraph lines were justified. States were free to
subsidize investment in telecommunications infrastructure (specifically, telephone wires
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and telegraph cables), but some economic return was expected.1 A true worldwide
network would require less expensive and more convenient means o f establishing
connections to locations which did not hold potential for significant economic return on
the investment.
Still, information traveled throughout many portions of the world in minutes.
Regional markets, no longer isolated by distance, responded to economic stimuli as
functional elements of “the whole” rather than distinct and independent components of
the world’s economy. The content o f mass media — still represented by the “printed
word” o f newspapers, and to some degree, periodicals such as magazines — could
traverse vast distances from “event” to point o f publication via the international cable
network. However, distribution o f the media itself— the printed word — continued to
depend on the speed o f human transport. The speed by which humans could travel had
increased dramatically from long standing rate of about five miles per hour to rail’s 40 to
50 miles per hour.2
Numerous technological advances as the previous era neared its close caused the
speed o f information transfer to increase dramatically. The airplane soon evolved into a
means by which information in other than electronic form could move at speeds measured
in hundreds o f miles per hour. The vacuum tube, essential to long distance transmissions

'Clare D. M cGillem and William P. McLauchlan, Hermes Bound: The P olicy an d Technology o f
Telecommunications (W est Lafayette, IN: Purdue University Press, 1978), 87.
2Terhi Rantanen, The M edia an d G lobalization (London: Sage, 2005), 50.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

124
of voices over telephones as well as effective use of radio, established a foundation for
technology3 which later gave rise to the transistor and integrated circuit.
In 1917, the newspaper continued to dominate mass media. However, broadcast radio
soon challenged its supremacy only to be eclipsed, or perhaps, subsumed by television.
States began to deal with telecommunications crossing borders, using some elements of
telecommunications technology to obtain information surreptitiously exchanged by other
states. Behavior o f states as well as their representative diplomats required alteration and
update to deal with new threats to the security o f sensitive information. One US
Secretary of State, discovering that elements o f his department engaged in electronic
eavesdropping, ordered it stopped because “... gentlemen do not read each others mail.”4
This attitude typified the dilemma created by the possibilities o f technology versus the
responsible use thereof.5

Sovereignty and Society in the Age o f Radio and Cable
The health o f the sovereign state, vital and vibrant a century earlier, began to decline
by the end o f World War I. European states who attempted to maintain the “exclusive
club” throughout the nineteenth century, despite incursion by various upstarts in the
Americas, found their exclusivity waning.6 Following World War I, under international

3George P. Oslin, The Story o f Telecommunications (Macon, GA: Mercer University Press, 1992), 274.
"Louis Kruh, “Stimson, The Black Chamber, and the 'Gentlemen's Mail' Quote,” Cryptologia 12, no. 2
(1988): 65.
5Bemard Woods, Communication, Technology and the Developm ent o f P eople (London: Routledge,
1993), 34.
6Hinsley, Sovereignty, 206.
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pressure, the European powers “created” states with lesser economic value while
steadfastly maintaining “ownership” of exploitable colonies. The decision to maintain
colonial or mandate status of territory versus granting sovereignty in state building
operations should not be mistaken for altruistic pursuit o f self-determination. Rather,
economic value o f continued exploitation played a much larger part.7
Meanwhile, nations throughout the world began to coalesce, demand release from
colonial, mandate, or protectorate status and insist on state and associated selfdetermination. Sovereignty and self-determination approached a natural right of
populations everywhere.8 Exclusivity of Europe’s “club” was on life support if it still had
any life at all.

Telecommunications and Sovereignty During the Age o f Radio and Cable
As demonstrated by the incident of the Zimmerman Telegram, new technology under
which states conducted diplomacy, brought danger of compromise through unintended
receipt by enemies, competitors, or even friends. Slow moving, but relatively secure,
letters between diplomats and their home governments had always been the target of
interception but protection o f the contents was quite feasible. Electronic transmission
brought international diplomatic actions into near real time in their communications with
their home governments, but it also increased the danger of interception and access by
unintended recipients. The human nature involved, however, was unlikely to suggest any

7F. S. Northedge, The International P olitical System (London: Faber and Faber, 1976), 90.
8Jorge M. Valadez, D eliberative Democracy: Political Legitim acy an d Self-Determination in
Multicultural Societies (Boulder, CO: W estview, 2000), 13.
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return to the inherent delays o f more secure but slower couriers9 and states incorporated
the telegraph into their modus operandi. Post-World War I advances increased
dependence on the associated telecommunications technology especially and expanded
use o f cables and development of radio.
Telephones remained expensive prior to World War II and were primarily a tool of
business, especially as an international tool.10 In the US, where the system was privately
owned, the installation o f central switching offices, lines, and consumer instruments
resulted in potential profit. In Europe, government ownership and resultant rules and
regulations provided no such incentive and probably crippled growth. Further, cultural
inhibitions hampered full use o f the telephone’s potential. The British considered it an
inadequate substitute for face to face conversation and people in Latin countries did not
find the device complementary to their temperament. The German government monopoly
provided no profit incentive for expansion or improvement o f service.11
Advances in radio, however, expanded coverage to include, virtually, any point on
earth where communications was required but economics prevented installation of
telephone or telegraph cable. With immediate connection available to the rest of the
world, states began to lose their “absolute” control (real or imagined) over their own
economies. In a fledgling process which would, in a following era, grow into the
designation o f “globalism,” the corporate world began to ignore or circumvent state

9David Pauli Nickles, Under the Wire: How the Telegraph Changed D iplom acy (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2003), 80.
'“Brian Winston, M edia Technology and Society (London: Routledge, 1998). 52.
"Oslin, The Story o f Telecommunications, 231.
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influences and supervision.12 Another world war interrupted the “natural” social
evolution o f sovereignty, international political economy, and world society in general.
After the war, technological advances also contributed to military control and protection
o f territory. The same advances, however, also allowed the growth o f MNCs in pursuit of
foreign direct investment.

Dominant Mass Media
Mass media first emerged in the seventeenth century in the form o f newspapers which
capitalized on high technology of the era — moveable type printing. Newspapers
continued to dominate mass media until the 1920s when broadcast radio offered an
alternative, or perhaps supplement, followed by television in the 1950s. At era’s end,
public reliance on radio and television as mass media was enhanced by the
geosynchronous satellites which heralded an era o f ubiquitous communications. By
1963, in the US, 90 percent of households had at least one television and nearly 100
percent had radios. Throughout the world, 245 million radios existed, 111 million of
which were in US homes.13

Telecommunications
As this era commenced, long distance communications still heavily relied on the
telegraph. Construction o f cable networks required significant capital investments, but
offered a substantial potential return. Telephones allowed consumers to access

l2Rantanen, The M edia and G lobalization, 50.
13Alm anac Book o f Facts (N ew York: Press Publishing Company, 1964), 765.
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telecommunications technology directly. While the telephone provided phenomenal local
service, any distance necessitated signal amplification which required further advances.
Those advances materialized in the inter-war years. Technology took telegrams
beyond labor intensive single operators transmitting a single message at 20 to 30 words
per minute. Teleprinters — perhaps best described as interconnected typewriters —
moved messages closer to 60 words per minute with less manual operator relay and
reduced errors. Vacuum tube technology permitted signal amplification to the benefit of
both long distance telephone and expansion of radio service from a wireless means of
sending telegraphic messages to a new voice medium.
By the outbreak o f World War II, information transfer had become wide spread and
nearly instantaneous. Available “throughput” appeared to be massive when compared to
early telegraph but it was still limited to information transfer. Distribution o f large
“volumes” o f written data still relied on available means of transport, but that now
included air service. Technological development is synergistic. Developments in the
speed of information transfer still depend on physical movement o f associated equipment
or might be required for security; the speed of human movement remained an element in
the all encompassing information transfer regime.
Broadcast radio, and its associated news services, provided for a previously
unavailable means o f widespread distribution. Initially, information which had been
transferred across long distances, but with limited distribution, reached radio stations.
News “readers” then read the information into a microphone which reached wide
audiences. By World War II, foreign correspondents’ reports were received via radio and
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broadcast over commercial stations in the US. Telecommunications technology now
provided both instantaneous transfer and distribution o f information.
Early advances in consumer oriented television technology had been accomplished in
the 1920s and 30s but were put into abeyance during war years. When war time national
security restrictions eased and released research and development to support the
consumer market, the wide data distribution pioneered by radio evolved to include
pictures as well.14
By their nature, governed by laws o f physics, radio and television signals have limited
range. (“Shortwave” radio, used for international broadcasts by many states have much
longer, but often intermittent servicing distance.) Various countries solved the restricted
range o f radio and television by combining transfer and distribution in networks. Radio
programs were initiated and broadcast from a central location. Concurrently, the signal
was transferred to other, distant locations via terrestrial cable where the same program
was broadcast, thus reaching extensive audiences at far reaching locations. The same
process was exploited and expanded when television began to supplant radio.
Transfer of signals across extensive distances required special technical consideration.
Complex transoceanic cables installed for use by telephone and telegraph systems had
some utility for television but at very high cost. The physics involved require television
signals to occupy the “space” or bandwidth of hundreds o f telephone connections. While
a television signal transited an undersea cable, transoceanic telephone service became
severely restricted.

l4David E. Fisher and Marshal Jon Fisher, Tube: The Invention o f Television (Washington, DC:
Counterpoint, 1996). 296.
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In the US, broadcast radio and television industries developed under private
ownership. Throughout much of the world, however, the electronic media were
government owned, often by the postal services. Under some theories o f government,
state owned broadcast media have a public interest requirement to protect the nation’s
culture and traditions.15 Where this was (and in some cases, remains) the case, the state
maintains predominant control o f the most dynamic cultural influence.

Territorial Control
This era saw significant change to the state’s control of its borders. The airplane
introduced a vertical element to sovereignty and begged the resulting question: How high
does state control over its territory extend? Has an airplane, flying so high that it is not
visible from the ground, violated a state’s territory? The answer was, initially tacitly,
later specifically agreed to be yes; state territory extends into the vertical plane. The
specific answer to “How high?” remained in the foggy ether o f international law. The
issue would reemerge late in this and into the next era; aircraft flight, measured in
thousands o f feet, might be one issue. When the USSR shot down a US U-2
reconnaissance aircraft “violating” its sovereign airspace in 1960, little defense could be
mounted to deny the violation beyond blustery insistence on sovereign rights to fly,
uninhibited, as a matter of national security.16 However, a “device” (specifically, a
satellite) “crossing” over state territory in earth orbit at an elevation o f hundreds or

ls“The Last o f the Old Guard,” The Economist, November 2, 2002.
16Phillip Knightley. The Second O ldest Profession: Spies an d Spying in the Twentieth Century (New
York: W. W. Norton, 1986), 325.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

131

thousands of miles appeared to be quite different. It would not be until the 1970s that the
issue of state sovereignty over a satellite would be addressed by the World Radio
Conference under the guise o f the ITU (see Chapter II, Satellites and Sovereignty).
Telecommunications technology continued to erode a state’s ability to control
information crossing its borders due to a combination o f the sheer volume circuits and an
inability o f states to develop hard evidence as to what information might be damaging to
their national interests. Cross-border data flows were, by their very nature intangible,
functionally integrative, and difficult to interpret. As a result, a “transnational
cyberspace” was emerging over which states had no control.17 Early in the era, the
telegraph (both via cable and radio) continued to dominate international communications
but the telephone soon entered the equation as an expensive but viable tool in business
and government operations. As with early electronic means, supervision o f information
entering and leaving state territory might be theoretically possible. The manpower
requirements necessary to read, listen to, and control every telegram, telephone call, and
radio transmission would vastly exceed the fiscal abilities o f even the most prosperous
states. Further, the delays and loss o f privacy resulting from state control would constrain
business. Business generates taxes. Attempts to limit the free flow o f information would,
therefore, hinder business, reduce the state’s income, and hurt the state’s health.

Cultural Cross-Pollination
Broadcast radio, followed by the enhancement provided by the synergistic addition of
images to create television provided an entirely new means o f cultural influence. Where

l7Drake, "Territoriality and Intangibility," 261.
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traditional intercultural influence took place through migration, trade, and conquest — all
activities with inherent contact among populations — radio and television had the
capability to “insert” one culture directly amid the core o f another.18
Various states, especially in post-World War II Europe, employed “world service”
radio as an element o f blatant propaganda. Voice of America, Radio Free Europe, Radio
Moscow, and British Broadcasting Corporation World Service, to name only a few,
actively sought to “export” their domestic “way o f life.” The shortwave radios necessary
for reception o f long range broadcasts were far more likely to be found in the homes of
citizens o f states “targeted” by “world service” broadcasts. In the US, the extensive size
of the country and near saturation o f markets with commercial [short range] broadcast
stations did not give rise to an extensive audience for international shortwave
broadcasts.19 As television entered the world market, production costs o f both news and
entertainment shows far exceeded those of radio broadcast. Consequently, a few Western
countries, most notably the US, came to dominate production and dissemination of
information and entertainment media for world audiences. Even the requirement to dub
or subtitle English language productions was far cheaper than local production. By the
early 1960s, at least 60 percent o f broadcast television hours in countries such as Nigeria,
New Zealand, Iceland, Malaysia, and Guatemala were imported. The result was labeled

l8Rantanen, The M edia and G lobalization, 24.
19Winston, M edia Technology and Society, 271.
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“cultural imperialism” and resulted in far more successful export o f culture and political
propaganda than world service radio.20
The geographic distance between the location of a program’s production and
broadcast became irrelevant. Opponents or those concerned about developing mutual
dependency and sensitivity among states, later to be labeled interdependence and
globalism, accused the larger, more dynamic cultures o f subsuming others much like
tenaciously procreating weeds take over a garden. The end result, however, had not
changed. Cultural subsumption had occurred throughout history. Telecommunications
technology introduced an accelerant.

International Finance
International monetary systems existed during the first half o f this era in turmoil as a
result of post-war chaos followed by the Great Depression. As World War II neared its
inevitable terminus, the soon to be victorious states convened an international conference
to establish a post-war international monetary system. It became known as the Bretton
Woods system, after the conference’s location at Bretton Woods, New Hampshire. The
resultant system established fixed currency exchange rates, aligned with the value o f gold
which assured currency convertibility. The agreements acknowledged autonomy of
national policies, but free pursuit o f macroeconomic policies always incurs some
consequences since foreign trade involves foreign currency exchange.21 The state might

20John Tomlinson, Cultural Imperialism: A C ritical Introduction (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University
Press, 1991), 36.
21Robert Gilpin, The P olitical Economy o f International Relations (Princeton, NJ: University Press,
1987), 132.
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have one philosophy as to the value of its currency; trading partners might have other
reasons to accept different values. Rapid advances in telecommunications technology
supported the expansion and efficiency o f foreign direct investment programs and laid
foundations for future transfer of funds from one international banking institution to
another with virtual impunity. The first vestiges appeared in what would evolve into
electronic cash and financial transactions; they later approached a complexity where
national identity dissolved into complex obscurity often transparent to the transaction’s
nation o f origin. Little, if any actual “money” crossed borders. Rather, the electrical
transmission o f transactions involving dollars, pounds, or other currencies provided a
means of “keeping score” and providing quantification to transactions.

Sovereignty as a Whole
Colonial empires reached their whimpering terminus as this era approached its
conclusion. The concept o f sovereignty and self-rule as the natural right o f all people
extended throughout the international system. Sovereignty remained a territorial centric
entity but the Cold War exerted artificial social evolutionary influences which suppressed
many nationalistic movements. Numerous territorial borders had been drawn to match
colonial frontiers or the needs and desires of European powers. Often, “nations” — in
their political science identity as cultural entities such as tribes or ethnic minorities — had
not figured in drawing borders, an omission that resulted in later civil strife.
States rebuilt after the devastation of World War II and looked outward for means of
expanding markets for their rebuilt and growing industry. By doing so, they surrendered
some control o f their domestic economies to Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” o f the
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market.22 The steady (and perhaps, inevitable) march toward interdependence and
globalism had commenced. With each element o f interdependence came an incalculable
increase in sensitivity and vulnerability to the economies o f the other states and the world.
Interdependence was not new. The necessity for Flemish weavers and fullers to purchase
raw wool from England in the middle ages certainly constituted an early example of
interdependence.23 However, in the twentieth century, world trade moved at a much
faster pace. The speed at which humans traveled had increased from a few miles per day
on foot or horseback to a few hundred miles per hour on aircraft. Final products in the
manufacturing process were automobiles, television sets, and consumer goods which
required raw materials available only through trade. Sovereign states, never completely
independent from others, had to consider availability o f both raw materials and end
product markets in considering their economic decisions. The difference over time was
the available telecommunications technology. International sales exploited the
availability o f communications and transportation to ensure on time delivery of
commodities and payment as well.
At the same time, advances in telecommunications permitted the transfer of news,
funds, and cultural influence across international borders and states had little ability to
control the flow. People were able to conduct some portion o f their day to day lives in a
“space” external to the state’s defined territory. Draconian exertion o f their sovereignty
might allow some supervision, if not outright control, but at high cost. Participation in

22Smith, Wealth o f Nations, 194.
23Alan K. Smith, C reating a World Economy: Merchant Capital, Colonialism, an d W orld Trade, 14001825 (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1991), 108.
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the world’s growing reliance on technological advancements often required sacrifice of
sovereign control for enthusiastic involvement. Foreign direct investment often resulted
in production facilities located in one state with management in another.
Telecommunications was in the adolescent stages o f making distance irrelevant. The
source o f “cultural imperialism” might be half a world away, but through radio,
television, and other media supported by its telecommunications infrastructure, the
resultant influence might have originated from “next door.”
Some elements of sovereignty, however, remained despite modem influences. Many
functions were not targeted by forces which affected other elements o f sovereignty. The
state remained in complete control o f “public goods.” The construction and maintenance
o f costly assets necessary for the efficient functioning o f domestic society require a
sovereign state, through its manifested government to provide for national security,
police actions, and other mundane functions such as light houses, seldom used roads, and
even in many cases, unprofitable telecommunications facilities. In these cases,
telecommunications provided states with tools for use in pursuit o f state duties.

Summary
The Age o f Radio and Cable saw phenomenal changes to the world’s culture,
economy, and the system o f sovereign states. Two world wars and the initial stages o f a
Cold War, unique to history, disrupted anything approaching “normal” social evolution.
States were bound by alliances. States were antagonized by alliances. States joined IGOs
in pursuit o f perpetual peace. States abandoned them as a result o f war.
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The era began with one state (Great Britain) “plucking” another state’s (Germany)
private telegram addressed to another state (Mexico) out of the ether. The resulting
information was used by Great Britain to attempt to influence the US entry into World
War I and eventually influence the final outcome and end to hostilities. The era ended
amid a “smoldering” cold war with telecommunications stimulating development o f a
single world economy and with television and radio expanding throughout the globe. The
sovereignty of Westphalia could not traverse the historic continuum from 1648 to 1964
without change.
Domestic economies were developing interdependent relationships among one
another which removed, or at least reduced, direct state control. Cultural influences
accompanied financial data through an ever expanding telecommunications network.
Finally, on April 6th, 1965 the Early Bird satellite was launched and placed in orbit above
the equator. The satellite functioned as a relay platform for radio signals between North
America and Europe. It could simultaneously receive and retransmit 240 telephone
circuits or one live television broadcast between continents. Early Bird was the harbinger
of a constellation o f satellites which provided the backbone for inexpensive, worldwide
connections o f telephones, computers, facsimile machines and virtually every other
electronic device imaginable. Instantaneous communications throughout much o f the
world were nearing fruition. Distance was on a path toward total irrelevance in the
movement o f information. The sovereign states o f the international system had to deal
with a different world. Therefore, 1965 and launch o f the Early Bird satellite establishes
a pertinent point at which to end discussion o f the Age o f Radio and Cable and begin
analysis of the Age o f Ubiquitous Communications.
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CHAPTER VI
AGE OF UBIQUITOUS COMMUNICATIONS — POST-1965

This chapter continues the process established in the previous three chapters. It looks
at how the society, telecommunications, media, territory, culture, and financial situations
have changed from previous eras and how those changes affect sovereignty.
Telecommunications technology allowed both businesses and individuals to carry on
international commerce and private activities in a “space” where state borders played
little or no part. A few “dominant” cultures exerted influence on other cultures from afar
through long distance transmission and delivery o f television, radio, music, and film.
State actions became known throughout the world moments after they occurred and even
in strictly domestic situations, decisions had to be made in light o f international
ramifications. It had become difficult, if not nearly impossible, for states to operate with
impunity, even within their sovereign territory. Sovereignty — the absolute and
unlimited power o f the state — required consideration o f parameters beyond frontiers.
Sovereignty had changed.
Following World War II, a globe-encircling system o f sovereign states emerged.1 By
1965 as this era began, the vestiges of Europe’s colonial elements had, for the most part,
achieved independence and joined the now not very exclusive “club” o f sovereign states.
Self-determination through sovereign states had developed into the natural right theorized

'Robert H. Jackson, “Continuity and Change in the States System,” in States in a Changing World: A
Contemporary Analysis, ed. Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, 347-367 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 347.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

139
by Immanuel Kant in the eighteenth century.2 However, as the number o f sovereign
states in the international system approached 200, the complexity o f the world’s
interdependent society also increased. Development o f interconnected computer and
telecommunications networks made a global economy possible. Global pressures on state
sovereignty and the institutional apparatus necessary to manage and regulate the economy
often threatened destabilization and transformation.3 The telecommunications systems
that allowed such institutions to function on the international level continued to grow.

Introduction
Throughout this era, telecommunications technology developed beyond the wildest
imagination o f Samuel Morse, Alexander Graham Bell or Guglielmo Marconi. With
each new development, the movement o f any type o f information, transferred into an
electronic format, could be moved faster and faster. By the end o f the twentieth century,
distance, in the movement o f information, became irrelevant. This era begins in 1965;
the first geostationary satellite, the “Early Bird” was launched. Capable o f handling one
television channel or 240 two way telephone calls, the satellite effectively doubled
transatlantic communications capacity4 and set the stage for an ensuing epoch o f true
communications ubiquity. “Live” television could be broadcast from Europe to North
America with technological “ease.” It was expensive, since the developers o f the satellite

2Valadez, D eliberative Democracy, 234.
3Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an A ge o f G lobalization (N ew York: Columbia
University Press, 1996), xii.
4Solymar, G etting the M essage, 188.
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expected to recoup their costs through charges for its use, but it made the routine
connection o f the continents feasible.
By the end o f the twentieth century, Early Bird’s capacity would be insignificant by
comparison to the interconnections among a constellation of satellites, undersea fiber
optics, and terrestrial cable and radio based communications systems. However, as a
milestone in evolution of worldwide communications, its 1965 launch marks an ideal
point to begin a final era’s analysis. With increased speed and capacity of
telecommunications system, the international system’s complexity increased as well.
Instantaneously available information, made possible by telecommunications
technology, constituted a primary difference between this final era and previous periods.
Events taking place beneath the glare o f television lights in full view o f cameras became
global historic turning points; without the cameras, continental epochs could easily pass
unnoticed.5 The Peoples Republic of China provided one of the best examples o f the
effects o f instantaneous, worldwide distribution o f news [information].
China historically limited foreign news journalists’ access to its domestic events.
Through an ironic quirk in 1989, international news media were onsite in Beijing
covering a meeting between the world’s two bastions o f Communism — the USSR’s
Mikhail Gorbachev and China’s Deng Xiaoping. The meeting came to an end with little
more o f significance produced than such meetings ever accomplish, but groups of
Chinese students in pursuit of greater democracy took advantage o f the media conclave.
The world watched as their protest begem on Tiananmen Square. Foreign observers

5Jay Mathews, “Mending Broken China: Beyond the Grim Television Images, There’s Hope for
Reform,” Washington M onthly 22, no. 8 (1990): 48.
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expected a government crackdown at any moment; cameras remained focused on the
protests, and transmitted the images globally via satellite.
Conventional wisdom dictated that Chinese government suppression o f the protest
would be accomplished with violence, but not with foreign satellite links beaming live
images throughout the world.6 Unique to this situation, CNN had a camera set up at their
satellite control station and continued a live broadcast as a Chinese official arrived to
inform them that their license to use Chinese government controlled satellite uplink
frequencies had been granted for coverage o f the Gorbachev-Xiaoping meeting. That
conference had ended. They must shut down their satellite operation immediately.7 The
official allowed the reporter to “sign off,” but live, realtime relay o f unfolding events
terminated. The world’s collective interest had been piqued and other media managed
continued news coverage with some delay and difficulty getting their information (video
tapes, news text, photographs) out o f China. Instantaneity had been lost, but the ubiquity
o f communications provide other means, not the least o f which was a fall back to move
information at the same speed as the humans who were carrying it.
Telecommunications created an environment where purely domestic events such as a
sovereign state repressing internal challenges to its authority could become events of
international interest and concern. The case o f China’s crackdown on Tiananmen Square
provided a particularly appropriate example. A decade prior, a strikingly similar event
occurred and the Chinese government brutally suppressed earlier student demonstrations

6Daniel Benjamin, “State o f Siege: With Tiananmen Square the Epicenter, a Political Quake Convulses
in China,” Time 133, no. 22 (1989): 38.
7“CNN Basks in Reaction to Its Beijing Coverage,” New York Times, May 25, 1989.
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on Tiananmen Square. The international press were not, however, present to record that
event and it went virtually unnoticed.8 The events of 1989 were, and remain, well known
due to ubiquitous media coverage.
China’s governmental efforts to remove their actions from the collective eyes o f the
world indicated a desire to conceal, or at least obscure their actions. Norms of behavior
form an essential basis of both natural and international law,9 and the government was
obfuscating their behavior so as not to be seen exceeding generally accepted norms. The
state’s absolute and unlimited power was being applied with judicious concern about
external opinion and reaction. The key was information, its speed o f transfer, and breadth
of distribution. The world learned instantly about far away events; they were
experiencing “news” not learning about past events. Would sovereign states in the
control era or later have tailored action based on news media coverage?
Information made universally available via advanced telecommunications technology
internationalized domestic actions. If states find it necessary to tailor, camouflage, or
obscure activities within their territory, sovereignty would seem to suffer. It is situations
like this which instigated and fostered this study in order to arrive at the Age of
Ubiquitous Communications and examine contemporary effects o f telecommunications
technology on sovereignty.

Sovereignty and Society in the Age of Ubiquitous Communications
As discussed in Chapter II, sovereignty has never been absolute. As the twenty-first

8Mathews, “Mending Broken China,” 48.
9Malanczuk, A kehurst’s M odern Introduction to International Law, 57.
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century approached and reached fruition, it became less so for many reasons. Sovereignty
provided an organizing element to society, especially international society. Societies
continued their evolutionary processes under various stimuli, one o f which was the
growth o f telecommunications technology. If the needs o f society changed (evolved) to
function in an increasingly complex world, as a supporting concept, sovereignty had to
change as well.
In a complex, interdependent world, isolation provided no value to states. Selfsufficiency escaped the ability o f even the largest and most diverse countries. Prosperity,
and in many cases, survival necessitated interdependence at regional, continental, and
often, global levels. An isolated and independent state (if such an entity could still exist)
would be unaffected by the actions or interests of other states. However, interdependent
states have mutual interests where both domestic and foreign policy interact. When tied
together through mutual interests, especially in trade, international predatory behavior
becomes harmful to all the states involved.10
To ease adversarial situations in mutual dependency, avoid predatory behavior, and
enhance efficiency of common goals which extend beyond international boundaries
requirements, states form intergovernmental organizations (IGOs). IGOs operate on a
principle of sovereign equality where each state maintains equal status with all others,
although the Orwellian concept of “some are more equal than others” 11 often plays a tacit
part. The scope of concern and privileges of membership vary according to the

l0Donald J. Puchala, “Western Europe,” in States in a Changing World: A Contem porary Analysis, ed.
Robert H. Jackson and Alan James, 69-92 (Oxford, UK: Clarendon, 1993), 84.
"George Orwell, Animal Farm. (New York: Harcourt Brace, 1946), 123.

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

144

organization’s founding purpose and charter.12 Whatever their purpose, member states
agree to behave in a stipulated manner which constitutes a limit on their freedom of
action and therefore, a “limit” to their sovereignty.
State membership in IGOs, especially those organizations with both broad and deep
involvement among members, could be said to require the voluntary “surrender” o f some
degree o f sovereignty. Reacting to members’ fears for the loss o f independence o f action
and identity, self-serving explanations or excuses by the organizations’ members and
leaders usually referred to “pooled” or “on deposit” sovereignty.13 IGOs are not a new
phenomenon. Any time in history where two or more states agreed to cooperate on trade,
a tacit IGO existed. More formal agreements, such as the Hanseatic League among
German principalities, also constituted proto-IGOs. However, in modem form, the IGO
dates to formation o f the International Telecommunications Union (ITU — nee
International Telegraph Union) in 1865.14 Technical and bureaucratic problems faced by
the world’s first telecommunications industry — the telegraph — were discussed in
Chapter II; solving the problems required states to ease their sovereign rights to supervise
messages — information — entering and leaving their territory. For the first time, the
best interest o f states would be served by international cooperation to ease and accelerate
the passage o f telegrams across frontiers.
Formation o f the ITU did not set any precedent to encourage immediate formation of
other IGOs. By 1909, there were less than 40 IGOs but nearly 400 operated in the Era of

l2Cusimano, B eyond Sovereignty, 221.
l3Philpott, “Sovereignty: An Introduction,” 358.
l4Codding and Rutkowski, The International Telecommunication Union, 3.
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Ubiquitous Communications one of which, of course, was the ITU.15 The complex,
interdependent world of the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries led states to
form IGOs for all the classic reasons: to promote trade, ease international exchanges,
prevent or discourage predator behavior, etc. The need for telecommunications
cooperation caused the first true IGO’s formation, but day to day functioning requires
effective communications systems.
Virtually all actors in the international system — states, IGOs, NGOs, and MNCs —
rely on the world’s complex web of telecommunications to operate. The world’s
communication system starts with each state’s national system (often government owned
and operated). Various private systems traverse, augment, or run parallel to national
networks. When the electromagnetic spectrum is involved (radio waves), little, if any,
argument exists to challenge a state’s right to control its use within territorial borders. In
many situations, short range or low power use o f frequencies is strictly a domestic
concern. However, many electromagnetic emanations have effective ranges extending far
beyond the territorial limits o f the state o f origin. States might be within their sovereign
rights to allow use of such emitters, but the international implications could be viewed in
a range from internationally “annoying” to outright hostility. Even legitimate use of
internationally allocated “long distance” frequencies caused concern as they crossed
borders.
During the Cold War, the US and its allies in the West generally claimed a right to
broadcast putatively objective radio programs directly to the populations o f various

l5Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore. "The Politics, Power, and Pathologies o f International
Organizations," International Organization 53, no. 4 (1999), 699.
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Soviet bloc states via shortwave radio and condemned any action taken to “jam ”or
prevent reception. The ITU, to which nearly all states on both sides o f the question
belonged, maintained through its regulations that shortwave radio provided an
internationally acceptable means by which information could be transmitted across
national borders. The Soviet Union, however, maintained that such undesirable foreign
transmissions violated their sovereignty. Therefore, they radiated blocking (known
commonly as “jamming”) signals on the same frequencies to render the Western
ideological broadcasts unintelligible.16 Similar situations still remain unresolved,
especially concerning US sponsorship of Radio Marti broadcasts into Cuba.17
This circumstance provides a point o f fact example o f telecommunications
technology’s impact on sovereignty. No foreign military forces crossed an international
border. No damage was done to any property, weapons, or assets. Nothing affected
national economies. Only invisible, albeit detectable, electromagnetic waves were
involved. Yet the targeted states maintained that their sovereignty had been violated and
they expended considerable effort and expense to counter the broadcasts, an effort which
was not 100 percent successful.
Modern trade, cultural exchange, international relief efforts to natural disasters, or
virtually any other multinational operations necessitate extensive consultation and
coordination, all of which requires telecommunications. Participation in the network that
allows these communications requires matching or conversion to technical standards,

l6Drake, "Territoriality and Intangibility," 267.
l7Monroe Price, M edia and Sovereignty: The G lobal Information Revolution an d Its Challenge to State
Power (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2002), 202-203.
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coordinated exchange of control data, as well as physical connections among networks.
The ITU provides a forum to coordinate and control the necessary actions. Does this
constitute a significant reduction, surrender, or erosion o f sovereignty? Perhaps
“significant” requires some elusive concept of quantification and operationalization, but
states’ exclusive authority to intervene coercively in activities within their territory has
taken on a new dimension. States agree to coercive intervention based not solely on
domestic law with constitutional limits, but in accordance with international convention
as well. Pursuit o f both internal and external trade relations, cultural exchanges,
international relief efforts to natural disasters, or virtually any other multinational
operations requires extensive consultation and coordination, all o f which requires
telecommunications.
Radiation o f shortwave propaganda across international frontiers presents a direct link
between sovereignty and telecommunications. Modem financial transactions are
somewhat more esoteric. States also have an uncontested right to determine and produce
“coin o f the realm.” However, in the telecommunications dominant world o f this era,
states have little say in the internationally accepted value o f their respective currencies.
In the 1960 with much of the world’s economy still linked to a gold standard and fixed
exchange rates, the French franc was facing devaluation with respect to other states’
monetary instruments. President Charles de Gaulle simply stated that he refused to allow
the devaluation o f his nation’s currency. However, release o f the link between currency
and gold, combined with instantaneous exchanges permitted by telecommunications
prevent any such future proclamation in the name o f sovereignty from rising above the
level o f joke. Various currency markets, instantaneously linked together, synergistically
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determine the value o f a state’s currency which is no longer directly based on precious
metal content or reserves. Rather, the wide variety o f elements constituting “news o f the
world” — both domestic and international — unite to influence currency exchange
transactions. With computer aided decision tools, a minuscule drop (or rise) in exchange
rates could result in massive electronic exchanges o f currency. It takes place in
“international cyberspace” and sovereign states have little or no control over the
transactions. The state might join the trading frenzy in attempts to bolster exchange rates
by purchase o f its own currency, but can do little else to influence the value o f its
currency on the international market. In the end, a state’s currency is valued by what the
rest o f the world will pay for it or sell it for.
Similarly, the evolution o f “electronic cash” allows payment in kind to be
accomplished with electronic transactions rather than exchange o f specie. Here states
might exert influence through severe control o f domestic banking with positive
supervision o f all transactions known to cross its borders. Once again, to do so would
hamper the market’s free enterprise. Traders would likely move their operations to
another state with less (or more acceptable) supervision. The trade off distills into a
simple equation o f exerting “absolute” sovereignty in the limited area o f currency transfer
at the likely cost of prosperity, or “surrendering” an element o f sovereign control in return
for economic gain.

Telecommunications and Sovereignty During the Age o f Ubiquitous Communications
This era, especially as it approaches contemporary points, combines all o f the impact
on sovereignty by telecommunications during previous eras. Sovereignty itself was
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considered “under attack” by many political scientists, but the subject to hand requires
distillation of the situation to refine the specific effects as a result o f telecommunications.
The ubiquitous nature o f telecommunications which developed and expanded
throughout this era removed physical location from the equation in many private and
public enterprises. Manufacturing operations could take place in a remote part of the
world where — presumably — low wages, low real estate overheads, minimal
environmental controls, and low taxes produced an optimal business environment.
Associated fiscal, management, and service activities, linked via telecommunications,
could just as easily be accomplished a continent, or more, away. Telephone calls from
corporate management to operational or manufacturing elements do not vary when made
from across a building, across, a town, or across an ocean. Funds can be moved
electronically around the world among financial institutions to locations with the most
favorable tax rate, minimal government influence, or ease o f future transfer.
An impact on state sovereignty appears obvious in many areas as a result. If MNCs
move fiscal assets with impunity to avoid tax liability, the state o f origin has lost control
over activities taking place within its territory. Harsh measures might attempt to clamp
down on industries’ free movement o f assets in response, but those MNCs would likely
limit or avoid future operations in that state. Other states create an “MNC friendly”
environment. The state’s “absoluteness” in taxing and supervision o f business operations
within its borders dissolves as they compete with other states who willingly forfeit some
of their “absoluteness” in return for the benefits derived from businesses operating from
their soil.
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Dominant Mass Media
Newspapers, from their beginnings, provided information to the populace. Some
versions may have experienced some state attempts at censorship and literacy rates
limited impact, but newspapers functioned at the speed o f civilization they served. Later
media continued to do so by exploiting technological advances such as the telegraph.
States found it necessary to suppress (censor) the press or live within the confines o f a
free press. The newspaper dominated mass media throughout the first two eras. During
the third, the Age o f Radio and Cable, broadcast radio materialized as an entertainment
and news source followed by television, but printed newspapers remained a predominant
means o f news distribution in 1965. As the Age o f Ubiquitous Telecommunications
progressed, even the venerable, “low tech,” printed on paper newspaper exploited
information transfer technology. Traditionally limited by the requirement to collocate
news, advertising, and production facilities with press equipment, newspapers had to print
their product and physically move the resulting paper copies to sales and distribution
points. Rapidity o f transfer and distribution depended upon the speed o f cargo transport
— primarily cars, rail and truck, but in some cases, aircraft.
Telecommunications allowed the layout o f pages to be accomplished on computers in
one location and transmitted quickly to distant points for printing, as distance approached
irrelevance in information transfer. This became particularly useful in geographically
large states such as the US where the idea o f a “national newspaper” was long limited by
the time required to transport the printed product. However, by the late twentieth century,
papers such as USA Today, New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal
capitalized on telecommunications technology to pursue “national newspaper” status.
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The newspapers were developed in their home cities and prepared for printing. The print
images were then transferred via computer networks to multiple points throughout the
country where press runs could ensure rapid delivery throughout the surrounding regions.
Rapid transfer o f the graphic images required for printing of a newspaper would have
been virtually impossible until the development o f integrated computer and
telecommunications networks.
O f course, newspapers exploited speed of information transfer in basic news
production, as well. Traditional information transfer in news media had used telegraph,
telephone, and various variants thereof such as teletype, and stock market ticker tape.
Modem networks, such as the Internet, allowed news gathering and transfer to printing
facilities to make use of the irrelevance of distance.
As computers began to permeate modem life, some experts predicted the imminent
demise of the paper copy o f newspapers. While this has not, in fact, happened, other
means o f reading the same information have emerged, most notably via the Internet.
Both local and far distant newspapers are available to anyone with a computer and an
Internet connection.
The printed word maintained a prominent if no longer dominant role in dissemination
o f information and shared its reliance on telecommunications with other mass media. All
elements o f media rely on telecommunications technology at some point in their
production and delivery. When it reaches the “consumer,” media o f all types presents
products o f the originating culture. It reaches large numbers o f people. If it presents a
desirable picture o f different but enviable lifestyle, the populace will likely begin to look
toward adoption o f some elements. The state can try to control access; it can pass laws
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making the use o f equipment allowing direct international connections illegal and
punishable by harsh penalty. Broadcast media have inherent characteristics, however,
which evade even the most severe attempts at suppression or control.
Since its inception, broadcast media always had some degree o f long distance
influence. Various national “world service” radio transmissions provided news and
cultural media beginning in the 1930s. Many continue today. The British Broadcasting
Corporation (BBC) World Service, Voice of America, Radio Moscow, and Radio Free
Europe provided both legitimate news and flagrant propaganda during the Cold War.
[These long distance broadcasts used the high frequency (HF) portion o f the spectrum
between 3 and 30 MHz, often generically referred to as “shortwave.” Most American
radios were not designed for reception of HF. Use o f shortwave radio was considered the
purview o f ham radio enthusiasts. Much of the rest o f the world, however, routinely
maintained the capability to receive the international shortwave portion o f the spectrum.]
Laws o f physics and the nature o f television transmission required it to be consigned
to portions o f the frequency spectrum limited to line o f sight capability (approximately 30
miles). Networking — linking one program production facility to numerous broadcasting
stations — overcame the need (or desire) to reach dispersed audiences with a single, high
powered transmitter. Except where transmitters were located near territorial borders,
cross-border incursion o f television signals was not a major issue.
Satellites provided the means by which to extend the reach o f television signals.
Direct broadcast satellite systems provided a capability for “customers” in much o f the
world to receive television originating throughout the world — but primarily in the
developed countries — directly from a satellite. States can outlaw the use o f such
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reception equipment, but at what cost? A desire for drastic repression o f foreign
influence would probably be indicative o f an already repressive regime controlling the
state. Police power, inherent in sovereignty, would become intrusive to the citizens in
denial o f equipment availability. Further, should the state wish to extend its own
influence through use o f similar media, equipment availability would be denied to the
citizenry.

Telecommunications
At the opening o f this era, telecommunications had already reached and exceeded the
projections for ubiquitous communications made near the end o f the Age o f Telegraph.
In 1896, the president o f the National Electric Light Association predicted a not distant
future where news from all areas o f the world could be gathered in less than a second and
human voices would be transmitted a thousand leagues.18 It did not happen quite as fast
as projected, but by 1965, radio, telephone, telegraph, and television girdled the earth.
Undersea and terrestrial cables dominated the long distance transfer o f data, augmented
by line o f sight and over the horizon radio systems. The environment surrounding
sovereign states was immersed in telecommunications. Nearly every event in the
domestic and international arena became known though mass media unless extreme
efforts were made to suppress transfer and distribution o f information surrounding the
event.

l8James Gleik, What Just H appened: A Chronicle from the Information Frontier (New York: Pantheon,
2002), 5.
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The definitive event to separate eras occurred in 1965. The first geo-synchronous
communications relay satellite reached orbit. This was the first step toward
exceptionally long distance exchange o f information in all forms o f electronic media. By
the end o f the twentieth century, a constellation of satellites orbiting the earth at 22,300
miles above the equator provided for the gathering o f news from all areas o f the world far
beyond the remotest dreams of 1896. If the information could be forced into a format to
be transmitted via electromagnetic radiation, it could be sent anywhere in an instant.
While the geo-synchronous satellite provided a key element, the ubiquity of
communications relied, rather, on a synergistic amalgamation o f interdependent networks.
Terrestrial cellular (wireless) telephone systems connect among each other via cables and
line of sight radios, and cross longer distances via satellite links. Television remote teams
connect to their home stations via line of sight when locally remote or satellite during
long distance separation, depending on terrain and availability o f equipment. The Internet
“rides” virtually every type of transmission media.
Ubiquitous communications impose a dilemma o f sovereignty on states. They are
capable of controlling where, within their territory, cables may be laid. Radio
transmissions originating within their borders used frequencies under their control and
allocation. States could — theoretically — exercise careful supervision over all
transmissions leaving their territory. However, in doing so, they hamper the efficiency of
the users o f telecommunications, many of whom will be involved in international trade
and finance o f benefit to the state. The state can exercise its sovereignty and suffer in the
international marketplace, or it can back away from sovereignty and participate.
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Territorial Control
The states comprising the international system continued to be territorially defined
and the development of ubiquitous communications did not change borders. Rather, one
o f the world’s primary commodities in this era — information — routinely and constantly
crossed frontiers, often without the knowledge of the state whose territory had been
“violated.” Telecommunications technology provided the means by which state residents,
MNCs, and NGOs could “operate” within or across borders with virtual impunity,
removing the significance of the territorial state over such actions. A particularly
pertinent example comes from “remote sensing.” For those states with the necessary
technology, powerful sensors attached to orbiting satellites scan territory to map
geography and obtain all types of resource information without any permission from the
scanned region’s government. The resulting information can be used to predict weather,
produce maps, or seek data on another state’s activities for intelligence purposes.
Technology may produce a counter measure to “protect” against such action, but it is not
likely in the immediate future.19
North Korea probably attempts the most draconian control o f its territory from the
influences o f telecommunications. The state severely limits its citizenry’s access to
modem telecommunications technology. Basic telephone service is both limited and
expensive and international calls are priced beyond the general population’s means. The
Internet is available only under controlled conditions. Still, people manage to make
hazardous journeys into China where they purchase cellular telephones and service.

‘’Herbert I. Schiller, Information and the Crisis Economy (Norwood, NJ: Ablex Publishing, 1984), 99100 .
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Returning home, the Chinese cellular network signals cross North Korean borders and
those telephones continue to obtain service, albeit, only in border areas.20
States maintained their responsibilities for those activities which remained purely
domestic — common goods, police and law enforcement, and national security — but the
borders did not exclude or prevent border crossing o f other commodities. The
“information revolution” finally completed the conversion o f much o f the world’s
financial transactions to purely electronic exchanges. Dollars, pounds, and eventually
euros still provided units o f quantification by which to “keep score” but an end point
occurred in the future — true e-cash which has been predicted to threaten the very basis
o f the territorial state by removing state influence, control, or taxation over financial
transactions.21 While this prediction might be somewhat harsh, it forms a basis for further
consideration. If a state has little or no control over currency transactions taking place
within its domain, has sovereignty been lost? Perhaps, rather than lost, states in the future
will no longer have domestically peculiar currency. If so it is the nature o f sovereignty
that changed rather than a level which has eroded. While traditional sovereignty included
issuing coin o f the realm, it may become unimportant in postmodern international society.
The specific impact remains to be determined.

Cultural Cross-Pollination
Throughout history, cultures intermingled through trade, migration and conquest.

20Howard, “The Real Threat to Kim.”
21Stephen J. Kobrin, “Electronic Cash and the End o f National Markets,” Foreign Policy, no. 107
(1997), 65.
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States, especially nation-states, often tried to maintain cultural purity by limiting that
influence. In antiquity, cultural influence required travel. People — traders, immigrants,
soldiers — had to travel to distant lands leaving some o f their culture and returning with
foreign influence. Telecommunications technology allows influence to be inserted into a
foreign culture without any travel. States must either adapt to or repress the receipt of
technical cultural influence. If sovereignty helps explain state behavior and states behave
differently from past eras, sovereignty has changed as well.
Even before the emergence o f mass communication, when influence relied on the
“natural” forms of cross-pollination, cultural purity was something o f a myth. Early in
the twentieth century, the anthropologist Ralph Linton observed that no extant culture
owed more than ten percent of its elements to members o f its own society.22 Put into
other words, ninety percent of all cultural peculiarities result from cross-pollination.
Languages dynamically demonstrate cross-cultural influence. Most modem
languages have adopted words peculiar to modem technology directly from the language
o f origin, usually English (or the American dialect thereof). The French are so concerned
about the “pollution” o f their language due to cultural cross-pollination that they “outlaw”
the “importation” o f foreign words and require new words, as necessary, to be “Francoified”23 rather than simply adopted from a foreign language o f origin. So what? The
French particularly associate their language and nation (nation = people with a shared
cultural heritage). Coalescence of society around common languages gave rise to the

22Linton, The Study o f Man, 325.
23David Hornsby, “Patriotism and Linguistic Purism in France,” Journal o f European Studies 28, no. 4
(1998), 362.
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original European nation-states. In the modem, telecommunications dominated world,
dominant culture — usually the US — wields its influence with near impunity. Linguists
attribute the “borrowing” o f words between and among languages as a legitimate
evolutionary process by which the lexicon of a language adapts to new phenomena. In
the postmodern world, however, where the borrowing often takes place from the US
dialect of English, it is seen as a cultural threat.24 Still, in language chauvinistic France,
le weekend and le drugstore are universally understood terms.
State rulers — especially in absolute or authoritarian states — regard modem
telecommunications and associated technologies as a mixed blessing. They usually want
the benefits accompanying automation, telephones, and television. At the same time, they
do not want the erosion o f cultural integrity often included with “progress,”25 especially
since the influence is often seen as US based. Cross-cultural influence via commercial
media is obvious to a modem traveler. Police in Beijing direct traffic beneath umbrellas
emblazoned with McDonald’s logos. Blue jeans-clad youth are everywhere. “Columbo”
and “Baywatch” are known to television audiences throughout the world. Where US
music, motion pictures, and television programs become so dominant, underpinnings of
political culture ride along like remora. States might deny their populace local broadcasts
o f foreign television, but in many cases, the dam has been broken. Could it be cut off
after the fact? Sovereign “protection” o f national culture was probably always impossible
due to natural human interface. Attempts to limit access to foreign media o f all types,
once broken, likely would be difficult to reclaim.

24Rebecca Posner, Linguistic Change in French (Oxford: Clarendon, 1997), 163.
25Pool, Technologies Without Boundaries, 101.
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The mythical nature o f true cultural “purity” was always defeated as populations
interacted by way o f trade, migration, and conquest. Cultures intermingled and
synthesized — cross-pollinated. Telecommunications technology accelerated the exact
same process, taking it from the speed o f its “state-of-nature,” where changes appeared
over generations, to a point where influence occurs in near realtime. The state has little
ability to stop the rapid influx of cultural influence. Saudi Arabia forbids the import of
Christian bibles, anything remotely connected to Judaism, and all media depicting nudity.
Any Saudi citizen with a computer and Internet access (and enough ingenuity or money to
get around government attempts to limit access) can find all o f the forbidden material.
Somewhat less blatant cultural influence, although neither as rapid nor as dynamic, finds
its way through. A full body concealing woman’s abaya purchased in Riyadh carries a
label, in English, proclaiming the shop’s name: “My Fair Lady.” The western cultural
influence is obvious, and the involvement o f telecommunications and impact on
sovereignty follows, logically.

International Finance
The world’s markets began to merge as a result o f the relative instantaneity provided
by the telegraph. A century and a half later, deregulation of many domestic financial
markets combined with liberalization o f international capital flows made possible by
telecommunications technologies linking computer networks results in a single,
worldwide economy.26 States no longer dominated their domestic economy. The

26Sassen, Losing Control, 40.
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economic system o f the world became inseparable from domestic systems. In 1987,
French economist Lionel Stoleru expressed it with complete accuracy:
[N]ational economies turn round the international economy like the earth turns
round the sun, and not the reverse.. . . Abandon the illusion o f strictly national
policies modified by international constraints and face today’s reality.
International policies modified by national constraints.27
Economic sanctions, in particular, hold potential for devastating consequences to the
state excluded from the global market. Telecommunications enable movement o f funds
around the world, with a few strokes o f a computer keyboard, the click o f a computer
mouse, or at the “low tech” worst, a phone call. The transactions often involve no state
control, review, supervision, or taxation. As with other modem implementations, states
could impose restrictions and review before the electronic transactions cross their
borders, but the resultant difficulty would limit the states effective participation in the
world’s economy. Once again, the state must choose between “full” exercise o f its
sovereignty and the gains to be had from both expressed and tacit membership in the
world’s institutions.
The primary influence of telecommunications on international finance is in the realm
of “electronic cash” or “e-cash” as the vernacular calls it. Totally reliant on a digitally
networked global economy, e-cash is often viewed as a direct threat to the existence of
territorial states.28
Traditional means o f payment did not spontaneously erupt when some prehistoric
financier smote the ground. It was an evolutionary process beginning with exchange of

27Basil Blackwell and Samuel Eilon, The G lobal Challenge o f Innovations (Oxford: ButterworthHeinemann, 1991), 156.
28Kobrin, “Electronic Cash and the End o f National Markets,” 65.
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goods. At some point, objects of value became a generic payment until precious metal —
primarily gold and silver — settled in as the nearly universal media o f exchange.
Problems with movement o f precious material gave rise to letters o f credit and paper
currency and set the stage for the modem evolution of electronic financial transactions.
Acceptance o f paper money required trust in the state responsible for issuing the script, or
in some early cases, banking establishments. That trust did not automatically shift into
the electronic world.
Electronic cash had its own metamorphosis through which to pass before larval
electronic debit and credit systems gave rise to the adult butterfly o f true electronic
money. Credit and debit cards in routine contemporary use throughout the world are
based on existing monetary systems. When used, funds are electronically transferred
from the account o f the user to the account of the merchant. Telecommunications
technology is essential to the cards’ use through nearly instantaneous verification as an
integral element o f the transaction. Next in the evolution of e-cash came the “smart card”
— credit cards in which an embedded microchip carries inherent electronic means of
verification along with available balance. However, credit, debit, and smart cards all
represent a more convenient means o f transacting financial transfers o f “traditional”
money. Banks still process the proceeds at the end o f the day, albeit electronically
without the exchange o f actual specie. Banks in all states operate under some degree of
government charter and supervision so that sovereignty still manifests in national finance.
True electronic money, existing only in digital form stored in the memory of personal
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computers or next generation smart cards, might not be backed by reserve accounts of
“real” money.29 Banks might cease to be an element in banking.
True digital money remains in the future of finance, but the foundation exists in
electronic credit and debit transactions. Trust and verification are critical to any
electronic financial transaction but once established, the title o f the currency merits little
concern. Rather than dollars, pounds, yen, or euros, “electronic credits” would work as
well provided their value is known and understood by all concerned. What part do states
play in this? Perhaps, none. Historically, only states and banks — and usually, state
chartered banks — could gamer the trust necessary for faith in currency. Should e-cash
evolve into a viable alternative to traditional monetary transactions, it would constitute a
de facto if not de jure single, international monetary system. To maintain any degree of
control or regulation, states would be required to harmonize national monetary
regulations and means o f control.30 Otherwise, independent e-cash issuing concerns
(probably some variant o f MNC) could elude any regulation and take on some elements
of sovereignty, in this case, determining the coin o f the realm to be used within multiple
sovereign states. It could be argued that interconnected international currency exchange
markets constitute a single international currency with multiple variants.
If electronic cash should emerge from the world’s interconnected network —
primarily the Internet — could state currencies survive? The Internet grew from a state
sponsored program — the US Advanced Research Projects Agency (ARPA) — into an
amorphous, international web with little state involvement in its expansion, growth or

29Ibid„ 67.
30Ibid., 76.
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use.31 Some analogies exist between the Internet, the anarchy o f the international system
of states, and the possibilities o f an e-cash system free o f state control. The Internet
represents an anarchical international means o f communications as a “network of
networks” which is neither owned nor controlled by any single state, person, or entity.
Protocols have been agreed to avoid chaos and ensure efficiency within the anarchy, but
anyone with the technical wherewithal can connect to and exploit the system.32 Many
users o f the Internet transfer money through its circuits. Consumers purchase day to day
items for small amounts to be applied to their credit cards. Brokers buy and sell stocks
involving large transactions. Currency traders exchange large amounts o f money to buy
and sell foreign script which never physically exists outside their computer memory.
Normally, the funds involved are in the home currency o f the user, but international
transactions present few problems to sophisticated users. A purchase in pounds or euros
appear on credit bills in dollars, in a simplistic example. Little imagination would be
necessary to picture the eventual emergence of universal exchange o f electronic “credits”
— probably starting with the deposit o f actual, traditional money, but leaving it behind at
some point and becoming truly digital.
If taxation is a sovereign right o f states, how will they determine the domestic value
of an international electronic currency based solely on trust and verification? Could they
exert any control over expenditures crossing their borders in pure electronic form? How
would they fund state operations? Sovereignty might be under attack by weapons no

31Jerry A. Goldstone, “Internet Celebrates Its Past and Forges Its Future,” Business Communications
Review 24, no. 10 (1994): 4.
32Douglas W. Vick, “Exporting the First Amendment to Cyberspace: The Internet and State
Sovereignty” in M edia an d G lobalization: Why the State M atters, ed. Nancy Morris and Silvio Waisbord,
3-20 (Lantham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2001), 6.
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more lethal than the electrons and magnetic charges making up electronic financial
transactions.
In the US, an analogous situation points toward similar problems in the international
commercial arena. The states and their local jurisdictions comprising the US federal
system all have different programs for collecting taxes on retail sales. With increased
sales via the Internet, state and local tax jurisdictions, o f which there are nearly 8,000,
complained about the annual loss o f $ 15 billion in uncollected sales tax. A group of 42
US states formed the Streamlined Sales Tax Project (SSTP) in attempt to encourage, or
perhaps coerce, on line retailers to collect sales taxes through simplified procedures.
While the SSTP has had some success, it is unlikely to achieve full compliance without
federal legislation for enforcement.33 Taking the analogy to the international
environment, anarchy still exists. No overarching means o f enforcement exists and
international taxation programs would require cooperation far beyond existing
intergovernmental organizational structures. As states in the international system see
their sovereign control over commerce changing, their surrender o f control over taxation
to an international entity would likely be seen as extreme.
The financial size o f some MNCs already exceed the gross national products of many
sovereign states. Using telecommunications to move fiscal assets, they already often
avoid tax burdens by relocating the “focus” o f their operations to tax friendly states.
Telecommunications allow them to communicate with a distant “headquarters” across the

33W. David Gardner, "States Line Up for Voluntary Internet Sales Tax Program," Information Week,
May 19, 2005, http://www.informationweek.com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=163105744 (accessed
August 8, 2005).
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world as easily as across a city or state. They seem to take on some elements of
sovereignty.

Sovereignty as a Whole
As originally actualized, sovereignty existed in a world system where territorial states
with nation based citizenship were the only actors. The Roman Catholic Church tried to
participate as it had under the feudal system, but sovereign states controlled the limited
membership to their exclusive club. As the number o f sovereign states increased, the
differences among them blurred in concert. By the Age o f Ubiquitous Communications,
the club was neither limited nor exclusive. The twentieth century’s growth o f a global
economy, spurred on by the computer networks, telephones, television, and other
elements o f telecommunications technology, caused profound reconfiguration to the
institutions fundamental to processes o f governance.34
States, while still territorially defined, were under constraints from all manner of
sources. Individuals and non-state actors in the international system made claims on
states through both tacit and explicit regimes. The human rights regime provides a
specific example. The Universal Declaration o f Human Rights does not carry the “legally
binding” status o f an international treaty. However, it is cited so often in international
law that it has ascended to the status of customary international law and observed as law
— to the extent that international law can truly be treated as law.35 Sovereign states find
their exclusive authority to intervene coercively in domestic activities to be constrained

34Sassen, Losing Control, xi.
35Ibid., 90.
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by a tacit regime proscribing norms o f behavior. Abuse of citizens, violations o f human
rights, even environmental damage are likely to be announced to the entire world as they
happen. O f course, states may ignore the percepts o f the regime but in doing so, risk the
wrath o f other states. International sanctions might be employed, but large powerful
states could ignore them and possibly retaliate. Smaller states might find sanctions
devastating. The norms o f international law would not be applied with any consistency.
Much has been made o f the effects on state sovereignty by international economic
activity. Often, this is described as erosion of sovereignty. However, it is not the
sovereign state that is being eroded. Rather, it is erosion of the central government’s
control o f activities which have international consequences, especially economic activity.
A synergistic union o f sovereign states created an environment where international and
mutually beneficial activities could flourish. States still impose organizing aspects on the
international system despite the efforts o f many members of the economic system to
evade state control. Without the structure o f states, the [purely theoretical] result would
be an inconceivable anarchic chaos. States might function in a chaotic international
system, but purely economic entities require the framework o f organized monetary
systems.

Summary
The Age o f Ubiquitous Communications began with communications available to
much o f the world, although in some cases limited to radio, telephone, and a vestigial
telegraph cable network. At the era’s beginning, the first geo-synchronous relay satellite
doubled transatlantic telephone and television capacity. By the twentieth century’s end,
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geo-synchronous satellites, undersea fiberoptic cable, and terrestrial communications
systems provided “connectivity” to most o f the world. Concurrent to the development of
ubiquitous communications, the sovereign state continued its social evolution to keep
pace with the demands of world society.
States’ various “coins o f the realm” based on gold standards gave way to floating
valuation which became dependent on telecommunications systems to tie them all
together in one world economy. Independent markets began to merge with the
introduction o f the telegraph in mid-nineteenth century but reached virtual consolidation
when computers in one hemisphere instantly relayed transactions to the opposite side of
the world, and all points in between. An increasingly literate, aware, and technologically
equipped populace found themselves exposed to cultural undercurrent from far away
places; the residual influence which in the “state-of-nature” might have taken decades or
centuries now happened in real time.
While this happened, states “absoluteness” waned. The telecommunications
technology which provided a foundation for expansion o f the world’s media, economics,
and culture also brought information across state frontiers with impunity. States found it
necessary to relook, reevaluate, and in many cases, reconfigure the fundamental processes
by which governance was accomplished. Yet states have remained sovereign.
Sovereignty has changed. States can rely on news o f their actions being learned
throughout the world moments after their occurrence. A requirement to consider world
reaction to purely domestic conduct and events diminishes states’ “ ...exclusive authority
to intervene coercively in activities within its territory.”36 Attenuated or not, sovereignty

36Thomson, “State Sovereignty in International Relations,” 219.
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remains. It is not like energy which can not be created or destroyed. Newly sovereign
entities emerge such as Croatia. Once sovereign players such as Somalia exist within
former territorial limits but without any “state” to exercise authority. The sovereignty of
the USSR transferred seamlessly, if not painlessly, to the Russian Federation.
Hastened by telecommunications, sovereign states have changed. “Cultural purity,”
in all probability a myth at best, remains elusive. If populations want modem technology,
information and ideas about other cultures comes along with it. If states desire the taxes
and prosperity from a vibrant businesses environment, they must accept the
telecommunications technology necessary for participation in the global economy which,
in turn, requires easing of state supervision o f funds, information, ideas, and concomitant
cultural influence crossing borders.
Joining the international community, further, requires state participation in IGOs, all
of which rely on telecommunications for routine functioning. Agreement to abide by the
“rules” of IGOs — in essence, acknowledging the existence and validity o f international
law — removes some o f the anarchy in the international system at the expense of
“traditional” sovereignty. A circular dialectic continues — the more a state desires to
participate in the international system, the less “freedom o f action” it has. However,
states remain sovereign.
Despite the erosion of their sovereignty, states still serve a vital function in organizing
the world’s international system. A true and pure capitalist — in economic system terms,
or an equally die hard realist, in international relations theory terms — might suggest that
states could confine themselves to maintenance o f a domestic economic system to foster
market forces which, in turn could take on other functions. However, in reality, it falls to
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the state to build infrastructure, protect domestic tranquility, and preserve the “common
good,” especially where it serves the populace in general, but not specifically business
interests.
The sovereign state survives.
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CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS

Introduction
The original research question asked: In what ways does telecommunications
technology affect state sovereignty? In answer to the question, the hypotheses set out in
Chapter I proposed that the more telecommunications technology developed, the less
states could control the passage o f information across their borders, influence the
international inflow and outflow of funds, and limit cultural penetration through foreign
influence. A converse null hypothesis suggested that state sovereignty is unaffected by
telecommunications technology. The methodology for analysis called for comparison of
variables, across time, beginning with 1648 — the generally accepted date o f the
sovereign state coming into its own — and continuing to the present.
When the international system of sovereign states emerged in Europe during the
seventeenth century, no telecommunications technology existed. Three and a half
centuries later, sovereign states still constituted the primary element o f international
social organization, and ubiquitous telecommunications technology provided the
infrastructure for worldwide, instantaneous transfer o f information without regard to
distance. Over this period of time, how had emergence and growth of
telecommunications affected sovereignty? Initial review of the analysis suggests
rejection o f the null hypothesis. This chapter compares the analyses described in
Chapters III through VI in response to the basic hypotheses set.
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In previous chapters, the evolution o f sovereignty was compared to the development
o f the telecommunications technology underpinning the ever increasing speed of
information transfer over four distinct eras. Some impact between the two appears
intuitively obvious and diachronic analysis would seem to confirm intuition’s validity.
This chapter specifically combines and presents the synergy o f mutual influence between
sovereignty and telecommunications technology.
Telecommunications technology (the independent variable) exerts influence on
sovereignty (the dependent variable) through the intervening variable o f information. In
other terms, states find that their freedom to act with sovereign impunity to be limited by
the necessity to consider international ramifications o f their actions because knowledge of
those actions will be internationally known rapidly if not instantaneously.

Sovereignty and Society
Sovereignty is first, and foremost, an organizing principle for both domestic and
international society.1 During the Middle Ages, the era between the fall o f the Roman
Empire until the dawn o f the Renaissance, which predates the time frame under study,
European society organized around feudalism. However, with the Renaissance and
associated enhanced rates o f literacy, early mass media, and the increased availability of
printed matter, society’s organization evolved away from feudalism toward a system of
sovereign states. Sovereignty was thought into existence to meet the needs o f post-feudal
society.2 The initial Control Era for this study began with the emergence o f an

'Bartleson, A G enealogy o f Sovereignty, 188.
2Knutsen, A H istory o f International Relations Theory, 2.
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international system o f sovereign states following the Peace o f Westphalia when no
telecommunications existed. Throughout the initial control era, as well as subsequent
telecommunications technology dominated eras, sovereignty continued to meet a number
o f societal needs. As with other forms of biological and social evolution, the process did
not reach an endpoint and cease in 1648. Societies’ needs changed, as did sovereignty to
meet them.3
Initially, little was expected from the sovereign states. They might be expected to
provide security in the form o f freedom from fear of foreign invasion, develop a monetary
system to support commerce, and in many cases, specify the means o f religious practice.
The absolute and unlimited power o f the state, inherent within sovereignty’s basic
definition, was rarely challenged and the international system approached the nineteenth
century as a strong and well established element by which the international system was
organized.
Sovereignty’s internal focus had always been the proverbial prince, but the American
and French Revolutions wrested the power away and refocused it on the people. Other
slow and less drastic processes, such as occurred in England, were moves toward
removing the concentration of sovereign power from the “sovereign” or monarch and
vesting it in the legislature. As societies evolved away from absolute monarchies and
approached differing degrees of democracy, the organizing principle — sovereignty —
might be expected to change along with it.
As the nineteenth century advanced, the international system o f sovereign states
remained centered on Europe but the walls surrounding the “closed club” were

3Philpott, "Ideas and the Evolution o f Sovereignty," 17.
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crumbling. The Industrial Revolution was in full swing and demand for raw materials
necessitated international trade and cooperation. In this environment, the telegraph made
its debut. Movement of goods still took place at the prevailing speed o f ground travel (at
this point determined by ocean and terrestrial steam engines) but information about
international transactions or diplomatic decisions could move in minutes or hours rather
than days or weeks.
Governments, businesses, and individuals altered their modus operandi to incorporate
telegraphic connections to transfer information over long distances. In a process that
continues into the twenty-first century, each new advance was incorporated into societal
functions. In the nineteenth century, the telegraph provided rapid exchange of
information at ever increasing distance and speed. The telephone provided convenient
exchange o f voices but it would take further, related technical advances for it to reach
distances comparable with the telegraph.
By the time radio emerged to augment telegraph and telephone at the turn o f the
twentieth century, international society was information dependent and states came to
expect rapid knowledge o f their actions to be available to friends, competitors, and
enemies. At the same time, the number o f states participating in the international system
increased as well. Former colonies and terra incognita coalesced into defined national
entities demanding self-determination, and the international system expanded with
telecommunications technology interwoven with the expansion.
Societies constituting the population element o f the sovereign state constantly
change through a natural process of social evolution, with the process often enhanced or
accelerated by telecommunications technology; in doing so, their expectations of
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government evolve as well. By the twentieth and into the twenty-first century,
populations in developed states looked to their own government for social safety nets and
various social justice programs. In lesser developed countries, populations as well as the
state looked beyond their own borders to IGOs and NGOs as the only likely sources of
assistance. What role did information — the intervening variable — play as enabled
(made possible) by telecommunications technology?
Much o f people’s expectations about the role o f their state and its government may be
attributed to increased awareness o f their place in the world, and that is a product o f
information. As discussed throughout the preceding chapters, both distribution and
transfer o f information contributed to increased availability o f information. State actions
became known domestically and internationally unless determined efforts were taken to
prevent it. The state-of-nature of information transfer can only be maintained artificially
through repressive measures by a state desiring to limit the transfer o f information by
suppressing the use o f telecommunications technology.

Telecommunications and Sovereignty
Entry o f telecommunications technology into the international arena caused states to
alter their way o f doing day to day business. Diplomats assigned to work with major
trading partners, advisories, or potential enemies were no longer sent out on their own
with a set o f instructions and requirements to report via slow mail. Exploiting
telecommunications technology, changes to diplomatic instructions and replies to them
could be exchanged quickly. This might actually be considered a positive change to
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sovereignty. States could exert their international influence directly rather than await
long delayed exchanges of reports and instructions.
However, the interconnected world removed much control o f other matters from state
supervision. A state attempting to exercise sovereignty over telecommunications and
information it carries has a difficult task. No argument exists over a state’s right to
manage and control the use o f the electromagnetic spectrum emanating from within its
borders. However, those electromagnetic waves do not stop at the borders. As the waves
fall on other states’ territory, interference is sure to follow unless spectrum use is
coordinated. Active participation and membership in IGOs such as the ITU helps
minimize potential chaos, but states limit their sovereign rights in return for the benefits
o f cooperation. Participation in the world’s postmodern economy requires extensive,
coordinated use o f the spectrum and minimum contribution to the potential chaos.
Therefore, states agree to the necessary limits on sovereignty in exchange for the
functional benefits o f international participation in actions requiring technical
cooperation.
Means o f information transfer which do not radiate, such as old fashioned cable or
ultra-modern fiber optics have different characteristics in that the information content can
neither cause chaotic electromagnetic interference nor can it be as easily extracted by
unintended recipients. The state can forbid use o f the technology, but once put into use,
little if any supervision can be exercised over the information transferred. The sheer
volume o f data would require extensive investment in personnel for review which, in
turn, would introduce unacceptable delays in delivery. The state might exert its
sovereignty over telecommunications technology in order to limit the information passed
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as is often attempted by North Korea. However, to do so minimizes effective
communications and severely limits participation in the functioning o f the postmodern
world.

Dominant Mass Media
The dominant mass media within any era merit discussion in the domain of
telecommunications because it provides the most obvious means for distribution of
information to the populace. During the control era, mass media consisted o f little more
than local newspapers which were few in number due to increasing but still low literacy
rates. Like all other information dependent elements o f the era, newspapers relied on the
speed of human travel to receive information to be published.
Newspapers maintained some degree o f dominance in mass media throughout all of
the eras under study and took advantage o f each advance in telecommunications to
increase the speed at which they could obtain data for publications. Still, until late in the
final era, the newspapers themselves always moved at the speed o f human travel. O f
course, that speed increased from a few miles an hour — the proverbial speed o f oxcart
— to hundreds o f miles per hour when aircraft delivery became available.
The first use o f radio was technologically limited to “wireless telegraph” capable only
of transmitting the same type o f Morse Code used over telegraph wires. When voice
radio developed in the 1920s to the point where broadcast systems were feasible, mass
media had new elements o f speed. With newspapers, rapid and nearly instantaneous
transfer o f information through telephone and telegraph then stagnated to await
production in print. When received by news organizations, it could be broadcast without
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delay (at the discretion o f editors or station owners). True mass media had emerged —
with particular emphasis on mass. The information moved at the speed o f light and
reached wide audiences. Advances in telecommunications technology expanded the mass
media into every element o f human activity. The Internet and various other computer and
communications networks rendered distance irrelevant and distribution approached
universal. Information could move across a city or across an ocean in microseconds.
The synergistic union o f computers and telecommunications technology produced an
amorphous, worldwide element o f infrastructure for massive transfer and distribution of
information — the Internet. Newspaper, television, and radio continued their traditional
delivery and broadcast, but often the same information was “posted” on or “streamed”
through the Internet. News, educational material, cultural information, and entertainment
from one part o f the world were all available, instantly, anywhere else on the globe. The
dominant mass media were mass media and states had little control over any o f them
unless they attempted to suppress them all.

Telecommunications
Telecommunications have evolved through numerous iterations from rudimentary
point to point telegraph connections in the nineteenth century to the ubiquitous Internet.
States have been required to contend with information crossing their borders but they
have also exploited the capabilities for their own use. The technical difficulty
surrounding interception and monitoring data crossing borders has not prevented states
from continuing long established attempts to determine the content o f messages. Rarely
discussed openly, intelligence gathering is generally acknowledged as a state’s sovereign

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

178

right, or even duty. Ubiquity o f telecommunications along with countermeasures to
prevent intercept and monitoring, however, continually make the process more difficult.
As telecommunications technology develops, so do the attempts to develop technical
means by which to intercept the information. State attempts to find out what information
was crossing its borders continue as they had for centuries.
Development o f telecommunications has been continuous, as a cursory look at its
history shows. The next step, perhaps, is more difficult to predict. Early twenty-first
century telecommunications would truly seem to have earned the title o f “ubiquitous.”
Citizens of nearly all countries have the ability to use a cellular telephone to talk,
exchange messages, or access the Internet from, and to, anywhere in the world. Again,
states might make attempts to monitor the cacophony o f data in search o f any with
sovereignty damaging potential but the magnitude o f such a task limits its potential. The
next step in the technological evolution may completely remove any potential for the state
to control information, cultural influence, or exchange o f funds across its borders.

Territorial Control
The sovereign state was bom a territorial entity and territory remains an essential
element o f the modem state. States have always defended their borders against military
incursion, tax evading smugglers, and unwanted immigration. Traditionally, such border
control is a police or military responsibility limited by little more than a state’s ability to
deploy adequate forces. In this context, the emergence o f telecommunications technology
likely enhanced a state’s control o f its borders. As communications would become a
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“combat multiplier” in warfare, it would provide similar enhancement to the process of
border control.
However, when telecommunications are used to transfer information across frontiers
rather than things or people, control becomes more difficult and approaches impossible.
Early attempts by France and Prussia (Chapter II) to control the content o f telegraph
messages entering and leaving their territory proved feasible but at the expense of
unacceptable delay to the messages and high personnel costs. Later technologies have the
same disadvantages magnified by orders o f magnitude. Sovereign “rights” o f states might
permit them to control electronic data but technology does not provide any practicable
method by which to exercise that right. Rather, states must adapt to the international
environment where information, as a commodity, circulates throughout the world without
state supervision. Uncontrolled movement o f information does not necessarily threaten
the territorial nature o f the state, but state action must adapt appropriately. Terrorism,
however, inserts an exception into the situation. Ease o f information transfer facilitates
all types of potential hostile attacks, but terrorists are particularly capable o f capitalizing
on the technology to pursue their ends.
Because o f the territorial nature of the state and the limits it puts on the exercise of
state power, their sovereign absolute and unlimited power stops at the border unless
offensive attack, invasion, or conquest is contemplated. All types o f technology,
especially transportation, combined with the modem nature o f territorial borders,
however, opens a particular vulnerability to threats from terrorism. It is not, specifically,
the motivations o f terrorists which has an impact on states and their sovereignty. Rather
it is the limits on the state’s freedom of action in response to terrorism that prevents
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fulfilling sovereign duties to provide security for the population.4 If the state is attacked
by a non-state terrorist organization, what are the options for response? In the case of the
September 11, 2001 attacks on New York and the Pentagon, the US responded by
attacking Afghanistan and Iraq. Subsequent terrorist attacks in Spain and the UK
provided no “convenient” target for state response, and no obvious path for states to
follow in pursuit o f the perpetrators and to reestablish security.
As with other “transsovereign” problems, terrorism exploits the open society, open
market and available technology which facilitate the legal cross-border movement of
goods, people, and especially, information.5 The telecommunications technology
underpinning the Internet combined with modem society’s reliance on computers also
provides particular vulnerability to “cyber-terrorism.” Doomsayers have long predicted
the US or another industrialized society being brought to its metaphorical knees by
computer virus, worms, or Trojan Horses. While no such catastrophe has yet reached
international proportions, numerous “lesser” attacks to computer networks have shut
down municipal communications systems and disrupted business.
A classic definition of “security” suggests that “a state (or its leaders and citizens)
believes itself secure when it fears that nothing adverse can be done to it by other states or
by other foreign non-state actors.”6 In a society dependent upon computer networks for
day to day functions, attacks on those networks surely fall into the category o f “adverse”

4David E. Long, “Countering Terrorism beyond Sovereignty,” in B eyond Sovereignty: Issues f o r a
G lobal Agenda, ed. Maryann K. Cusimano, 96-108 (Medford, MA: St. Martin’s, 2000), 96-97.
5Ibid., 97.
6Joel Krieger, ed., The Oxford Companion to Politics o f the World (N ew York: Oxford University
Press, 1993) s.v. “Security.”
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actions. Individuals with no agenda beyond catastrophic mischief have disrupted
systems. If an organized terrorist group obtains the necessary technical acumen, the
threat may become as real as a hostile, lethal attack. How does the state protect its
citizens against such a threat? Conventional sovereign statecraft provides few courses of
action. Terrorist groups are not participants in the pursuit of security, or o f peace, as
practiced by states. A focus o f sovereignty becomes development o f technology for
protection against non- state threats which might be violent or cyber-based. Terrorism
drove another change in the nature of sovereignty to emerge.
The state remains a territorial entity. Domestic sovereignty is exercised much as it
ever was but control o f information eludes even the most technologically savvy of states.
Control o f actual crossing o f borders by people or cargo can still be attempted. Every
state has procedures to control immigration, and cargo control becomes limited by sheer
volume. Smuggling to avoid both immigration restrictions and freight import duty
remain police and military actions.

Cultural Cross-Pollination
Intercultural influence has existed for as long as human society supported more than
one culture. The natural process occurred as a result o f normal interactions such as trade,
migration, and conquest. In its “state-of-nature,” intercultural influence took place as
traders visited other societies and returned with stories about how others lived. In the
case o f migration or conquest, the travelers often remained and attempted to introduce
their own ways into a distant culture. Intercultural exchange took place as a result o f
human travel at the associated speed o f human movement.
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Telecommunications technology, especially in its later, ubiquitous incarnations,
changed the speed at which the influence could take place between cultures. Cultural
influence no longer requires any international travel. Extensive availability o f direct
broadcast satellite television, wide distribution of digital video disks, Internet exchange
of information, and a synergistic union o f media accelerated evolutionary processes.
Impoverished cultures often have access to television which shows them how the rest of
the world lives (valid or otherwise). It remains to be seen how that will affect cultures of
the future, but dominant cultures — especially American in the late twentieth and early
twenty-first centuries — may subsume any number of others. Police in Beijing directing
traffic under an umbrella with McDonald’s logos, as a case in point, demonstrate the
concept. This may be a result o f aggressive marketing by McDonald’s, but
telecommunications technology provides Chinese people with their perception (again,
valid or otherwise) o f US culture, the “desirability” of “all things American,” and
provides the corporate structure with the ability to maintain its worldwide distribution of
products.
Without the underlying telecommunications technology, some o f the same influences
might exist but slower in process and lower in intensity. With the technology, the culture
which most successfully exploits the advantage will appear to dominate, and possibly
endanger others. How might it affect sovereignty? One of the three key elements o f the
sovereign state, a population identifying itself with that state, might find dissatisfaction
with their identity. They might see how other people in other societies live and function
and demand similar benefits (real or perceived). The state may wish to isolate its
populace from “undesirable” cultural influence but find itself virtually powerless to do so.
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International Finance
Telecommunications technology made “internationalization” o f the world’s finance
systems possible. Interconnection of geographically separated markets began with the
introduction of international telegraph. Later, ubiquitous communications throughout the
world permitted nearly instantaneous transfer o f currency transactions based not on any
preset value by the state, but rather, on the actual rate used by sellers and purchasers.
The sovereign state’s control over domestic monetary systems, as a result, was subjugated
to the whims o f Adam Smith’s “invisible hand” of the international market. States might
attempt to maintain a high level o f their currency exchange rate by offering a higher than
market price, but in doing so, they were participating in, rather than exerting control over,
the international trade regime. Similarly, all international trade succumbed to
instantaneous and universally available information about the cost o f goods, services,
stock shares, and any other commodity bought or sold on the open market. States had
little control over international financial transactions which might directly affect them.
When the international system o f sovereign states emerged in the seventeenth century,
mercantilism dominated approaches to finance. State programs focused on extracting the
maximum possible amount o f gold from foreign lands while exporting as little precious
metal as possible. Subsequently, the Industrial Revolution and Adam Smith’s invisible
hand of the market suggested removing any goals o f self-sufficiency and
acknowledgment o f the necessity for mutually beneficial international trade.
International transfer o f funds had been going on for centuries and provided the
emphasis for many advancements in the development o f monetary systems. While not an
unusual process, it was accomplished on an as needed basis. Feeding the voracious
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appetite for raw materials in support of the Industrial Revolution, however, required a
steady stream o f international transactions. Various industries had always required
international sources o f supply but as it approached “normal” it resulted in degrees of
interdependence.
As the need to transfer funds internationally evolved in concert with developing
interdependence, the financial community exploited the benefits o f developments in
telecommunications technology. As with other “users” o f the world’s
telecommunications infrastructure, the financial community found ways to relegate
financial data to the realm o f information in formats transferable initially by telegraph and
later by the further developments. At the end o f the final era, the international financial
system allowed for funds to be moved around the world with virtual impunity. Funds
require quantification; transactions must specify the value of the “money” involved. Any
o f the world’s viable currencies could be specified although most international
transaction take place using the US dollar, British pound sterling, EU euro, or Japanese
yen. The actual unit of currency is o f little consequence as long as all parties to the
transaction acknowledge the value.
Globalization — perhaps euphemistically described as interdependence on steroids —
became reality as mutual dependency among states grew. As discussed earlier, no state
can survive in isolation with total self-sufficiency. Import of some raw materials is
essential to industry and foreign markets are necessary for a dynamic economy. However,
MNCs existed solely to produce profit and often removed any state loyalty they may have
had in pursuit o f tax advantage and maximum return on investments.
Telecommunications allowed them to move funds from one sovereign jurisdiction to
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another to avoid the taxes on which states rely for their existence. Extraction, purchase,
and transport o f raw materials has been in progress for centuries, but sophisticated
manufacturing processes rely on timely arrival and predictable prices. International
distribution o f finished products also relies on advances in transportation which are
enhanced, carefully controlled and made more profitable by close corporate supervision.
Through telecommunications technology, that supervision often emanates from locations
with long distance separation from the actual process.
This globalized situation in which MNCs appear to thrive further removes them from
specific state identity. With corporate headquarters located in a “tax friendly” state,
production situated across the world among people with low expectation o f wages, and
distribution of final products based on convenient delivery to end users, national identity
and state loyalty do not figure prominently in profit based decision making.
Diversification o f assets brings the MNCs into play in the international system not as
sovereign elements, but entities with which sovereign states must contend.
Without the ability to move money around the world with virtual impunity, global
pursuit o f profit could not thrive as it has. MNCs with corporate budgets higher than
gross domestic products o f many sovereign states have begun to impose themselves as
players in the international system. While they do not posses true elements of
sovereignty, their financial influence can not be ignored by many states, and in fact, many
states court them obsessively to gain economic benefits o f employment and trade.

Sovereignty as a Whole
Regardless o f the presence o f influential MNCs or the “pooled sovereignty” of IGOs,
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the sovereign state remains the key player in the international system. The Realist
theoretical argument might discount the influence of other actors, but in an era of
globalism, the impact of IGOs, NGOs, and MNCs can not be ignored. The realist school
of thought has been under assault in recent times.7 Among the lines o f attack, its
detractors argue that states are not as important in world politics as realists would assume;
that they may in fact be eclipsed in influence by a variety of non-state actors placing the
future of sovereignty upon which states are built into serious question.8 The study carried
out in pursuit o f the research question shows otherwise. The sovereign state remains a
player in the international system. Virtually every state has agreed to some limits on
sovereign rights in return for the benefits of active participation in the world community.
States agree to control use of the electromagnetic spectrum radiating from within their
borders to minimize interference with other states through the ITU. Similar functional
agreements “push back” anarchy in aviation and mail regimes.
Telecommunications technology is necessary for the day to day exchange of
information required in a complex system of states to organize market functions and
ensure international cooperation. Technology, and the information reliant thereon,
particularly permits, enables, or accelerates evolution toward some sort o f “common
denominator” in currency and culture. Ever increasing use o f charge or debit cards tends
to make individual currencies irrelevant. The ability to transfer funds electronically
without ever making physical contact with money further points toward some common

7Ethan B. Kapstein, "Is Realism Dead? The Domestic Sources o f International Politics," International
Organization 49, no. 4 (1995): 752.
Jeffrey W. Legro and Andrew Moravcsik, "Is Anybody Still a Realist?" International Security 24, no.
2 (1999): 7.
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currency — e cash. American products can be found advertised and for sale in virtually
any large city in the world in local currency. The telecommunications technology that
carries the US culture may, or may not, cause it to subsume others, but its influence is
domineering. However, despite the large industrialized states’ domineering presence in
the world, the sovereignty o f other states remains.
State behavior, and therefore, many elements of sovereignty have changed over the
proceeding three and a half centuries. Trading blocks, IGO memberships, and functional
organizations, have caused the voluntary “surrender” o f some sovereign control.
Telecommunications technology may be creating an environment where a single — or a
few — currencies will quantify the world’s financial transactions. Mass media require
that states consider their actions before the fact because the world will know about them
in a virtual instant.
Yet the sovereign state remains. The basic definition o f a state specifies three
mandatory elements: a sovereign government, a population, and territory.
Telecommunications may make distance irrelevant in the transfer o f information and
permit territorial “violation” which may not be favored by the state, but the territory
remains defined by the state and acknowledged by the system o f states. Cultural
influence may expand the population’s identity from purely national (German, for
example) to regional (European, to continue with the same example), but some degree of
national identity remains. The sovereign government controlling the state may have
different parameters for its exercise o f absolute and unlimited power when compared to
eras long past, but it still has domestic responsibilities to establish and maintain
infrastructure and provide for security of its citizens, as well as participate in the
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international system. MNCs might establish security forces or build roads, schools, and
common goods when it serves their profit potential, but they can not be relied upon for
unprofitable service to the populace’s universal well being. The sovereign state will
remain until society, and the needs of society, dictate the creation o f a viable alternative
as an organizing structure.
The last time society needed a fundamental change in the organizational nature o f the
international system, feudalism gave way to sovereign states. The economy had changed
and began the evolution o f a vibrant middle class. New organizations, institutions, and
ways o f thinking developed in concert with the changes. The sovereign state won out as
the primary international organizing factor. In the twenty-first century, similar parallels
exist. The economy has gone through a metamorphosis away from a focus on “goods”
and toward information, technology and services, all o f which rely far less (if at all) on
territorial control. The means o f production, supporting capital, and labor are no longer
fixed, as they were in the past and have become quite mobile. States with governmental
systems spanning a wide variety o f philosophies — ranging from democratic republics, to
theocracies and residual authoritarian regimes — all court foreign direct investment
which is capitalistic in nature.9 The annual budgets o f many MNCs exceed the gross
domestic products o f some sovereign states. The world might seem ripe for another
cataclysmic change in the international system.
NGOs, IGO, MNCs, and perhaps some additional category o f international entity are
insinuating themselves into the international system as “players,” if not “actors” on an

9Maryann K. Cusimano, “Sovereignty’s Future: The Ship o f Theseus and Other Conclusions,” in
Beyond Sovereignty: Issues for a G lobal Agenda, ed. Maryann K. Cusimano, 311-331 (Bedford, MA: St.
Martin’s, 2000): 317.
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equal footing, with states. Transsovereign problems carry the potential to extend beyond
resolution by states. The states become mediators, facilitators, and persuaders to develop
solutions to transsovereign problems,10 but often without the means to solve them without
non-state assistance. State institutions, developed to support historically conventional
approaches to the international system, may require reorganization and modification to
accommodate new roles. However, rather than a loss, or reduction o f sovereignty, this
might be classified as an “expansion” o f sovereign duties or requirements. The state still
maintains it place as an international organizing factor. States continue to posess and the
ability to use hard and soft power. Further, no viable alternative has emerged to replace
sovereignty and its manifestation in the state. Telecommunities, trading states, or other
pseudo-state concepts may take on some elements o f sovereignty, but they lack the all
encompassing responsibilities and power of the sovereign state.

Conclusions
Sovereignty is a theoretical concept. As such, it consists o f a series o f statements, or
hypotheses which explain observed phenomena. The archetypical sovereign state, with
[telecommunications in its peculiar state-of-nature, functioned in an environment where
news o f its actions, both domestic and international, took time to reach other competitors,
friends, and enemies. As the concept o f sovereignty developed to describe observed
behavior of states, it was based on this state-of-nature.
As the distribution o f information broadened through the use o f mass media, and
transfer o f data increased due to telecommunication, states’ actions became known more

l0Ibid., 329.
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rapidly across — and even beyond — their area o f influence. Decision making had to
include the results o f rapid (and eventually immediate) news transfer. The most
parsimonious o f theories o f sovereignty have room for states altering their behavior based
on their pursuit o f courses o f action in the best interest o f the state. However, the fact that
a state must alter, adjust, or limit its actions based on external concerns indicates impact
on sovereignty. If sovereign states no longer “behave” in concert with the theory, it is not
necessarily sovereignty that is different, reduced, or eroded, it may well be that the theory
requires revision. As a social construct, sovereignty meets the needs o f society — both
domestic and international. Society has changed since 1648 and states may just as likely
have changed as well. Sovereignty may still exist but the hypotheses which help explain
state behavior may require revision to continue to be relevant.
States no longer await days, weeks, or months for news from other parts o f the
international system. In the twenty-first century, distance has little effect on the speed of
information transfer; it can travel to the farthest comers o f the world with virtual
instantaneity. Although the international system is still in anarchy, telecommunications
technology and the resultant transfer o f information provide new tools for states to use
within the anarchical system. They have positive, instantaneous control o f their
diplomats and forces under their control throughout the world.
One necessary element o f the state is its population. If the state serves the population
then the culture o f the people becomes a sovereign concern. Telecommunications
technology and information transfer act as a catalyst and accelerate the natural processes
o f social evolution. Various electronic media provide instant exposure to cultural
influence which, historically, was accomplished through trade, migration, and conquest.
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Is the sovereign state in competition with anything? Telecommunications technology
allows IGOs and MNCs to take on some sub-elements o f sovereignty; they have a
bureaucratic or organizational structure which performs many o f the functions o f a
government; they have employees with a loose identity; and some degree economic
control over finance which approaches establishing a currency. Such organizations,
however, exist to pursue the goals of their founding treaty or charter; in the case o f IGOs
and NGOs, or in pursuit of profit with MNCs. Further, they fail to meet the territorial
control element o f the state.
The US dollar, the British pound sterling, the newly emerged euro, and the Japanese
yen have all been used as a form o f international currency because their value is more
trusted than many other domestic currencies. Does this spell and end to sovereign “coins
of the realm?” If so, does it affect sovereignty?
As the international movement o f money via telecommunications becomes more
routine and “e-cash” nears reality, state currencies may decrease in importance. If an
internationally accepted form and quantification o f e-cash should gain worldwide
acceptance, state peculiar currencies may survive for domestic transactions. The
sovereign state acts in its own best interest. It does not necessarily affect sovereignty if
the state determines it to be in its own best interest that its coin o f the realm should be one
produced elsewhere.
The sovereign state, defined by territorial limits, will remain a significant player in the
international environment. While other entities such as MNCs, IGOs, NGOs, trading
blocks, or even somewhat ethereal telecommunities might begin to take on some
elements of sovereignty, there is still a place and a necessity for the state. Other
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international actors are driven by self-centered interests, primarily profit. States are
concerned with security. Will other entities establish security forces to protect all citizens
and elements o f the state, not just profit related entities? Who will build the roads to
unprofitable areas? Establish an egalitarian school system? Provide the community with
common goods?
Because o f the presence o f other actors, the state may see its application o f power
diminished, or changed, but its significance as the territorially-oriented sovereign entity
remains. Other participants in the international system such as MNCs, IGOs, and NGOs
have narrow interests which can not rival the requirements, responsibilities, and power of
the state. The theory describing the concept may well require revision, but the
international system will remain in an anarchic situation. Other actors will become more
influential as ubiquitous telecommunications technology allows virtually instantaneous
movement o f information. As globalization necessitates deeper and deeper cooperation
in pursuit o f prosperity, perhaps the anarchy will be “pushed back” a little as the “norms”
o f cooperative behavior become established and coalesce further a body o f international
law.
Although the concept o f sovereignty represents a mature element in the discipline of
International Relations, further research is indicated as technology o f all types, but
especially telecommunications, continues to evolve. As citizens’ expectation o f the
governmental element o f the state changes, the impact o f technology can not be ignored.
Sovereignty remains an organizing element but it coexists with increasing power and
significance o f MNCs, IGOs, and NGOs.
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This study points to conclusions about effects on sovereignty, but the conclusions
require differentiation between changes in sovereignty and a serious diminution of
sovereignty. Returning to the basic definition of sovereignty — the absolute and
unlimited power of the state — “reduced” or “diminished” sovereignty would be reflected
in an inability to exercise state power. In terms of hard power, diminution would reflect
the state’s inability to use military or economic assets in pursuit o f its best interest in
either domestic or international roles. This would require restraints on the ability to
accomplish state functions such as pursuit of national security, engaging in international
agreements and recognition among the community o f sovereign states, or a lack of
international recognition that it has the exclusive right to intervene coercively in activities
within its territory. While soft power accounts for a significant element o f the state’s
total national power, diminution would require some means by which a state was
prevented from using its inherent culture, values, and ideas to convince others o f the
validity o f or need for cooperation
Short o f outright conquest by another state, or perhaps in some extreme (approaching
imaginary) situation where a non-state entity, such as an MNC, might exert exceptional
control over a government, sovereignty will exist in some form until destroyed.
In comparison to diminution of sovereignty are changes in sovereignty caused by
external stimuli, in the case o f this study, of course, by information as enabled by
telecommunications technology. Here, telecommunications technology enabled the
movement o f information throughout the world at increasing speeds until distance
became an irrelevant factor. If the state participates in international trade or economic
activity, its domestic market becomes an integral part o f the single, world economy,
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linked by telecommunications with immediate, worldwide transfer o f information about
its decisions and actions. A domestic economic decision may be reflected in the world’s
market with international ramifications. Cultural influence, transferred across borders via
various electronic means, could potentially alter some elements o f a state’s soft power. A
change in or subsumation o f cultural elements would change the values on which it
attempts to exert soft influence on others in the international system.
The foregoing study has not identified evidence o f impacts on sovereignty resulting in
diminution. Rather, the effects o f information enabled by the evolutionary developments
o f telecommunications technology result in modification of sovereign states’ behavior.
They are still sovereign by classic definitions. However, as members o f the international
system of sovereign states, and more importantly, as participants in an ever-increasingly
interdependent world community, states modify their behavior to fit the needs o f modem
society. They still pursue security and self-interests but with information about all states’
actions moving throughout the world at the speed o f light, state behavior must consider,
accommodate, and where possible, exploit the information-based environment o f the
future.
Changes to sovereign state behavior do not necessarily indicate a loss o f sovereignty.
They do, however, suggest that the natural social evolutionary process has resulted in a
necessity for review o f some elements o f the theories which describe and explain state
activities. Future developments in telecommunications technology can be expected, even
relied upon. Consequently, states’ territorial borders may be expected to become
invisible and inconsequential to information transfer. It does not mean that the borders
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disappear. The sovereign state will survive well into the foreseeable and imaginable
future.
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